With European military aid to Kiev plummeting and the difficulty of compensating for the American withdrawal, the 27 EU member states, together with the UK, must try to change the situation with support for Ukraine. All this is happening under the watchful eye of Donald Trump, who is becoming increasingly insistent that Ukraine accept his "peace" plan, while Vladimir Putin rubs his hands with joy. If the Europeans do not engage more now, the price will be much higher in the event of a Russian victory.
That is the conclusion reached by the authors of a report published a few weeks ago by Corisk, a geopolitical risk assessment company, and leading Norwegian experts. According to their estimates, "Continued current support for Ukraine will gradually pave the way for a Russian victory, which will cost Europe twice as much as if we allow Ukraine to achieve military superiority and force Russia to conclude a lasting peace." Rise of populism, political polarization, budgetary pressure, influx of refugees, collapse of Ukrainian government...
In an interview with the French newspaper L'Express, Carsten Friis, co-author of the report and professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, examines the catastrophic consequences of a potential Russian victory in Ukraine, in the absence of a structured European response. Although he does not hide his pessimism - "We are at a historic turning point" - he nevertheless offers a strategic roadmap to avoid the worst-case scenario.
L'EXPRESS: Your report indicates that if Russia achieves a military victory or forces Ukraine to accept peace terms that guarantee Russia's key interests, it will cost Europe twice as much as if Ukraine were to succeed. That is, between 1.205 trillion euros and 1.633 trillion euros over a four-year period. How did you come to this conclusion?
KARSTEN FRIES: This is a "bottom-up" approach based on accurate data. This does not mean that we think things will develop exactly that way, but these projections are based on a number of assumptions. For example, a Russian victory would lead to significant military successes and the conquest of more territory, which would necessarily lead to a greater influx of refugees throughout Europe. This is where the bulk of the costs would be concentrated, with an estimated 6 to 10 million refugees.
Another hypothesis: if Russia were to succeed in occupying a large part of Ukrainian territory, this would pose an increased risk to the Baltic states due to their Soviet past and strategic vulnerability. From a military perspective, it is generally considered necessary to mobilize at least 50% of the enemy's forces to counter them, along with a sufficient supply of reserve equipment. One set of tanks or artillery pieces is not enough; there must be reserve systems to compensate for losses in the first weeks of the conflict.
This is a classic "staff" assessment based on conventional military criteria. Our analysis is therefore based on two key elements: the likely number of refugees and the urgent need to strengthen deterrence capacity in Europe.
L'EXPRESS: If Russia wins the war, "a migration wave of 6 to 11 million Ukrainian refugees is expected, which would lead to costs of between 524 billion and 952 billion euros over four years", the report says. According to you, "the economic, social and political costs of such a scenario would be enormous".
KARSTEN FRIES: Yes. The refugee issue itself already represents a heavy economic burden, regardless of political considerations, such as the fact that it could clearly fuel populism. There are currently approximately 5 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. We think that there could be up to 11 million new refugees if the conflict escalates. These are only rough estimates, but they allow us to model possible scenarios. In Europe, the estimated costs are around 25,000 euros per refugee per year. Of course, these costs decrease slightly as refugees find jobs, but not significantly, because integration into the labor market takes time. Europeans have committed to spending 3.5% of GDP on defense.
In theory, these resources are already included in national budget plans, but they will probably have to be mobilized sooner than expected. Taking in millions of new refugees will therefore be a very difficult task.
On a more political level, a victorious and strengthened Russia would pose a risk to Europe, with the potential to destabilize member states, with negative economic consequences. It would be the final nail in the coffin of liberal democracy, squeezed between the security pressure coming from the United States through its National Security Strategy and the pressure from Russia. In my opinion, this is a decisive moment for Europe. It may be a cliché, but I sincerely believe that we are at a historical turning point.
L'EXPRESS: Shouldn't the National Security Strategy presented on December 5 by the White House serve as a wake-up call for Europeans?
KARSTEN FRIES: The real scandal is that Europe is subjected to so much criticism, especially regarding freedom of speech, without saying a word about the threat that Russia poses. This is both shameful and absurd.
The report also reveals glaring empirical errors and hasty generalizations about the European situation. Many of these assessments seem strange, especially in the context of a national security strategy; this is unusual. The tone is very similar to that of J. D. Vance in Munich, with ambiguous rhetoric.
We will have to see what this means in concrete terms, since this type of document does not always translate into effective action. But it is another reason for Europe to wake up, act more unitedly and achieve concrete strategic results.
L'EXPRESS: If Russia wins in Ukraine, the report warns, it will be able to threaten Moldova, the Baltic states or the Scandinavian region. What exactly does this mean?
KARSTEN FRIES: It seems unlikely that Russia will be able to demobilize all its armed forces overnight. A certain level of military presence will have to be maintained. But if Ukraine does not become a theater of hostilities, these forces could be redeployed elsewhere.
Furthermore, Russia is not limited to a military posture: it is also developing an ideological discourse that presents Europe both as a threat and as a weak entity, an almost schizophrenic contradiction. We have seen the evolution of Russian rhetoric towards Ukrainians over time. Nothing prevents this narrative from developing to the point where it begins to claim that the Russian-speaking population of Estonia or the Baltic states is under threat.
If Russia believes that it has a clear military superiority over its neighbors, why not continue its expansionist strategy, especially in a context in which NATO appears weakened or disorganized? The role of the United States is clearly a determining factor in this assessment. And the weaker NATO is, the greater the temptation for Russia to resort to military force.
L'EXPRESS: The political consequences - a kind of domino effect - could be devastating for the current balance of power in Europe.
KARSTEN FRIES: We know that they have already interfered seriously in the elections in Moldova, so why not do it militarily, given that they already have troops in Transnistria? But it all depends on the military scenario in Ukraine. If Russia manages to take over southern Ukraine, thereby establishing a direct land corridor, then yes, obviously, that would change everything.
But I don't think that's very realistic. It's more likely that they will try to advance towards central Ukraine. So, politically Moldova is vulnerable, but from an operational-military point of view, the situation seems to me more unclear. On the other hand, the Baltic states are more vulnerable: Russian troops can be deployed there quickly via Belarus.
L'EXPRESS: Will the Russian threat remain limited to a limited number of European countries?
KARSTEN FRIES: This threat will affect Europe as a whole. We are developing an integrated economy and each European country, in its own way, faces difficulties and interdependencies. This war is of strategic importance to all and therefore it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the main countries.
However, some will feel the consequences more directly than others. For example, Poland, which has already taken in around two million refugees, is facing serious political and economic consequences. Germany is following suit, and there are political parties there ready to exploit this situation for electoral gain.
The countries closest to the conflict will obviously feel its consequences more acutely. Other countries, such as Portugal, will probably be less affected. But if the economic situation in Europe worsens, they will also suffer.
L'EXPRESS: One of the possible consequences of the war started by Russia, combined with the arrival of millions of new refugees, in your opinion, will be a political restructuring in Europe.
KARSTEN FRIES: Yes. As I said, in such a scenario, countries like Poland would undoubtedly suffer significant political consequences. In Germany there is the "Alternative for Germany" (AfD). In France, the National Union. In the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage continues to exert influence. And of course, Austria, Hungary, Serbia and other countries are already involved in this dynamic.
The political consequences - a kind of domino effect - could be devastating for the current balance in Europe. This would not necessarily mean the end of Europe, and not all the dominoes could fall, but the resulting Europe would be very different from the one we know today. Moreover, political events are closely linked to international relations.
If a Russian victory encourages a resurgence of the far right in Europe, US Vice President J.D. Vance would applaud. These movements could receive support from the United States, and traditional liberal and centrist politics in Europe would be under double pressure: domestic, with the rise of populist forces, and external, with political support from across the Atlantic. This is a plausible scenario.
L'EXPRESS: This is especially true given the obvious divisions in Europe over how to support Ukraine. The proposal for a "recovery loan" of 137 billion euros for Kiev, guaranteed by frozen Russian assets, has met with strong resistance from Belgium (Euroclear, the Belgian company that holds most of these funds).
CARSTEN FRIES: One of Belgium's concerns is the fear of future lawsuits, and that is understandable. But these frozen assets represent the only significant leverage we still have. If Europe fails on this issue, it will lose its most important strategic tool of influence.
Then we will be reduced to the role of spectators, witnesses to a form of diplomatic capitulation, in which Ukraine will effectively be handed over to Russia at the insistence of the United States. This is a harsh statement, but it is the reality. These frozen assets are the most pressing strategic issue.
A solution must be found. And I would like Norway to play an active role in this process. Frankly, it worries me that our Finance Minister Jens Stoltenberg (ed. note: former NATO Secretary General) is not more interested and proactive on this issue.
L'EXPRESS: Your report warns of the risk of the collapse of the Ukrainian state if the war continues indefinitely.
KARSTEN FRIES: Yes. If Russia continues its actions at the current pace, the Ukrainian state will not be able to survive under these conditions. When electricity and infrastructure are destroyed daily, life simply becomes impossible for the population and people are forced to leave their homes.
Under these conditions, holding elections becomes impossible, and we are already witnessing growing political tension. Imagine what Ukraine would look like in ten years: no elections, no regular democratic debate - this would inevitably lead to a form of authoritarian rule.
No democracy, especially as young as Ukraine, can survive 10-15 years without elections or a functioning democratic space. Even in the event of victory, Russia will face an extremely unstable period over the next ten years.
I would compare this prospect to the situation in Bosnia, but on a much larger scale. Bosnia remains a country paralyzed by the shadows of its past, unable to move forward. And this is true even without an active armed conflict: its GDP remains lower than before the war, young people are leaving the country en masse, and the political system is fragmented.
Ukraine could experience a similar but worse evolution. A weakened, unstable country where Russia would continue to exert a destabilizing influence through campaigns of interference, intelligence operations, and corruption. In short, a mafia state under Russian influence. This is a completely realistic scenario if the war drags on indefinitely without a clear strategic solution.
L'EXPRESS: Which of the two proposed scenarios - a Ukrainian victory or a Russian success - seems more likely to you today?
KARSTEN FRIES: In the absence of real European leadership and the mobilization of financial resources commensurate with the challenges, I am quite pessimistic. I observe a certain fatigue. I sincerely hope I am wrong, because the consequences of a European failure, in my opinion, would be enormous. And I do not get the impression that our leaders are fully aware of this.
L'EXPRESS: How do you explain this inaction?
KARSTEN FRIES: This lack of action is directly linked to the fact that we do not have a coherent framework for security in Europe. That is the main problem: the lack of strategic leadership. Every important decision requires consensus, which makes action slow, difficult and sometimes paralyzed.
This leads to the spontaneous creation of "coalitions of the willing", which countries like Norway can join. But these coalitions lack stability; they change according to the circumstances and interests of each country. And in this context, our research clearly shows the dramatic consequences that a Russian victory would have in the absence of a structured and coordinated European response.
But on the other hand, there are also positive aspects. The European Union manages to maintain and expand sanctions against Russia, despite Viktor Orbán's hostility. So, it is not impossible. It is difficult, but I continue to hope that there will be a shift in awareness, that people will understand the crucial importance of the moment in which we are living. In a way, I hope that the National Security Strategy and other recent developments will encourage policymakers to take more action.
In our report, we compared the support needed for Ukraine to the efforts made to help Greece during the financial crisis or to deal with the Covid pandemic. In reality, the amounts needed are smaller. This clearly shows that Europe has the resources to act.
And if it commits to it, it could even turn this mobilization into a real political and historical success. So, it is neither impossible nor unattainable. We have done it before. It just requires a little political will, courage and strategic competence.
L'EXPRESS: In the "New York Times", former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba calls on Europe to "stop treating arms production as an administrative procedure and start treating it as a continental emergency". Do you agree?
KARSTEN FRIES: I find this entirely plausible. Again, it is not just a matter of commercial logic, but also of urgency. This situation should not be treated as a purely economic issue. The defense industry is quite unique in its nature.
It functions both as a commercial enterprise and is closely linked to the state, even semi-nationalized in some cases. It certainly operates on the market, but it must also respond to the strategic needs of states. Therefore, a constant balance must be maintained, but it is entirely possible to prioritize according to national needs, especially in times of crisis.
L'EXPRESS: The report argues that the European defense industry should be incentivized to produce goods that meet Ukraine's needs, replacing its annual exports to the Middle East of 15 billion euros. But wouldn’t that also mean giving up huge revenue streams?
KARSTEN FRIES: First, it’s important to remember that the figures in question come from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), a leading Swedish organization. The ten largest European defense companies account for approximately 30% of global arms exports.
However, less than 10% of these exports currently go to Ukraine. Therefore, when it is claimed that Europe does not have the industrial capacity to provide military support to Ukraine, an important distinction must be made: this capacity does exist, but it is being used to serve other priorities.
The efforts of the European defense industry are currently focused on international markets, especially those in the Middle East. If European leaders claim that Ukraine is an urgent strategic priority, these declarations must be accompanied by concrete actions.
For example, they could tell certain partners, such as the United Arab Emirates: "You will have to wait two years for the delivery of your tanks, as our current priority is to support Ukraine." This will, of course, entail financial costs: short-term loss of revenue, contractual penalties in the event of postponement or cancellation, and the impact on commercial competitiveness.
But if we believe that the war in Ukraine poses the most serious threat to Europe's security and determines its future, then we must accept its consequences. It is a question of ensuring coherence between political rhetoric and concrete decisions. In other words, it is not enough to declare principles or send a strong message; action is also needed.
It is entirely possible that some of the equipment exported from Europe is not relevant to the Ukrainian context. This requires careful study. But if less than 10% of European arms exports go to Ukraine, this shows that the industrial capacity is indeed there and that it could theoretically be redirected.
This could involve either directly supplying specific equipment to Ukraine or adapting production lines to supply the equipment that is truly needed.
L'EXPRESS: In your second scenario, Ukraine manages to stop the Russian offensive and strengthen its air defenses. Its military successes are making Russia consider ending hostilities. But after nearly four years of war, are we still underestimating the resilience of the Russians and their president?
KARSTEN FRIES: I don't think so. Putin has significantly weakened Russia. Strategically, Russia is losing this war, even without taking into account the isolated military successes. The very fact that Sweden and Finland have joined NATO already constitutes a major strategic defeat.
Furthermore, the country is practically bankrupt. Although there is no complete collapse, the Russian economy is deeply weakened. The country is completely militarized and the very goal of the state seems to be to continue this war. There is no longer any autonomous political or civic space: all resources, the entire state apparatus, are mobilized to sustain the military effort and to ensure a semblance of social cohesion during this conflict.
According to some indicators presented in our report, compiled by our economic experts, Russia is in dire straits. It is drawing on its last reserves. If, for example, its oil revenues decline further, the economic consequences will be very severe. This does not necessarily mean that there will be an immediate revolution or mass mobilization in the streets.
But one thing is certain: Russia is weaker than it has been in decades. Even in the event of a military victory, it will be extremely difficult to remobilize society and return to some semblance of normality.
Finally, it should be remembered that Putin is 73 years old and his death is inevitable within a decade. The Russian political system is completely dependent on him, lacking a structured party or any real institutions to support it. Therefore, it is certain that after his death a fierce power struggle will break out between the different factions of the regime.
In short, regardless of the military scenario, Russia will go through an extremely unstable period for the next ten years. Even if Russia wins, it will be impossible for it to take advantage of this and become a prosperous country. Of course, one can envisage a scenario in which Donald Trump lifts sanctions and seeks to encourage investment. But I highly doubt that the Western private sector is willing to take such a risk.
It is unlikely that we will see the return of companies like McDonald's or other large multinational corporations to Russia in the short term. The country remains an extremely unstable and risky society, where legal and political instability discourages investors.