Relations with Turkey are of key importance for placing Bulgaria on the geopolitical map of the Balkans - and in the broader context of Eastern Europe. The contract with Botas, imposed in a way unknown to us on a caretaker government, created a huge advantage for Ankara to launch and achieve its goals in the partnership with Bulgaria. During Radev's meeting with Erdogan, Botas was "frozen" for 15 months. We do not know what exactly this means, but what is more worrying is that we do not know in return for what - in return for what concessions from the Bulgarian side the Turkish president's consent to this "freeze" was obtained. What are the interests of Turkey and Bulgaria in the necessary process of expanding bilateral cooperation?
Turkey has become a crossroads - "hub" of energy flows, utilizing both the inevitable transit of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons towards Europe from a geographically central point, and the flows of natural gas from Russia, which is under sanctions and needs to "disguise" the raw material as someone else's property. Expanding flows of oil and gas from the Middle East in a western direction pass through Turkey and will continue to pass. Therefore, Ankara needs long-term agreements with Bulgaria to increase the flows of hydrocarbons through Bulgarian territory to Europe, which - preferably - are related to the acquisition of Bulgarian transit infrastructure. We are again facing a case that we had to deal with during the pressure from Gazprom in the 1990s, aimed at acquiring our gas infrastructure through "Topenergji". This time - with "strong arguments" from Ankara, which has with the contract with Botas as a means of pressure.
So far, we have no reliable public information about the updated Turkish interests in bilateral relations, but as far as non-public sources can be trusted - Ankara is interested in acquiring (in some form) Neftochim, wants the concession of the Black Sea highway, which is part of a key infrastructure corridor of high defense and geostrategic importance through the Balkans, Turkey wants to take on the role of exclusive supplier of Bulgaria with energy resources in a wide range - including aviation gasoline to service NATO combat and logistics aviation on Bulgarian territory and in the Balkans. We will be able to understand how relevant these claims are when Ankara and Sofia provide some public information on the matter.
In the long-term interests of Sofia and Ankara, there are both areas in which bilateral cooperation brings significant benefits to both countries, and areas in which Sofia must very carefully assess the specifics of its long-term strategic interest. Turkey wants to be an empowered "hub" - a crossroads of maximally concentrated energy and strategic corridors. Bulgaria wants to take advantage of its central geographical location in the Balkans to also be a "hub" both in the energy sphere and in the logistics of transport, NATO defense and strategic balances both between the countries in the region and between the major players that are fighting for influence and control over it - including Turkey. Therefore, Ankara's goal is to maximally "suck" the Bulgarian geographical and strategic resource into the sphere of influence and control of Turkey - i.e., to turn Bulgaria into a transit, but voiceless territory under the control of the Turkish strategic interest, competing with other strategic interests in the region and in its broader context.
It is worrying to what extent the current Bulgarian government headed by Rumen Radev has the capacity - political, intellectual and willpower - to protect the long-term Bulgarian national interest in the necessary expansion of bilateral cooperation with Turkey. What makes us doubt the existence of such capacity of Dondukov? First of all, the fact that we have known Radev for 10 years, we know his views, the degree of competence he has, as well as the degree of dependence - personal political dependence on factors that have semi-publicly played the role of his mentors in favor of non-Bulgarian (to put it mildly) interests... The most serious argument for our doubts on the issue of whether Radev can defend and promote the Bulgarian interest in the talks with Ankara is called the "Botas agreement". "Frozen" or not, this agreement shows us the astonishing willingness of Radev and the group around him to easily - irresponsibly sign documents of dramatically important and long-term importance for our country.
In this sense, it is worryingly important to understand to what extent the "freezing" of Botas is good news, or is it an indicator of growing Turkish pressure on the Bulgarian state to make concessions with its strategic interest in favor of Ankara's strategic goals and in the direction of turning the Bulgarian national resource into an inert possession of the regional great power in the Balkans?