In recent days, the Russian leadership has increasingly stated its readiness to accelerate the occupation of Ukraine and the availability of sufficient resources for this, as well as the lack of need to conduct another stage of mobilization in the country. Such statements still sound unconvincing and cause skeptical assessments from international experts, as they contradict the real steps taken to prepare for a new wave of mobilization in Russia, and the real state of the line of contact shows the impossibility of the Russian army achieving even minimal successes without attracting large-scale personnel reinforcements. The concealment of this fact by the Russian authorities and the wait-and-see tactics regarding the announcement of mobilization are explained by the desire to minimize domestic political risks before the vote in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Mobilization carries a risk of public discontent and protests for the Russian leadership. The Kremlin is also trying to avoid directly acknowledging the shortage of contract soldiers, so as not to undermine its own rhetoric about a “controlled situation“ and “no need for mobilization“.
Despite official statements by Kremlin representatives about the lack of need for mobilization, against the backdrop of a decrease in the recruitment of contract soldiers and personnel problems in the army, the Russian authorities are increasingly actively discussing the possibility of a new wave of mobilization after the State Duma elections on September 21, 2026.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, referring to Putin's logic, noted that “the Russian president is preparing a new wave of mobilization, during which he seeks to attract about 500 thousand people. The announcement of mobilization could take place within a few weeks. The Kremlin's main goal is not only to strengthen the troops in the war against Ukraine, but also to intimidate the European member states of NATO with the risk of escalating the conflict. At the same time, Russians should not wait for an official decree on mobilization, because Putin will deceive his people. “ “The mass mobilization of Russians will take place without its announcement. Men will be lured into the war with dubious contracts, promises of secure positions in the rear. However, after that they will immediately be sent on “local assaults“. In order to avoid a mass flight from the country of potential conscripts, the Russian Federation plans to completely block the departure abroad of Russians of draft age. “
Public statements by representatives of the Russian leadership about the lack of need for mobilization are deliberate disinformation of Russian society, designed to hide the real scale of losses and calm its own population. In particular, the statement of the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev about the lack of mobilization plans and the allegedly high rate of recruitment of contract soldiers (according to him, about 200 thousand people signed contracts in the first 6 months of 2026) does not correspond to reality and contradicts logic and is aimed at creating the illusion of control by the Russian authorities over the situation. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russian troops lost 42,860 people killed and wounded in July 2026. This is the highest monthly figure for the entire war, which indicates a steady increase in Russian losses since February 2026, when they were estimated at 26,090 people. As a result, the needs of the Russian army to at least maintain the number of servicemen participating in the aggression against Ukraine at the current level are from 300 to 500 thousand.
In this context, by the middle of this year, the Russian leadership's ability to restore the combat capability of its military units was significantly limited: financial incentives for potential recruits had finally run out, which showed the limits of the economic attractiveness of war for the civilian population. In the spring of 2026, the flow of those wishing to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense decreased by about a third compared to the same period in 2025. Even in Moscow, where payments for signing a contract reached record amounts, the indicators of attracting volunteers in the spring of 2026 dropped significantly. In particular, if in April 1,708 people signed a contract, then in May - 1,378, which is almost a thousand people less than in 2025, in June the downward trend continued. According to estimates by German researcher Janis Kluge, in the first quarter of 2026, the average daily recruitment of contract soldiers in Russia was about 800 people, which is 20% lower than last year's data and is the worst result in the last three years. In total, 71,216 new contracts were registered, which confirms the decline compared to previous periods. According to the researcher, the Kremlin's problems with the recruitment of contract soldiers are evidenced by the increase in the average regional bonus for signing a contract and the “huge pressure on recruitment in some regions“.
Social networks have seen numerous examples of violent actions and extrajudicial detentions of Russian citizens in the regions with the aim of forcibly sending them to the front. In particular, such cases have been registered in the Penza, Amur, Ulyanovsk, Yaroslavl regions, Tatarstan and Udmurtia, as well as in Rostov-on-Don, Kaluga, Voronezh, Arkhangelsk. Law enforcement raids on public places and in transport in various parts of the country have become systematic, demonstrating a deep gap between the claims of “lack of mobilization“ and the real actions of the Russian authorities. The growing wave of spot actions and violent detentions of potential recruits reveals the inability of Russian generals to compensate for losses at the front exclusively at the expense of volunteers.
It should be noted that the new mobilization in the Russian Federation will create a large but extremely passive mass of people who will not be able to wage a modern high-tech war. Attempts to fill the gaps in manpower with people without proper motivation only reduce the quality of the troops, which on the battlefield leads to an increase in the number of cases of surrender, desertion and sabotage of orders. According to internal Russian military statistics, the desertion rate among servicemen from the North Caucasus regions has exceeded 70%. It is recorded that the remaining personnel of this number often resort to deliberate self-inflicted bodily harm (self-inflicted gunshot wounds and mutilations) to avoid participation in combat operations, which creates an acute local shortage of manpower in the Russian army.
Currently, covert preparations for mobilization are underway, which are accompanied, in particular, by the closure of checkpoints on the border with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. In many regions of Russia, men are already being massively sent electronic notifications to "clarify their data", after which their right to leave the country is automatically blocked and their basic civil rights, such as selling property or driving a car, are restricted. At the same time, the Russian authorities are taking measures to prepare the mobilization infrastructure, check the readiness of military commissariats, improve the military accounting system, and expand the preparation of the mobilization reserve.
In these circumstances, in addition to mobilizing its own citizens, Moscow is involving up to 50,000 North Korean servicemen in the war in Ukraine. Putin needs all this to demonstrate at least some "victory" on the front, as well as psychological pressure on the West to reduce military support for Kiev due to fears of World War III.
It should be expected that a new wave of mobilization in Russia will expand the spectrum of hybrid threats on the EU borders. Trying to avoid being sent to the front, hundreds of thousands of Russians, following the example of 2022, will look for ways to escape to Europe through third countries, which will create an additional burden on the migration systems of European countries. Such mobilization will increase the burden not only on the EU border services, but also on the security services, since together with the flow of refugees, Russian special services will have a convenient opportunity to introduce agents of influence, saboteurs and provocateurs into European society in order to destabilize the internal situation, which will require coordination between the intelligence services of the EU member states.