Putin's huge electoral success does not show the truth about Russian society. Officially, everything is fine: the army is being replenished, advertisements promise men both money and respect. But the casualties are growing, and the need for people is not decreasing.
The results of these elections in Russia were predictable. This is probably the only thing that can be said about them without further ado. “United Russia“ again received what, in fact, the entire Russian electoral system of recent years has existed for: the ability to control and a majority that can unhinderedly push through the State Duma any decisions that the Kremlin needs. In this sense, there were no surprises.
After the vote, the questions did not decrease, but increased.
It is obvious that the elections were held in a Russia in which it was impossible to talk about party programs, the alternation of power and political representation. They were held during a war that became not just the main event in the life of the country, but also the way of life of the state. War changes the budget, the labor market, schools, television, conversations in families, the list of forbidden words and, of course, the work of parliament.
The previous State Duma had already managed to completely restructure itself in accordance with this war reality. The deputies learned to instantly adopt laws that serve the war and turn even the slightest shadow of dissent into a crime. The Russian parliament has become a machine for serving the military and repressive demands of the presidential administration.
But now this machine will operate in conditions where the usual prohibitive measures may prove insufficient. In 2026, war requires not only the right words and patriotic messages. It requires money, people, as well as constant mobilization of society - in the direct and figurative sense. Mobilization is the main issue now. In Russia, they continue to pretend that this problem does not exist. Officially, everything has long been settled: the army is replenished with contract workers, regions compete in the size of salaries, advertisements promise men both money and respect, and a new life. But the war does not end, losses are growing, and the state's need for people does not decrease.
Will there be a new wave of mobilization? Will it be called mobilization? Will it be directed at the regions, will it be a covert or forced campaign with pressure on conscripts, criminal cases and economic impasse? The current elections do not provide any answers to these questions.
"United Russia" and "heroes of the SVO"
The way in which the authorities have treated their own rhetoric about "heroes of the special military operation (SVO)" deserves special attention. In recent years, Russians have been consistently told that the war veterans will become the new Russian elite, that they will govern the regions, hold positions, pass laws, educate the youth, and generally replace the technocrats and bureaucrats who, as it turned out, do not understand the new era well enough.
The idea is completely understandable: the war was supposed to not only destroy and cripple, but also create a new ruling class - loyal, tested, ready to be the face of the regime. But when it came to the specifics, things went wrong. “United Russia“ announced that 86 war veterans would receive seats in the State Duma. Then the announcement was removed at the request of the party itself, and in the new version the number of “heroic“ deputies was halved. I don't even want to guess what exactly irritated the party leadership: the quantity, the wording, the premature publication, or the very fact that a promise of a "new elite" suddenly had to be presented in the form of an official statement.
In my opinion, this story clearly illustrates the contrast between the image of a "veteran of a special military operation" - useful for propaganda - and a real person who needs to be integrated into the power structure. The image is convenient: you can put him on a poster, invite the person to school, seat him in a place of honor, give him the floor at a forum, or shoot a video with him about patriotic education. But the real political subject - a person with personal experience of violence, his own network of contacts, a sense of entitlement to a certain status, and perhaps even with questions for officials - is something much more complex. As the experience with Yevgeny Prigozhin shows, the Russian system generally does not like people who think they are entitled to something more than what is standardly due to them. Even if these people fought for the system. Especially if they fought for it.
Space percentages in elections in Russia
It is also indicative what results are reported in elections in regions where the question of the real expression of will has long been a non-issue. Ramzan Kadyrov, for example, collected 99.85% of the votes for the head of Chechnya, according to election data. But let's be honest - 99.85% is not a result that speaks of trust. This is a result that speaks of the impossibility of measuring trust. It says nothing about what people think, whether they are afraid, whether they support the government, whether they hate it, whether they are ready to tolerate it any longer or simply try to survive another day. These figures are not for citizens, but for reporting to superiors: everything is under control, everyone is loyal, there are no problems.
But, of course, there are problems. One of the main ones is that the authorities themselves are finding it increasingly difficult to understand what is happening in the country they have learned to control for so long. Perhaps during the campaign the Kremlin was really trying to assess something - not the election results, of course, because those were predetermined. It is possible that they were assessing the public's readiness to tolerate war, the degree of fear of mobilization, or the reaction to the fuel crisis and regular attacks by Ukrainian drones. It can be assumed that this was precisely the purpose of the three-day vote.
The most important question
I suspect that we will never know exactly what data they collected - let alone how it will be interpreted. In Russian politics, the opportunity to see the true state of the country through official procedures has long since disappeared: elections do not reveal public sentiment, parliament does not represent the public interest, television does not cover real debates, and the judiciary has long ceased to be independent or fair.
Perhaps in a few months a “source close to the presidential administration“ will tell a foreign journalist that the Kremlin was concerned about certain indicators – for example, that support for the war turned out to be not so solid or that mobilization was causing panic. Or it will not. In that case, we will once again see results of 99.85%, laws passed in silence, and rare mentions of “heroes of the special military operation” in the State Duma, while we continue to search for the answer to the most important question: what exactly does the Putin regime consider a victory?
This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the State News Agency as a whole.