DV: At the end of the campaign, it is good to explain why the presidential institution is important.
Hristo Panchugov: The presidential institution is important from the point of view of the possibility of someone accepting legitimacy on behalf of everyone in Bulgarian political life. Unfortunately, Bulgarian society organizes itself around its support for different political formations, without recognizing a common interest. In few situations in Bulgarian history has this been possible. For example, President Petar Stoyanov united a significant part of Bulgarian society towards a significant political change, and he expressed this consensus for a long time.
In this particular situation, the presidential institution is essential from the point of view of the concentration of power. For the first time in the new democratic history of Bulgaria, we have an absolutely indisputable majority, which is not held by some coalition, but by a political formation that has a lead against the background of an absolutely disintegrating opposition that cannot find unity on any topic.
The debate on the presidential institution, in my opinion, should have been conducted around whether it is necessary for the president to be a corrective to this absolute majority. And to present an alternative point of view on how the public debate and at the same time the political agenda in the country should be carried out. This should have been the focus of the main candidates, including Ms. Yotova. In my opinion, she should have positioned herself against the possibility of being a corrective even to this formation that supported her. Unfortunately, this was not the focus of the campaign.
What did this campaign look like from your perspective?
The focus of the campaign was determined by the clash between the different political formations regarding the history of one or the other candidate, as well as in some specific scandals, such as the one with the pardon and with Petrokhan.
A big story about the development of our political system, about how Bulgaria stands in this complex foreign policy context, about the challenges related to our economic development, unfortunately, never happened. Besides the stakes of whether the presidential institution could be a corrective and controlling factor in relation to the absolute majority, the other big battle was for the public narrative.
On the one hand, we have an obvious creeping restoration of the communist regime in Bulgaria, of the practices associated with that regime, of the relations with the Russian Federation, of a rethinking of Bulgaria's geopolitical place and from the point of view of the values to which we belong, and on the other hand, unfortunately, there is a much more silent presence. That is, there is no adequate narrative about how the democratic space is being reclaimed.
It is possible, of course, that this situation around the drones and the threat to the security of Bulgarian territorial waters will somehow influence the campaign.
According to the polls, Andrey Gyurov is the main opponent of Iliana Yotova. However, what do you think was missing from his campaign?
From the very beginning, I think that the candidate's profile was deeply flawed. He made an attempt to distance himself from the political formations that promoted him, but in practice, as an acting prime minister, he permanently attached himself to them. Secondly, his political career was built on fighting a large group of voters whose votes were naturally against Iliana Yotova. I am talking specifically about GERB voters. When your political career is based on erasing the consequences of GERB's rule and expecting that their voters will voluntarily come to you as a presidential candidate, it seems quite optimistic.
One of the mistakes is the absence of Andrey Gyurov from almost every serious public debate during the six months in which he hesitated whether to run for president or not: neither on the budget issue, nor on drones and Bulgaria's withdrawal from the "Coalition of the Willing" and the NATO initiative to protect Bulgarian airspace from drones, nor for the president's statements to the UN. The belated campaign in this sense put him at a disadvantage.
What I really miss is the anger. I am personally infuriated by the inadequacy with which this administration is responding to a real threat to Bulgarian national security. And it shows. Gyurov doesn't show it. He has no passion. He is clearly in a rather unequal battle, and that requires passion. What we are getting is a little Instagram, I'm afraid.
In your opinion, will Bulgaria's foreign policy and the principled alliances in which it participates, or the topics on the domestic agenda, carry more weight in deciding who the next president will be?
What Rumen Radev calls foreign policy is actually domestic - political messages that aim to mobilize his voters. They do not lead to any changes that would realize foreign policy goals. In this sense, I think that foreign policy in itself does not actually carry the potential to reverse the way of voting. What will matter in the end is the threat to the country's security. But I fear that the greater driving force will be domestic politics. Specifically, whose voters hate whom more.
In fact, the big question that remains unanswered is whether GERB voters will see a big enough threat in the face of Iliyana Yotova to reverse their way of life to support Andrey Gyurov, or on the contrary - will they see an opportunity to take revenge on him by voting for someone else. This is the big question of this campaign.
Will GERB voters decide the outcome of the elections?
Probably in the runoff, yes, but certainly not in the first round. Borisov himself does not demonstrate self-confidence. If this were true, we would see a GERB candidate. At this point, there is more confusion among GERB voters. One that struggles between two tendencies: do we hate everything that "those" did to us and thereby brought "Progressive Bulgaria" to power, or whether the values and what they stood for are more important and would swallow everything in the name of the opportunity to stop "Progressive Bulgaria".
What were Iliana Yotova's mistakes in this campaign?
The first was the attempt to play with patriotic things. Of course, they were not played out significantly by the opposition. But one was its statement that it would not send its son to the front in Ukraine. Making such a statement from the perspective of the presidential institution, and not just as an aunt talking on Facebook, should have institutional consequences.
The second was the play with the Cyrillic alphabet, which irritates another group of Bulgarian voters, especially the one who knows Bulgarian history and is clear that the Cyrillic alphabet should actually be protected from the Russian Federation's attempts to appropriate it.
And besides, of course, her statements regarding foreign policy, her hesitation when she had to comment on the issue of drones, the lack of a firmer tone towards the Russian ambassador, all this unsettles the periphery of "Progressive Bulgaria", which does not vote for this type of behavior.
What would be the biggest problem if all power were concentrated in the hands of "Progressive Bulgaria"? Can Yotova emancipate herself from "Progressive Bulgaria" if she is elected president?
I don't think she has the desire to do so. She can imitate belonging to European values, but she cannot stand up for them and defend them when necessary. This is more than obvious after several terms in the presidency and within the framework of this campaign.
There are two truly big threats. The first is the mediocrity that settles at all levels of government, mainly in the Foreign Ministry. Almost every initiative of this government crashes in the lack of specifics regarding the way in which this initiative is implemented, and in the ability to clothe it in some institutionality. And the second real threat is the ongoing restoration of the communist regime.
Hristo Panchugov is a political scientist and lecturer in political science at the New Bulgarian University.
Author: Mihail Ivanov