Since the 1960s, Soviet, and later Russian ideologists, have been developing a theory combining traditionalism with technological modernization in order to promote the construction of a Stalinist-type authoritarian state. Their influence stems not only from the spread of their ideas, but also from their ability to organize themselves in networks and take advantage of ideological pluralism that remains under the strict control of the authorities.
In her book Russian Hawks: Ideologists in the Service of Empire - from 1960 to Today, published on September 17 by Presses Universitaires de France, Juliette Faure, professor of political science at the Free University of Brussels, traces the genealogy of this movement and shows how, after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its imperialist, anti-Western and conservative themes once again take center stage. The French publication The Conversation has published excerpts from the book, with some abridgements.
The Origins of Modernizing Conservatism
Rather than relying on the classic division between the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, I have sought to highlight the historical continuity spanning the period from the 1960s to the present. During this period, Russian "hawks" developed and disseminated a new ideological language - "modernizing conservatism", which combines religious traditionalism with technological modernization in the service of an authoritarian, imperialist state.
Analysis of the Soviet roots of this discourse reveals its purpose: to oppose Western theories of modernization, according to which post-industrial development would lead to the convergence of societies and the adoption of liberal institutions. In contrast, "hawks" argue that the Soviet Union - and subsequently Russia - should follow its own path of modernization, combining technological progress with values presented as uniquely Russian.
Modernizing conservatism seems more like a collective language capable of uniting groups and generations linked by their rejection of rapprochement with the West and by their common stance in political competition than a fully coherent doctrine. Towards the end of the USSR, this language became a defining identity for the first generation of "hawks" - a group that included intellectuals nostalgic for the tsarist empire and representatives of the Soviet political and military elite hostile to reforms.
Despite their social and ideological diversity, these participants shared a common experience in mobilizing against liberal reformers - be it by publishing manifestos, forming electoral coalitions, or participating in the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. Their political failure did not lead to the disappearance of the group; modernizing conservatism continued to shape their collective identity throughout the post-Soviet transition. In the early 2000s, a second generation of "hawks" emerged - the "young conservatives". They revived criticism of the idea of rapprochement with the West, rejecting both Western hegemony over the international order and Russia's integration into the world economy.
And in this case, the group maintained its cohesion despite internal ideological diversity - ranging from Orthodox imperialism to secular ethno-nationalism. It was built both on the basis of shared ideas and on the collective desire to displace liberal groups from the media space and from the sphere in which expert opinions on state policy are formed. With training in the field of social sciences and active activity as authors in online media, they established themselves as public intellectuals and systematized the legacy of their predecessors in a structured ideology that they called "dynamic conservatism". The creation of the "Election Club" in 2012 united these two generations. Thus, the club transformed a relatively loose community of intellectuals into an institutionalized ideological network that advocated the restoration of Russia as a great imperial power through cultural, political, and military confrontation with the West.
Ideological Pluralism Under State Control
Despite the prohibition on imposing an official state ideology enshrined in the 1993 Constitution, the Russian regime began - as early as the mid-1990s - to gradually restore forms of state support for the creation of ideology, reminiscent of certain Soviet practices. However, it did not restore a centralized ideological apparatus comparable to that of the Communist Party. Instead, it preferred relationships based on mutual benefit with clubs, foundations, think tanks and other ideological entrepreneurs operating on the periphery of state and party institutions.
State support for ideological production is not aimed at imposing a single doctrine, but rather at organizing a certain degree of pluralism under authoritarian control. While a stable core of meaning has gradually formed around topics such as state power, sovereignty and the multipolar nature of the international order, other ideological elements remain volatile. This "managed ideological pluralism" relies on the selective promotion of some networks and the marginalization of others. By regulating these groups’ access to public resources, institutions, and media visibility, the authorities maintain a sufficiently diverse palette of ideological orientations to justify policies that can sometimes contradict each other. This configuration allows for the coexistence of liberal-leaning economic policies—such as those that led to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2012—with a foreign policy that is increasingly critical of international liberal norms.
Instead of assessing the extent to which a regime adheres to an ideology viewed as an abstract doctrine or a static set of beliefs, this approach proposes to analyze how the authorities organize and regulate the sphere of ideological production in which multiple actors operate. Within this sphere, I outline two key dimensions through which ideology shapes the political course of the Russian state.
The first dimension is structural. Ideology serves as a common language through which elite groups recognize each other, coordinate their actions, and construct their political identities. It does not simply define preferences, but helps to structure divisions, organize coalitions, and delineate boundaries between groups seeking to influence decision-makers. The "hawks" operate actively in this space of political competition. I have shown that they follow a strategy inspired by Gramsci's ideas: instead of relying on direct action through party structures, they strive to achieve cultural hegemony in the public sphere in order to indirectly influence the decisions of ruling elites.
The creation of the Izborski Club in 2012 marks the culmination of this evolution. By uniting two generations of "hawks", the club consolidated an infrastructure capable of mobilizing intellectual, organizational, and financial resources to compete with liberal networks in the field of public policy expertise. The club's growing visibility, legitimacy, and institutional recognition demonstrate that changes in the ideological landscape stem not only from the spread of new ideas, but also from the organizational activity through which certain groups manage to permanently change the power dynamics that structure the political environment in which state decisions are made.
The second dimension of the political influence of ideology is instrumental. Ruling elites select "ideological entrepreneurs", support their activities, and adopt some of their ideas in order to legitimize their choices in domestic and foreign policy. The way the regime manages ideological pluralism - sometimes intensifying polarization, sometimes mitigating it - reflects the evolution of its political course, which varies between cautious openness to cooperation with the West and taking a confrontational stance.
The rise of the "hawks" is therefore not only the result of their own mobilization strategies. It also depends on how the authorities rethink their ideological alliances in response to crises that question the legitimacy and authority of the regime or its perception of the international environment.
The general trend observed since the mid-1990s has been towards a gradual rapprochement between the "hawks" and the ruling elites. Their ideology has become a key resource from which the regime draws arguments to justify its political decisions. However, this dynamic is not linear. State support for the "hawks" networks has gone through periods of ups and downs, and has weakened significantly in the years before the invasion of Ukraine. During my last stay in Moscow, which ended in December 2019, the leaders of the "Election Club" unanimously spoke of their isolation and exclusion from key decision-making circles. This feeling is confirmed by the repeated refusals of the presidential administration - starting in 2016 - to grant the funding requested by the club. Therefore, on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, there was no reason to consider their rise irreversible.
The invasion of Ukraine - the culmination of the rise of the "hawks"
Vladimir Putin's decision of February 24, 2022, to launch an aggressive war against Ukraine marked an important turning point. The abandonment of the negotiation strategy centered on the Minsk agreements in favor of the open use of force reactivated the ideological ideas that the Izborsk Club had been defending for years. This change was not so much a result of the club's growing influence as a reflection of the new configuration in the relations between the authorities and the "ideological entrepreneurs", in which imperial, anti-Western, and conservative ideas took a dominant position.
However, this development did not lead to the restoration of a fully centralized and unified ideological apparatus. The regime continues to rely on partnerships with ideological entrepreneurs operating outside state institutions, thus maintaining competition between the different entities responsible for the formation and dissemination of legitimate narratives.
Finally, despite the growing authoritarian tendencies and the restrictions imposed by the war, the polarization in the intellectual space has not disappeared. It has transformed into a clash between ideological networks supporting the war and communities of intellectual émigrés who continue to critically analyze the ideological foundations of the regime from abroad.
These findings require a rethinking of Russia’s place in the international system. Rather than being a monolithic entity with fixed preferences, the Russian state seems to be shaped by diverse and changing ideological attitudes; their influence varies depending on internal elite realignments and changes in the international environment.
The analysis of competition between networks of actors reveals that the course of the state depends to a greater extent on a set of circumstances than it seems at first glance, as specific concepts of power, security or national identity can gain ground, recede or be revived depending on the prevailing political balance of power.
Source: news.bg