When we talk about the reasons for Russia’s war against Ukraine, the issue of Europe’s security architecture has always been a priority for the Kremlin. Until now, Europeans, as well as the United States, rejected this and focused primarily on achieving a ceasefire. Now, however, it appears that thinking is changing in Washington, says Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin in an interview with German public broadcaster ARD.
"When Trump talks about a "big and beautiful deal" covering the whole of Europe, this sounds threatening to Europeans. Putin and Trump could sit down at the negotiating table and, in something like a new Yalta, reorganise European security, i.e. agree on new spheres of influence. This is precisely what many Europeans fear," the expert points out.
Why is the United States accepting Russia’s demand?
According to her, Trump urgently needs some kind of success that he can sell to his voters – especially after the midterm elections, he sees such an opportunity precisely in the field of foreign policy. "I think this is yet another attempt to demonstrate foreign-policy success, to show activity and to divert attention from the fact that Trump has just been severely punished on the domestic political stage," says Puglierin.
Russia’s problem with the current European security order is not a new one. As early as 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, Putin showed that under his leadership Russia no longer felt bound by the rules that, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, it had negotiated together with the Europeans and Americans in various formats, she goes on to say in the interview with ARD. "Today, Russia behaves as if all these principles had been adopted without taking it into account, as if its weakness had been exploited," says the representative of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
"Rewriting the end of the Cold War"
She also recalls Russia’s maximum demands, packaged as "guarantees for its security" because it felt threatened. These demands included NATO halting the admission of new members and withdrawing its troops and military infrastructure to the status that existed in May 1997, i.e. before the Alliance’s eastward expansion.
"Essentially, this means reversing NATO’s eastward expansion without these countries being officially expelled from NATO. The aim is for NATO’s eastern member states to become a buffer zone and for separate security zones to be established in Europe." Put briefly: the aim is to rewrite the end of the Cold War, restore spheres of influence in Europe and have Russia once again be viewed as a great power, Puglierin summarises in comments to ARD.
"If we look closely at the situation in 2021, the Russian version focused on a threat from Ukraine and on Ukraine’s supposedly imminent NATO membership. In 2021, however, Ukraine was as far from NATO membership as it had been in 2008. The so-called "Membership Action Plan" did not even exist yet, nor was there any threat to Russian territory," the expert recalls, stressing that no one had threatened Russia’s territory – neither Ukraine nor NATO. Russian analysts themselves viewed it this way at the time.
According to Puglierin, in 2021 almost no analyst in Moscow had anticipated the full-scale invasion that took place a year later. "From the Russian point of view, the threat consisted in the fact that Russia’s claims to hegemony were under threat. The United States, under the leadership of then-President Joe Biden, had further intensified its cooperation with Ukraine."
What should we understand by a new "European security architecture"?
But if a new European security architecture is now being discussed, what exactly would this mean for European NATO member states and, more specifically, for the countries of the former Warsaw Pact or the former Soviet republics? Puglierin responds to this question by saying that the aim is to grant Russia what it considers to be its "legitimate" place in Europe. In other words: if the West accepts this Russian viewpoint, it will have to recognise that Russia has the right – beyond its own borders – to exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its neighbours and over the arrangements governing their security, she explains.
For Europeans, this would mean abandoning principles that have guaranteed European security over the past 80 years – for example, the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, the right to self-determination and the freedom to choose which alliances to join, Puglierin stresses.
"As Europeans, we must realise that Russia is pursuing a revisionist agenda that extends far beyond Ukraine – Russia is seeking to change much more than just Ukraine’s borders or its political control over the country. This ambition will not simply disappear, even if the war in Ukraine is frozen. For Russia, Ukraine is not an end in itself, but rather the key to establishing a new security order in Europe. Europeans must face this reality. It is not in our interest for such issues to be discussed solely between the Russians and the Americans. That is why we must clearly define our "red lines", while also recognising that this conflict with Russia is a long-term, enduring reality – it will not fade away any time soon," says Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations in her interview with ARD.