America’s geopolitical power is coming apart, and that should not be much of a surprise. After all, hegemons rise and fall. Yet in American politics and among political commentators, no one seems willing to discuss the consequences of this process, especially for the American people. When it comes to decline, they either believe it will not happen or that it will not matter. In other words, they believe either that America cannot decline or that Americans will do perfectly well even if it does. This is what Nick Danforth, deputy editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy, writes in a commentary.
"Many in the Republican Party’s neoconservative and traditional conservative wings believe that by making renewed use of its still considerable military and political power, the United States can maintain its position as the world’s leading power for the foreseeable future. Republicans who advocate limiting American intervention abroad, for their part, believe that if America relinquishes its dominant role while preserving its strength, global chaos can be contained and the American people will benefit. And although key figures around President Donald Trump are excessively concerned about America’s decline from a racial or civilizational perspective, they offer their own dangerous and counterproductive ideas for reversing this trend.
In the Democratic Party, many in the more traditional liberal internationalist wing also believe, albeit with greater moderation than their neoconservative counterparts, that Washington can still lead efforts to restore a world order that would generally serve American interests. The party’s progressive wing, meanwhile, is convinced that a more restrained foreign policy will bring peace to the world and prosperity to ordinary voters, with billionaires being the only ones to suffer the negative consequences.
But what if everyone is right—but about the wrong things? The worst possible scenario would be for advocates of a restrained foreign policy to be right that maintaining America’s global superiority is no longer possible, while the neoconservatives and liberal internationalists turn out to be right about all the negative consequences of that. What if ordinary Americans really have benefited from the United States’ unique international status and will bitterly regret its loss?
Just as Trump’s presidency became a catalyst for America’s decline, so too did his open contempt for the traditional U.S. foreign-policy consensus give momentum to the debate over what went wrong and what lies ahead.
Firm defenders of Washington’s traditional foreign policy express regret that voters no longer seem to support America’s global leadership. On the other side, many progressives and conservatives who support a more restrained foreign policy argue that, although insincerely, Trump articulated entirely justified public anger over Washington’s failure in its effort to maintain global hegemony.
There is, however, another and more troubling version of what Americans actually gained from their country’s unprecedented geopolitical power and why they have concluded that these benefits are no longer being realized.
During the Cold War, and even more so immediately afterward, U.S. foreign policy largely provided voters with the benefits of hegemony—both material and psychological—without burdening them with the cost of large-scale wars abroad.
With its good and bad sides, American power helped drive the extraordinary expansion of global trade and industrialization, from which America and Americans grew richer. Washington defended democratic stability in Europe through NATO, while in the Middle East it imposed authoritarian stability through friendly dictators. The United States used its economic power to support the industrialization of its allies under conditions set by America and to force defiant governments to open their markets. At the same time, it used military force to guarantee freedom of the seas and prevent other countries from industrializing on their own terms.
Meanwhile, the dynamic and independent American education system, combined with enormous military spending and an arms race of apocalyptic proportions, helped produce unprecedented scientific breakthroughs.
Partly thanks to all this, the real gross domestic product of the United States has grown more than tenfold since 1945. These benefits were not distributed evenly among the country’s population. But the postwar period of prosperity and broad-based economic growth also helped sustain public support for expanding government programs and building a strong social safety net.
Meanwhile, Washington’s military superiority often allowed it to impose its will through pressure and proxy wars rather than direct military confrontation. Other peoples paid the price of American power, often with their blood. Wars such as those in Vietnam and Iraq claimed many American lives, but the casualties among the Vietnamese and Iraqis were incomparably greater.
Today, however, that hegemony is weakening—as are its benefits. The financial dividends of America’s position are increasingly going to a small and wealthy elite, while prestige is accumulating among a community with which many Americans no longer identify. As a result, voters are beginning to believe they are paying the price of American power without receiving its benefits.
Americans remain uncomfortable acknowledging the benefits of imperial dominance, and therefore the cost of losing it. Many neoconservatives and liberal internationalists prefer to talk about the freedom and prosperity that American power brings to the world. Trump and many opponents of internationalism on the political right take this selfless rhetoric literally and suggest that Americans are suckers who finance the prosperity of the rest of the world for free.
By contrast, members of the left readily emphasize the material benefits of American power. Progressive critics have long reduced U.S. foreign policy to a neo-imperial drive to conquer markets from which profits can be extracted. According to this interpretation, however, those profits have always gone solely to large corporations, not to ordinary Americans. Trump and the left may disagree over whether oligarchs benefit from U.S. global hegemony, but they essentially agree that the rest of the country gains nothing. From this perspective, a more restrained foreign policy that accepts—even welcomes—America’s smaller role in a more multipolar world would bring significant savings without any negative consequences.
It is possible, however, that the truth is this: in the heyday of postwar American foreign policy, the country’s role in the world really did bring widespread economic benefits to all Americans. But because of changes in the world order, there is now no foreign-policy course capable of restoring those benefits in the same way. At the very least, this is a possibility for which politicians must prepare.
Reducing the material consequences of American decline, difficult as that may be, could prove significantly easier than limiting its psychological ones. Many Americans drew a genuine sense of pride and security from their country’s leading position. Power brought prestige, but also a feeling of control over a chaotic world.
Since at least 1945, America’s national image has been tied to its wealth and military power, but also—for Republicans and Democrats alike—to its role as a respected leader, reliable ally and generous benefactor. Trump rejected this tradition, but his presidency continually appeals to Americans’ deep longing for a lost sense of strength and control.
America’s victory in World War II brought the country an intoxicating combination of military glory and genuine respect. In the following decades, ordinary Americans who traveled abroad—whether as service members, Peace Corps volunteers, government employees, tourists or businesspeople—could enjoy this recognition. In politics, economics and culture, Americans mattered more because America mattered. At the very least, they could comfortably assume that people around the world wanted to talk about American films, television shows and music.
Over time, the country’s reputation became more controversial. But America, and Americans abroad along with it, continued to attract enormous attention. Even people who had never traveled overseas could see their presidents and generals receiving the world’s respect and could indirectly share in that feeling. But just as American power reached its peak at the beginning of the new millennium, the combination of partisan culture wars and racism changed how many Americans viewed their country’s international image. Unlike during the Cold War, the people who represented America on television, shaped its foreign policy and commented on international affairs became both more liberal and less white than before.
This means that, according to Trump and his movement, responsible liberal internationalism had brought respect to the wrong people, and they no longer perceived the country’s international prestige as their own. Conservatives criticized President Barack Obama’s global "apology tour" while watching him receive the Nobel Peace Prize and international praise. Trump promised to change this by, in David Frum’s words, "redistributing respect—from those who get too much of it (the overeducated coastal elite) to those who don’t get enough (white Americans without college degrees who feel left behind)." While diplomats, aid workers and journalists had previously held professions that gave them a sense of social prestige, Trump would leave them crying outside their offices—whether at the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development or the "Voice of America."
To complete this redistribution, Trump’s policies had to provide a different set of psychological rewards for another group of people. Instead of the "liberal-professional preference for restrained institutional impersonality," he offered "gilding," "military pomp" and "exaggerated talk of conquest and possession." This was a form of national power from which Trump’s followers could derive satisfaction. Or, as the president himself put it while explaining why he wanted to seize Greenland: "What I think is psychologically necessary for success."
During the 20th century, Americans grew accustomed to their country’s global power and to the possibility of exercising it at a relatively low cost. No one, however, has a plan for what will happen when that is no longer possible.
When events—from terrorist attacks to wars abroad—threaten their sense of security, voters expect their leaders to respond in a way that restores their feeling of control. Thus, although Americans were genuinely tired of the war in Iraq and sincerely opposed intervention in Syria, when the Islamic State began broadcasting beheading videos on television, they demanded that Obama take action.
So far, Trump has managed to meet these expectations by spending the military, diplomatic and economic power the United States accumulated over decades of responsible, or at least less reckless, governance. Ignoring international law in order to bring Venezuela’s president to New York shackled in chains was a vivid demonstration of American military power. The images undoubtedly gave some viewers the same satisfaction that Romans felt when they watched captured enemy rulers pass in a triumphal procession. The war with Iran, however, quickly exposed the limits of Trump’s approach.
Already, Iran’s ability to defy Washington for eight months is having a direct economic impact on American citizens. And the White House, realizing that there is no good military path to victory, is forced to systematically lie about the number of casualties and the state of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in order to counter humiliating accusations that the United States has suffered a defeat.
Iran also shows why the United States, after playing a disproportionately large role in world affairs over the past decade, cannot simply withdraw and leave others to deal with the consequences. The end of the British Empire may have left behind civil wars that claimed millions of lives in Sudan and South Asia, but their impact on life in London was minimal. After decades of accelerated globalization, however, the consequences for Washington are unlikely to remain so distant and harmless.
There is every reason to fear that over the coming decades the world will become more violent, and that this violence will leave Americans less secure. It will also be more unstable, undermining the sources of American wealth. A series of sensible and measured foreign-policy decisions, combined with competent economic management, can undoubtedly limit the damage, but the country will nevertheless be less secure and less prosperous. This, in turn, will intensify voters’ sense of powerlessness and unfair treatment.
To be effective, a new foreign-policy program must also include a plan for managing these consequences. Advocates of a restrained foreign policy have embraced the argument that Americans are tired of endless wars and do not want costly adventures abroad. But anyone who remembers the consequences of the September 11, 2001, attacks knows how quickly this can change in a moment of national anger and humiliation.
Advocates of a restrained foreign policy are undoubtedly right that Washington would be wiser to calmly accept the transition to a more multipolar world rather than resist fiercely and destroy itself. They do, however, appear overly confident that this process will be a win-win for everyone—both America and the world—instead of a painful adjustment for all, including the American people themselves".
Source: news.bg