U.S. President Donald Trump has two more years to achieve peace, consolidate the "Donroe Doctrine," confront China and help the United States dominate the field of artificial intelligence, writes American historian and Bloomberg Opinion columnist Hal Brands.
By the midpoint of his presidency, Donald Trump no longer dominates the world stage in the way he once did. His first year was filled with ambition, provocation and an active foreign policy. Trump’s strategic "blitzkrieg" unleashed U.S. power and shook the established world order.
His second year, however, brought the opposite effect and disappointment: the prolonged war with Iran, which has no easy way out, seriously weakened Trump’s position both domestically and internationally.
Now Republicans have suffered a heavy defeat in the midterm elections — a result largely linked to the failure surrounding Iran. But do not expect a politically weakened president to become geopolitically passive or restrained. Trump will have to confront a hostile Democratic majority in Congress.
Political clashes over his foreign policy will intensify. Toward the end of their terms, presidents often pay greater attention to foreign policy, as the domestic situation becomes increasingly difficult.
Trump — a president who likes to be at the center of attention and wants to leave a lasting mark on history — will fight fiercely to avoid becoming a complete political lame duck. Nor should you expect the world to give Washington a respite: Trump faces crises and challenges that will consume the final two years of his administration.
The president must end the war with Iran without destroying America’s position in the Middle East. He also faces the unresolved task of achieving peace in Ukraine, where the outcome of yet another prolonged conflict will determine the future of a strategically important region.
He will seek to consolidate the "Donroe Doctrine" — his plan to guarantee American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, even as the risk of relations in North America falling apart increases.
Trump must also manage the rivalry between the United States and China, which could still take a dangerous turn. Finally, he has promised to restore American power by winning the race for artificial intelligence, but security risks and political resistance are growing as technological innovation continues.
How Trump handles these five challenges will define his strategic legacy. It will also determine how unstable a world and how strong a U.S. position his successor will inherit.
From relentless offense to losing direction
The pace of action during Trump’s first year was exceptionally high and often produced results. The president changed relations with U.S. allies, forcing them to significantly increase defense spending. He reshaped the global economy by imposing the highest U.S. tariffs since the Great Depression and subsequently striking one-sided trade deals with partners ranging from South Korea to the United Kingdom.
He carried out short, targeted and largely successful military operations against Iran and Venezuela, destroying key elements of Iran’s nuclear program and literally pulling Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro out of bed.
The operation in Venezuela was part of a broad strategy to restore American dominance in the Western Hemisphere. It included strikes on vessels suspected of drug trafficking, economic subsidies for friendly governments and other measures.
Meanwhile, Trump negotiated a lasting ceasefire in Gaza and the return of all living Israeli hostages — achievements that proved beyond the reach of his predecessor.
There were failures as well as stalemates. Trump sought to deliver a crushing economic blow to China by launching a trade war in April 2025, but Beijing’s countermeasures forced him to accept an uncertain trade truce.
His attempt to achieve peace in Ukraine failed because of Moscow’s excessive demands and Kyiv’s refusal to capitulate.
Even so, the defining feature of this period was clear: one president and one superpower acting without any constraints.
The turning point came at the beginning of 2026. After his impressive success against Maduro in Venezuela, Trump became too greedy. He plunged the transatlantic community into crisis with his threats to annex Greenland. He backed down only after shaking financial markets and provoking a firm European response, eventually accepting an agreement he could have achieved simply through diplomatic negotiations.
In February, Trump attacked Iran in the hope of achieving a quick and impressive victory similar to the American operation in Venezuela. Instead, he became embroiled in a costly stalemate that depleted U.S. military stocks while hindering America’s strategic efforts around the world.
That same month, the Supreme Court overturned Trump’s tariffs — which he called "Liberation Day tariffs" — forcing him to rely on alternative legal grounds and demonstrating that the president had reached the limits of his power, both at home and abroad.
Since then, foreign policy has become a severe test for a president backed into a corner. Allies are questioning American power and competence, while adversaries appear more encouraged than deterred. The easy victories have already been achieved: only complex problems and stubborn rivals remain.
And geopolitical overconfidence led to political retribution. Trump’s global activism was facilitated by the Republican majority in Congress, which largely avoided confrontation with the president, even though some of its members had serious doubts about his policies.
But Democrats have now regained control of the House of Representatives and the Senate, while also winning a number of governorships — largely because of Trump’s extreme actions on the international stage.
The tariffs intensified concerns about the affordability of everyday life. The war with Iran raised consumer prices and interest rates while simultaneously lowering Trump’s approval rating.
"The reason we lost is the war," Vice President JD Vance wrote on X — a claim that may serve his personal interests to some extent, but is not without basis.
The president who sought imperial power now faces a hostile Congress and a difficult, disorganized international environment.
Investigations, impeachment and obstruction
Of course, a Democratic-controlled Congress cannot impose fundamental changes on most policy issues. Day-to-day control over diplomacy and the military is highly concentrated in the White House. Trump has never shown an inclination to defer to the legislative branch.
Democrats themselves will be divided on key issues, such as policy in the Middle East and relations with Israel. They will probably fail to gather the necessary supermajority to strip Trump of his power to impose tariffs or force the president to end the war with Iran.
The strongest institutional mechanisms for restraining Trump will remain the courts, which could further limit his tariff powers, as well as broad opposition within the Republican Party — the organization Trump must control to preserve his influence after leaving office.
In fact, Trump may even double down on foreign policy. Presidents under domestic political pressure often view foreign policy as an area where they can still exercise dominant influence. High-stakes diplomacy can provide an escape from domestic political conflicts.
Barack Obama, for example, reached two historic agreements — the Iran nuclear deal and the opening of relations with Cuba — after Democrats suffered defeat in the November 2014 midterm elections.
As he considers the end of his presidency, Trump will likely focus on the legacy he leaves behind. He may be drawn to strategic gambles promising sweeping results. Trump will not become a humble president who has learned from his mistakes and focused on domestic problems. Democrats, however, will make his life difficult in three ways: through investigations, impeachment and obstruction.
Control of key committees will allow the new majority to actively investigate the legally questionable strikes on vessels suspected of drug trafficking, opaque oil deals in Venezuela or potentially corrupt arrangements with participants ranging from the Caribbean to the Persian Gulf.
Hearings are expected on Trump’s decision to ease restrictions on semiconductor exports to China, as well as on the often humiliating and counterproductive ways in which he has tried to pressure Ukraine.
The Democratic-led House of Representatives could also initiate impeachment proceedings against cabinet members, if not against Trump himself.
A primary target is expected to be Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth, who has led a politically motivated purge of senior military leaders. Democrats are unlikely to secure the two-thirds Senate majority needed to remove Hegseth. But the threat of investigations and impeachment could make serving in the Trump administration unattractive and prompt senior officials to leave in the coming months.
Finally, Democrats could obstruct Trump on key policy issues. Working with Republicans who take a harder line on national security, they could restrict his freedom to lift sanctions on Russia or withdraw more U.S. troops from Europe. They could complicate diplomacy with Chinese leader Xi Jinping by imposing tighter restrictions on exports of chips and chipmaking equipment.
Democratic control will, of course, trigger new conflicts. Administration officials may ignore congressional subpoenas. A president who claims he can do whatever he wants may resist limits on his powers as commander in chief.
Trump likes confrontation with his Democratic opponents. Political clashes over foreign policy will intensify as he tries to deal with the multitude of strategic problems.
Two wars and one doctrine
The most fundamental challenge remains the war with Iran. The president who promised to reduce the Middle East’s role in American strategy is now embroiled in a conflict that has disrupted freedom of navigation and consumed a huge share of American military power.
If the war with Iran derails Trump’s foreign-policy plans, ending it — without allowing Iran to dominate the Persian Gulf — is a prerequisite for restoring his strategic initiative.
Trump wants a deal that fully reopens the Strait of Hormuz and handcuffs Iran’s nuclear program. He has built leverage through a naval blockade restricting Iranian oil exports and intensive, though quiet, military operations to protect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
But Tehran is not backing down. In October, it intensified attacks on shipping in the strait. Iranian leaders view Trump’s midterm losses as a victory for their strategy of punishing the American president and inflicting economic damage on the world. If Tehran does not retreat, Trump may be forced to accept a prolonged and economically costly confrontation, periodically accompanied by violence, in the hope of gradually exhausting the regime.
But this strategy offers no guarantee of a quick resolution. Trump may take an even greater risk to achieve an even bigger victory. Until January, when the new Democratic majority is sworn in, Trump will be less concerned that intensified combat could damage Republican electoral prospects.
He appears tempted to launch a short, extremely intense bombing campaign that would force Tehran to submit. After the elections, however, it is difficult to argue that there is political support for such an escalation. The risks are enormous: a wider war that could engulf the entire region and increase the economic and strategic damage caused by the initial mistake.
Trump’s second priority will be ending another war — the one in Ukraine. Here, his policy desperately needs correction after the midterm elections. In recent weeks, Trump has tried to neutralize one of Ukraine’s most effective weapons against the Russian war machine — strikes on Russian oil refineries — while simultaneously striking new economic deals with Moscow.
If he continues down this path, he will face stronger resistance in Congress next year. He will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin’s belief that the United States will ultimately hand Ukraine to him on a platter. He will also encourage assassination attempts, violent sabotage and other covert attacks through which Putin harasses Europe and seeks to divide NATO.
A better option would be to use the sanctioning powers adopted by Congress in September to maximize pressure on the Russian economy while helping Ukraine intensify its long-range strike campaign. Closer cooperation with Europe to support Ukraine on the battlefield could ultimately convince Putin that victory is impossible and that Russia’s losses will only increase.
This strategy could build bridges between the White House and the new Congress. But it would require Trump to abandon his preference for quick solutions to extraordinarily complex problems — as well as, in the author’s view, his mistaken belief that Ukraine rather than Russia is the main obstacle to peace.
The third task is consolidating the "Donroe Doctrine." Regardless of its boastful name, this is a task of historic importance. The need for the United States to consolidate its regional dominance grows when the rest of the world is in disorder. The president began with swift action: capturing Maduro, reducing Chinese influence in Panama and establishing closer relations with countries in Central and South America. But serious obstacles lie ahead.
Trump took advantage of a wave of right-wing electoral victories in Latin America that brought a group of leaders close to the MAGA movement to power. This momentum weakened after the unexpected victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil. The South American giant "would not fit into anyone’s backyard," Lula declares. Trump tried, but so far has failed, to topple Cuba’s communist rulers through economic pressure.
If the hard-line leaders in Havana continue to resist, he will have to choose between military intervention and retreat. Trade disputes with Canada and Mexico threaten to fragment North America — the economic and strategic core of the Western Hemisphere. Political relations in the region will not become easier. Republicans from border states oppose the president’s trade war with Canada, while Democrats see Trump’s seizure of Venezuela’s oil as corruption and blatant personal enrichment.
The "Donroe Doctrine" is one of Trump’s signature initiatives. But it remains an open question whether he will create a more united Western Hemisphere or leave behind shattered relations and unfulfilled missions.
The AI race with China
Trump’s fourth test is managing U.S.-China relations. A superficial thaw is concealing growing tensions. The U.S.-China race in artificial intelligence is accelerating. Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines is increasing. And overcapacity in Chinese industry is harming manufacturers in countries around the world.
Xi Jinping has no illusions about the direction in which U.S.-China relations are heading. Recently, he warned Communist Party leaders to prepare for "strong winds and turbulent waves, even raging storms."
American officials say diplomacy between Xi and Trump is buying time to strengthen U.S. defenses in the Pacific and America’s resilience against Chinese economic pressure. It is unclear, however, whether this is a realistic assessment or merely an excuse.
The thaw with Xi prompted Trump to ease restrictions on the sale of high-tech chips to China and delay arms deliveries to Taiwan. Democratic senators who take a hard line on national security, such as Chris Coons, accuse Trump of effectively selling out American interests.
The close relationship between the White House and Nvidia, which is urging Trump to remove restrictions on chip exports, will face greater scrutiny from Congress in 2027. The dynamics of U.S.-China relations could also become more complicated.
High-level meetings with Xi will tempt Trump, especially as his political power at home weakens. But real breakthroughs are few because the fundamental rivalry between the two countries is deepening.
Trump will have to find ways to strengthen America’s position through arms deliveries to Taiwan, tighter chip controls and higher military spending, while continuing dialogue with Xi.
He must also prepare for a potential Taiwan crisis in the final months of his presidency. If Beijing does not receive an outcome it finds satisfactory after Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2028, China could intensify pressure on the island — for example through a partial maritime or trade quarantine, or other measures that would require a firm American response.
Chips and China are directly linked to Trump’s final problem: winning the race for artificial intelligence. Trump has repeatedly argued that whoever wins the AI race will win everything. Daily diplomatic battles pale in comparison with the question of which country will dominate this revolutionary technology.
His approach so far has consisted mainly of encouraging American laboratories and the biggest technology companies to "build, build and build," while opposing stricter regulation.
But he has weakened the defensive side of America’s strategy by selectively easing export restrictions that could keep China at a significant disadvantage in computing power. At the same time, public concern about artificial intelligence in the United States is provoking an increasingly strong backlash. Opposition to the construction of data centers is uniting voters from both the Democratic and Republican parties.
Support for AI regulation is growing in Congress. Lawmakers are proposing measures ranging from antitrust exemptions that would allow leading AI companies to slow the development and deployment of the most powerful models, to outright bans on creating superintelligent systems. New incidents involving dangerous behavior by autonomous models or poorly designed training environments could further intensify pressure for regulation.
Trump believes artificial intelligence will usher in a new era of American dominance. But his strategy will be threatened if the dangers and disruptions caused by the technology arrive faster than the expected benefits.
Trump’s final act
This is an exceptionally difficult agenda. It could be further complicated by new shocks over the next two years. The international environment could become even more dangerous if, for example, Putin’s hybrid attacks trigger a direct confrontation with Europe or the Houthis resume large-scale attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
North Korea, which appears to be behind last month’s massive cryptocurrency theft, could emerge from its relative lull with aggressive missile tests or other provocations. India and Pakistan could once again enter a dangerous cycle of military confrontation.
It would be unwise to assume that no major international crisis will arise during the final two years of Trump’s term. The domestic political environment will also become increasingly tense as the November 2028 presidential election approaches. Republicans will probably begin distancing themselves from the president if he remains as unpopular as he is now. Democrats will intensify their criticism as they begin preparing their own campaigns for the White House.
Trump will remain the dominant figure in American politics. But foreign leaders will inevitably begin gradually looking beyond him as his political influence starts to wane.
It is reasonable to assume that Trump will be obsessed with the question of his historical legacy. His place in history will indeed be determined to a large extent by how he handles these strategic challenges. But the stakes are much higher than his personal legacy. The final two years of Trump’s presidency will affect the balance of power in the defining rivalry of our era — that between the United States and China.
They will shape the prospects for war and peace in strategically important regions and determine the development of a technology with potentially enormous consequences for humanity. The next two years will show whether Trump leaves behind a difficult but manageable situation, in which dangers are numerous but America’s position remains strong, or departs leaving behind excessive American overreach and deepening global chaos.
After a turbulent decade, the Trump era is nearing its end. Its final act will certainly not be boring.
Source: news.bg