Daniel Smilov's comment:
The Russian drones in the skies of Poland have debunked the mantra that Russia will never attack a NATO country and will be content with the captured Ukrainian territories. Only a blind man would support such claims when the following irrefutable facts are available.
First, the entry of the drones into Polish territory is not an accidental side effect of a massive air campaign over Ukraine, but a deliberate provocation that tests NATO's reaction. There is simply no way that twenty drones "accidentally" could end up over NATO territory. Second, Russia's rhetoric against the supposedly "Nazi" NATO countries is intensifying - just a few days ago, former President Medvedev accused Finland of planning an attack on Russia. This is the same flat propaganda preparation that we saw against Ukraine. Thirdly, the Russian side is massing troops on the borders with NATO and in Belarus. Fourthly, Russian ballistic missiles and other offensive equipment are being deployed in these same places.
A very real danger of a military clash
All this speaks only of one thing: preparation for aggressive military actions and testing the readiness of NATO countries. Arguing whether this is a bluff or a real attack plan is irresponsible - in both cases, we are talking about a major threat to the security of the continent. In January 2022, similar disputes were again going on about whether Vladimir Putin was bluffing or not. From this point of view, Poland is completely right to trigger Art. 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to coordinate actions with its partners.
In the face of such a very real danger of a military clash in the near future, the question is how ready NATO and Europe are to respond adequately. This week, EC President Ursula von der Leyen delivered her annual State of the Union address in Strasbourg. The focus and emphasis in this speech were deservedly on common defense, and it became clear that the EU is doing what is necessary, within its powers. And these are mainly three things. First, to allow member states to significantly increase their military spending, temporarily suspending the rules on fiscal discipline for them. Second, the EU is providing low-interest loans to member states for rearmament. An initial fund of 150 billion euros is already in operation, which will grow to around 800 billion by 2030. These low-interest loans will allow highly indebted countries to finance their defense at an affordable cost. These instruments are possible because the eurozone and the EU as a whole are the best-managed financial system in the world, with a total debt that is lower than that of Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and even China.
The financial resource will enable not only rearmament, but also the development of a serious European military industry. Bulgaria will be part of this effort and it is a huge opportunity for modernization. The Bulgarian military industry has proven to be key in the war in Ukraine, because we have the ability to mass-produce cheap weapons and ammunition, which are key.
However, money is not the most important thing for Europe's defense. Even now, European countries collectively spend huge sums of money annually on defence – €381 billion by 2025, which should make the EU at least the third or fourth largest military power in the world. The problem is that this money is spent by 27 governments and defence ministries, much spending is duplicated, and there is no common procurement programme to bring down prices. That is why, with its SAFE funding and other instruments, the EU is trying to stimulate pan-European purchasing of equipment and spending. But in this respect, the Union can only play the role of coordinator, while the decisions are ultimately taken by national governments.
The decisive moment has come
And here is the crux of the matter: EU defence is in the hands of the sovereign member states, even though 80% of Europeans want and see the point in a common defence and security policy (according to the Eurobarometer 2025). In the near future, however, things will remain as they are now - and the 27 must be able to coordinate with each other effectively enough to respond to any threats. Such coordination is not at all impossible, and at least until now NATO has been the main instrument for it.
It is extremely important that NATO gives a very firm and unambiguous response to Russia's provocation. Here, President Donald Trump missed the opportunity to send such a message immediately after the provocation: this comes on the back of his meeting in Alaska with Putin, which not only did not lead to anything positive, but also seems to have encouraged the Russian side to escalate the war and even try to expand it. So the leaders of European countries have the difficult task of compensating for Trump's passivity (to put it mildly) on the issue. The leading countries' unequivocal support for Zelensky, as well as the uncompromising support of the EU for Ukraine, expressed by Ursula von der Leyen, are promising steps.
However, it should be clearly understood that Russia's actions are actually aimed at one main thing: to test the extent to which the United States is ready to fulfill its allied obligations towards Europe. The decisive time has come: if the US, through the Trump administration, remains ambivalent on the issue, Russia's provocations will continue and intensify.
And then the real question of Europe's defense will come, which is not limited to finances (in relation to which the EU has serious powers). The most important thing is the creation of a truly common defense that would guarantee airspace as a starting point, but also the sovereignty of European countries in general. They thought they had five to ten years to solve this problem. However, Putin seems to intend to drastically shorten this period.
Where will Bulgaria stand
What is realistic is for groups of willing European countries to move towards a common defense. If the big ones like France, Germany, and Italy do not participate, the undertaking will be half-hearted and unsuccessful. Therefore, ultimately, the leaders of these countries have a great responsibility to lead the process. The others are also important, however, because only with joint efforts can Europe become a meaningful entity from a military-political point of view. There will certainly be those who will remain outside the core of the EU and will even try to block common decisions in this direction. We will not be far wrong if we predict that Hungary and Slovakia, under their current governments, will be in this role.
The question is that Bulgaria will not also end up on the parade in Beijing, when important decisions have to be made. And such decisions will become imperative and inevitable very soon.