It is unlikely that Russian representatives will deviate from their initial military demands during the upcoming trilateral talks between the United States, Ukraine and Russia on February 17-18 in Geneva, Switzerland.
This is reported by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on February 16 that Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky will lead the Russian delegation to the upcoming trilateral meetings.
Peskov noted that the Russian delegation will also include Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and the first deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Vladimir Kostyukov.
The CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev, will be in Geneva, but will participate in a working group on economic cooperation, likely referring to the bilateral economic group between the United States and Russia.
The Geneva talks will discuss "broader" a range of issues from previous talks in Abu Dhabi and will discuss territorial issues in particular.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said the Kremlin had instructed the Russian delegation to act within the framework that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump allegedly agreed to during the Alaska summit in August 2025.
Kremlin officials had previously claimed that the Alaska summit had agreed on principles based on Putin's June 2024 speech to the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA), in which Putin called for capitulation to Russia's demands on both Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated its full commitment to achieving its initial military goals, including those not related to territory in Eastern Ukraine.
Russia may try to use another temporary moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes to falsely claim that Russia is making concessions. Secretary of the Ukrainian Defense Council Rustem Umerov said on February 14 that Ukraine would raise the issue of a new temporary ceasefire after energy strikes at the Geneva meetings.
Russia has already used temporary moratoriums on energy strikes in March-April 2025 and in January-February 2026 to stockpile drones and missiles for subsequent devastating strikes.
The Kremlin agreed to the January-February 2026 moratorium on strikes against part of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure only after causing serious damage to Ukraine’s national energy grid. The Kremlin will likely again try to present its adherence to any future short-term moratorium as a significant concession, although the Kremlin will likely use these days to stockpile weapons for larger strike packages.
Russian forces have also already degraded Ukraine’s energy grid, so Ukraine faces serious energy problems even if Russia temporarily halts its strikes. Ukraine's power grid suffered significant disruptions during the January-February 2025 moratorium on strikes due to the months and years of damage the grid had already suffered.
On February 14, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Russian strikes had damaged every power plant in Ukraine and that Ukraine could once again face serious energy problems during a future moratorium.
Russia appears to be investing in centralized drone technology incubators and creating special roles and units to support efforts to develop specific drone capabilities. These drone capability development efforts include supporting the ability of drone units to perform tactical missions that support Russia’s Battlefield Air Interception (BAI) campaign, as well as drone-based air defense.
Former head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos and occupation senator from Zaporizhzhia Oblast Dmitry Rogozin said on February 16 that the BARS-Sarmat Special Purpose Center for Unmanned Systems (formerly the BARS-Sarmat detachment), which Rogozin heads, is expanding its list of specialized roles, expanding combat units, and conducting additional recruitment.
The BARS-Sarmat Center is a key research and development (R&D) organization for Russia’s drone capabilities, and develops and tests hardware and operational concepts before disseminating new drone technologies and tactics more broadly to Russia’s drone units.
The official Telegram channel of the Center for Special Purposes for Unmanned Systems "BARS-Sarmat" stated that the center is not just a group of drone operators, but a comprehensive structure that integrates intelligence, strike capabilities, electronic warfare, engineering and design development, production and training within a single organization.
The "BARS-Sarmat" center stated that it also includes two specialized detachments - the "Dnepr" and "Stalingrad" detachments - which specialize in operating drones at an operational depth of up to 30 to 35 kilometers, and a separate air defense detachment "Bagration", which specializes in intercepting Ukrainian drones using unmanned systems. The "BARS-Sarmat" center stated that it is developing "new" military specialty called "soldier-technologist" - a role likely designed to facilitate the development and integration of drone capabilities into the Russian armed forces as a whole. The "BARS-Sarmat" center also includes a specialized unit - the "Ustinov Scientific and Technical Unit" - that produces and modernizes equipment, taking into account combat experience from the front.
Each of these new units focuses on different elements of the Russian BAI campaign, including providing medium-range strikes, interceptor drones, and technological adaptations. The Russian BAI campaigns are largely responsible for facilitating Russian advances on the battlefield in the fall and winter of 2025. It is worth noting Russia's investment in specialized units designed to develop, improve, and disseminate Russian drone capabilities. ISW has previously monitored reports that Russia plans to reorganize the BARS-Sarmat center and at least five separate regiments of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) into six USF brigades, and further development and expansion of the center could allow Russia to more quickly disseminate successful drone developments throughout the Russian army.
The Kremlin appears to be adapting its tactics for conducting sabotage attacks in Europe. Western intelligence officials told the Financial Times (FT) on February 15 that former Wagner Group recruiters who previously recruited Russians to fight in Ukraine are now organizing Kremlin-sponsored sabotage attacks in Europe.
Sources told the FT that the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian General Staff is using the Wagner recruitment network in Europe, while trying to maintain at least two degrees of distance from the agents in order to maintain plausible deniability. Wagner Group recruiters are reportedly trying to lure Europeans, particularly those who are "economically vulnerable" or lack purpose or direction in their lives, to carry out arson attacks or pose as alleged Nazi propagandists in Europe. The FT report on February 15 follows earlier reports that Russia’s sabotage campaign had declined in 2025, possibly as the Kremlin reassessed its tactics.
American and European officials told Bloomberg in August 2025 that the decline could be due to the Kremlin’s efforts to regain control of the unreliable local criminals it often used for these attacks.
At the time, officials noted that many potential recruits were likely less likely to participate in Russian attacks, given that several agents had been arrested and prosecuted. The GRU has also reportedly been diverting resources from its European sabotage campaign to the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin began a campaign to regain control of the Wagner Group and other irregular forces and integrate them into Russian state services in late 2022, and has intensified this campaign since the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.
The GRU appears to be using former Wagner Group elements to meet GRU needs in Europe, potentially allowing the GRU to focus more of its organic resources on Ukraine. Russia may re-intensify its sabotage campaign in 2026, shifting from using unreliable organized crime networks to financially motivated individual agents.
In January 2025, at least one Ukrainian FP-5 "Flamingo" cruise missile failed to cause damage at the Russian Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast. On February 16, Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) released satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date showing a six-meter crater near the fence of a preparation area at Kapustyn Yar.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had carried out a series of strikes involving "Flamingo" missiles against Kapustyn Yar in January 2025, and later stated that the strikes damaged a missile maintenance facility, an assembly building, and a logistics warehouse.
These recent satellite images show that at least one of the "Flamingo" missiles reached Kapustin Yar, but either missed its target or was intercepted by Russian forces. The available satellite images are limited in range, and other Ukrainian missiles may have hit other areas of Kapustin Yar. A Russian blogger said on February 16 that Ukrainian forces fired a total of four "Flamingo" missiles in the strike package.