Iran's official warning to Bulgaria is not an isolated diplomatic demarche, but part of Tehran's broader strategy to deter and logistically complicate US operations in the Black Sea region, Bulgarian journalist Ruslan Trad from De Re Militari wrote on Facebook.
What are the real dimensions of this confrontation, what is Tehran's new tactic in Europe and what cards does Sofia hold?
It should be clearly stated that any speculation about a direct kinetic or missile strike by Iran against Bulgarian territory is militarily unrealistic due to our membership in NATO. The pressure could be entirely along the lines of hybrid and asymmetric confrontation.
Another thing that should be clearly mentioned is that the real operational risk to security in the Balkans has changed radically in recent months.
The growing threat is related to the Revolutionary Guard's new strategy of the so-called "violence as a service". The organization Ashab al-Yamin (HAYI), which has claimed responsibility for dozens of arson attacks and attacks on Western, Jewish and dissident sites in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and North Macedonia, is among the new factors that all of us in the sector are following. The group is a front for Iranian operations, whose main apparatus is located in Iraq and operates on European territory through connections with European criminal groups.
The revelations of counter-terrorism services and journalistic investigations show a new modus operandi, which my colleagues and I have mentioned more than once:
- Ashab al-Yamin is in practice not a classic terrorist group - and it is inaccurate to describe it as such - but a digital front, controlled by Iranian special services (mostly the "Al-Quds" forces) and pro-Iranian Iraqi militias (in this case - Kataib Hezbollah);
- instead of sending its own agents, Iran outsources the execution of arson, espionage and sabotage to local criminal groups and drug cartels for payment, which is often done through cryptocurrencies or Telegram channels;
- all this provides Tehran with the right to denial and although the scheme was borrowed to some extent from the Russian services, this mode of operation is an extremely trademark of Iran;
The Balkans - and Bulgaria in particular - have historically functioned as a critical logistical and financial bridge for Tehran to the interior of the EU. It has been known for years that structures used for:
1) circumventing the sanctions regime - shell companies for acquiring civilian dual-use technologies (microelectronics) that power the Iranian drone program operate on Bulgarian territory;
2) capital transfer - using the traditional hawala system to finance operations and pay mercenaries from criminal groups;
If it wishes, Bulgaria has the capacity to deal an extremely painful blow to Iranian interests. So far, the Bulgarian authorities have done little against Hezbollah and the former Assad regime, and they have been developing their activities without any problems. A coordinated and massive offensive by the special services to break the channels, block financial flows and neutralize the connections between Iranian operatives and the local underworld, will literally paralyze Tehran's logistics in Southeast Europe.
Tehran understands this language perfectly. When Sofia shows a willingness to "turn off the tap" on Iranian logistics networks in the Balkans, the price of any Iranian hybrid escalation against Bulgaria becomes too high for the regime in Iran itself. As long as Sofia wants to act, of course.