From September 18 to 20, 2026, elections for the 9th State Duma of the Russian Federation will be held in Russia. It is important to note that the organization of these elections was planned in violation of numerous international standards and requirements, and even before they were held, international organizations and civilized countries stated that their results would not be recognized.
For the third time, elections in Russia will be held without independent observation by the OSCE. Russia did not invite the OSCE/ODIHR mission. “The refusal of the Russian Federation to invite the OSCE election observation mission is a serious violation of the commitments it has made as an OSCE participating State“, said OSCE PA Chairman Pere Joan Pons. He assessed that “Such a stubborn refusal of independent supervision is part of from a deeply worrying trend of disregard for the principles of transparency, democratic accountability and the rule of law. Election observation is not optional; it is a fundamental element of the process.“ It is a cornerstone of the OSCE’s comprehensive security system and tangible evidence of the country’s commitment to the principles of free and fair elections.
The lack of international election observation is particularly worrying given the overall situation of democracy and human rights in the Russian Federation. Following the previous parliamentary elections, the Russian authorities, through legislative changes and their implementation, have imposed further restrictions on political participation. In particular, individuals designated as “foreign agents” are barred from running for office, campaign financing is further restricted, and the rights to nominate candidates and political parties are curtailed. These steps add to long-standing restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly, association, expression and media activity, as well as a wide Putin’s widespread persecution and intimidation of political opponents, independent journalists, civil society representatives and other critics of the government.
Transparency and independent public oversight of the election process have also been further weakened in Russia. Independent citizen monitoring has been significantly limited as a result of the ongoing pressure on the public movement “Golos”, which led to its dissolution. A key feature of these elections in Russia will be remote electronic voting, planned in 33 regions, potentially reaching an estimated 48.4 million voters. The scale of remote electronic voting, the three-day duration of the elections and the lack of an OSCE/ODIHR mission leave limited scope for independent external verification of the electronic results and a significant part of the election procedures.
The ODIHR and the OSCE PA once again condemned the decision of the Russian Federation to hold voting in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The Russian Central Election Commission has officially scheduled voting in the occupied Crimea, Sevastopol and parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine, where martial law is in force. The results of any such “elections” organized by the Russian Federation will have no legal force under international law. Such actions contradict international law and violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. Therefore, the OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE PA have stated that the results of the “elections” organized there by Russia will not be valid under international law.
The inclusion of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories in the national voting process in Russia is problematic from the point of view of the legitimacy of such voting. In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the Russian Central Election Commission has illegally formed 11 single-member constituencies. constituencies, but their influence extends beyond that. Of the 450 deputies of the State Duma, 225 are elected from federal party lists. Therefore, votes cast in the occupied territories are included in the national result and affect the distribution of half of the parliamentary seats. Since votes from these territories are also counted in the distribution of seats on federal party lists, this issue extends beyond the legitimacy of individual deputies representing the occupied regions and affects the formation of the State Duma as a whole.
The voting is being organized in territories outside the Russian military occupation, and the decision to hold it was made by the Central Election Commission of Russia after consultations with the Ministry of Defense and the FSB. With the presence of military and security forces, it is impossible to independently verify the voluntary participation of the population, the freedom of political choice and the accuracy of the results. Although Russia has launched a propaganda campaign in the occupied Ukrainian territories, its main goal is to attract residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine to participate in the fake “elections“ and to create the illusion of a high voter turnout. In particular, in order to form a “correct” picture, the occupiers are actively recruiting local pensioners. The exploitation of the elderly is a classic manipulative technique. Due to the vulnerability of this population group, the occupation administrations are trying to create an atmosphere of excitement and popular support for voting, concealing the real coercion and the factual lack of any choice.
The presence of ten parties on the federal election ballot does not in itself indicate real political competition.
During Vladimir Putin's rule, a significant part of the non-systemic opposition was banned, expelled from the country or deprived of the right to participate in elections. The barriers are especially high for politicians who openly oppose the war in Ukraine.
The case of the “Yabloko“ party is particularly indicative. On August 10, the Supreme Court of Russia, in a lawsuit filed by the “Rodina“ party, canceled the registration of the federal list of “Yabloko“. This party remained the only registered political force with an open anti-war position.
This case shows that restrictions no longer apply only to the non-systemic opposition. However, even a legal systemic opposition party may be prohibited from participating in a federal campaign if its participation creates an opportunity for political expression of anti-war protest.
By the summer of 2026, according to the Russian Election Monitor, 32 party representatives had been prevented from participating in the elections in various ways, 58 politicians had been fined, 13 had become defendants in criminal cases, and ten had been designated as “foreign agents“.
These figures point to a model of preventive management of political competition. Its goal is not to eliminate any alternative party, but to prevent the election of those political entities that could potentially consolidate a protest or anti-war electorate. The Kremlin seeks to control not only the winner, but also the scale of the victory.
Key positions in the regional lists of “United Russia“ are occupied by governors, mayors and other civil servants, which provides the ruling party with access to administrative, personnel and information capabilities unavailable to its competitors. Under these conditions, the formal multi-party system does not imply equality between participants in the electoral process.
An important feature of the Russian electoral system is the establishment of expected indicators of the effectiveness of the regions. According to RBC data cited in the document, on the eve of the 2026 elections, the Kremlin has oriented regional administrations towards a voter turnout of approximately 50% and support for the “United Russia“ party of 55% of the vote, although specific targets may vary depending on the region.
The parliamentary elections in Russia, which will be held from September 18 to 20, 2026, are taking place in a context in which the main parameters of political competition are largely determined even before the start of voting. The continued elimination of the non-systemic opposition, restrictions on anti-war political activity, the use of administrative resources, and the advantage of the United Russia party in the information space significantly limit the ability of voters to influence the composition of the future State Duma through competitive elections. The three-day voting, mass electronic voting, reduced opportunities for independent public monitoring, and the absence of the OSCE/ODIHR create a situation in which a significant part of key procedures is controlled exclusively by Russian state agencies. Therefore, the main problem lies not only in potential violations, but also in the impossibility of independently verifying the authenticity of the final results.
The Russian State Duma elections on September 18-20 are being held in the absence of a full international observation mission. Restrictions on the anti-war opposition, widespread remote electronic voting, dominance of the ruling party, and the inclusion of votes from occupied territory of another state in the federal results support allegations of premeditated fraud in the Russian Federation, as well as the cumulative failure of key conditions of the electoral process to meet the criteria for free, competitive, and independently verified elections. Taken together, these violations make it impossible to assess the elections in Russia as fully competitive and verified.