Russian President Vladimir Putin has only two options in Ukraine: complete victory or endless war, The Atlantic Council writes in an article.
Any serious attempt to end the Russo-Ukrainian war must begin with a frank assessment of the historical grievances and imperial insecurities that form the basis of Putin’s geopolitical worldview. Putin’s fierce opposition to Ukrainian statehood reflects his deep-seated resentment of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
For Putin, Ukraine is not only the most populous of the numerous non-Russian republics that emerged from the remnants of the USSR; it is culturally, spiritually, and historically inseparable from Russia itself. The restoration of Ukraine is therefore key to reversing the Soviet collapse, while the further consolidation of Ukrainian statehood threatens to act as a catalyst for the next stage of Russia's retreat from empire.
This has inspired the obsession with the destruction of an independent Ukraine that has become a defining feature of Putin's revisionist ideology and has dominated his entire rule.
Most importantly, Putin has presented his invasion as a return to "historical Russian lands." This alone is enough to cast serious doubt on the durability of any agreement based on the current front lines of the war.
An agreement reflecting today’s battlefield realities would limit Russian gains to roughly 20 percent of Ukraine, while the rest of the country would remain outside the Kremlin’s control and free to continue consolidating its position in the wider Western world. This would be seen in Moscow as a major defeat, with Putin doomed to go down in Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.
Almost everything about Putin’s current stance suggests that he has no interest in ending the war and no intention of coexisting with an independent Ukraine. While the Russian leader has only declared the idea of a peace agreement, he has repeatedly refused to join Kiev in agreeing to an unconditional ceasefire. Instead, Putin is pushing to address the so-called “root causes” of the war, which effectively means imposing restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty that would turn the country into a Russian vassal.
Putin’s fierce opposition to a post-war European military presence on Ukrainian territory is equally telling. He recently said that any attempt to deploy European troops in Ukraine would amount to “war with Russia.” Given the long-standing presence of significant European forces in the six NATO countries bordering Russia, Putin’s objections make little sense from a purely military perspective. Instead, his scare tactics are a clear indicator that he intends to complete the conquest of Ukraine and does not want even a token number of European troops to stand in his way.
Putin is undoubtedly eager to delay the return from Ukraine of more than half a million brutally maimed Russian soldiers, whose presence on the home front could easily become a source of internal destabilization. Veterans of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan played a key role in the rise of lawlessness during the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s. No one in Moscow wants to risk a repeat.
Putin’s determination to wipe Ukraine off the map and his regime’s dependence on the current military conditions make further escalation a far more realistic prospect than peace. Indeed, if he fails to secure a decisive victory in Ukraine, Putin will almost certainly choose to continue the war indefinitely rather than settle for a compromise agreement that would have uncertain consequences for his regime.
The Russian ruler believes he is waging a holy war to destroy Ukraine and restore his country’s superpower status. He will not be distracted from this messianic goal by promises of small territorial concessions. Instead, serious negotiations will only begin when Putin is subjected to significantly greater pressure from Ukraine’s international allies. Peace with Putin’s Russia is possible, but it can only be peace through force.