Russia accused Ukraine of not having conducted an exchange of prisoners of war and not having accepted the bodies of its soldiers who died in the fighting. These are part of the Kremlin's efforts to thwart agreed confidence-building measures with Ukraine, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) commented.
Aide to the Russian President Vladimir Medinsky, First Deputy Head of the Information Department of the Main Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff Alexander Zorin, and Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Alexander Fomin said that Russia is ready to exchange seriously wounded and sick prisoners of war, prisoners of war under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of the dead, as agreed during the last bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2.
Zorin further stated that Russian representatives had been waiting for Ukrainian representatives at the border with Belarus to clarify the technical details related to the exchange of bodies, but the Ukrainian representatives never arrived.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Relations Andrey Klimov claimed that Ukraine had refused to repatriate the bodies of the dead.
The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters denied the allegations and clarified that Ukraine and Russia had not yet agreed on a specific date.
The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters confirmed that it remained fully committed to the successful implementation.
Russian authorities continued their efforts to shift the blame from Russia to Western countries for the lack of progress towards a peaceful settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European countries of being the main obstacle to peace talks in Ukraine.
Ryabkov also said that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was opposed to peace in Ukraine and was trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to the "path of escalation" in the war.
Ryabkov said that the United States is aware that Russia will not deviate - even with the imposition of more sanctions - from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war (a phrase that Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO's open door policy and other unilateral US concessions that the Trump administration has described as "too much").
ISW continues to assess that Russia is very likely to create information conditions for prolonging or possibly expanding the war.
On June 6, US President Donald Trump signaled that he is inclined to strengthen sanctions against Russia. However, Russia's economic difficulties have been and will continue to be conditioned by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure on Russia is not possible without continuing military sales to Ukraine. On June 6, Trump told reporters that he would be prepared to "use the Russia Sanctions Act of 2025, a bill in the U.S. Senate, if necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting.
The Russia Sanctions Act of 2025 enjoys broad bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate.
Any increased economic pressure on Russia - while a positive political development - is not enough by itself to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or to change Putin's theory of victory. Continued Western military aid to Ukraine remains key to mounting a pressure campaign against Russia that could force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.
Putin’s theory of victory is based on the assumption that the Russian military can sustain a gradual advance on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend themselves and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. Putin’s strategy will likely continue to guide his decision to refuse to engage meaningfully with the United States and Ukraine in peace negotiations.
Achieving a peace in Ukraine that is acceptable to U.S. interests requires sustained Russian battlefield losses or significant Russian battlefield failure. The United States must continue to arm Ukrainian soldiers, as Russian battlefield losses remain a key driver of Russia’s current material, human, and economic problems.
Western aid, especially weapons systems that only the United States can provide on a large scale and quickly, would allow Ukrainian forces to better defend their positions, slow down the Russian offensive, and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian military. Higher and more unsustainable levels of Russian battlefield casualties, especially when they are disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, would jeopardize Putin's efforts to balance and maintain domestic support.