The parliamentary elections in Russia ended with an expected victory for “United Russia“, but the vote did not answer the most important question – what is the real public support for the war in Ukraine. With limited political competition, the absence of real opposition and allegations of falsification of the results, how will the Kremlin use the election result… What did the elections actually show, will the result change the Russian strategy on the front and does Moscow have the resources to maintain the war for years to come? Plamen Dimitrov from the Bulgarian Geopolitical Society spoke to FACT.
- Mr. Dimitrov, “United Russia“ Vladimir Putin achieved a convincing victory in the parliamentary elections. Putin himself defined the vote as a test of support for the war in Ukraine. How should this result be interpreted - as a political confirmation of the Kremlin's course and will it change Russia's actions on the front in any way?
- Yes, indeed, for Vladimir Putin, the main goal of these elections was to show that he enjoys the support of the majority of Russians, holds the political initiative and has full control over the situation in the country. This was not difficult to achieve, considering that elections are held in Russia without a choice. All participating parties are proxies of the Kremlin and declare support for Putin's course. The only formation that advocated peace, i.e. - for an end to the war in Ukraine, was “Yabloko“. Initially, it was allowed to vote, but then its registration was deleted because the Kremlin was concerned that it could gather the protest anti-war vote. Under these conditions, voter turnout is used as a measure of support for the government. It reached almost 60%, more than in the previous parliamentary vote, and Putin immediately announced that this was support for his course. In other words, the Special Election Operation in Russia is much more successful than the Special Military Operation. The party "United Russia" received 57% of the vote, and the victory in most of the single-mandate districts brought it a constitutional majority in the State Duma. But considering that the opposition or independent observers have absolutely no access to the vote count, it is logical to assume that this result, as well as the percentage of voters, were falsified. According to an independent mathematical analysis, taking into account the anomalous differences between the results in neighboring polling stations, "United Russia" actually received about 34% of the vote. The rigging of the result became especially visible at the end of the official counting by the Central Election Commission, when with 99% of the ballots counted, the party "A Just Russia" was below the 5% barrier, but suddenly jumped over it. But these are technological details that do not change the general picture - in Russia, the issue of power and the country's political course is not decided in elections. Therefore, the results of the parliamentary vote will not affect the strategy and actions of the Russian army at the front.
- After the elections, do you expect a change in the Russian military strategy - stronger pressure on the front, new mobilization and more intensive strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, or on the contrary - a search for an opportunity for negotiations?
- The pressure of the Russian army on the front line will continue with the same force as before, it has not been reduced because of the elections. It is a mistake to think that Russia has some hidden military reserves that it is not putting into action due to political maneuvers on the diplomatic front. At the moment, Putin is not looking for negotiations, he still believes that he is the stronger side and that it is in his interest to continue the war. It is unlikely that there will be an officially announced new mobilization, because this will be met very negatively by the people of Russia. And there is little use for unmotivated and unprepared soldiers on the front. Rather, the Russian military authorities will seek to replenish the army's personnel using the methods used so far - monetary incentives, attracting prisoners and other marginal elements who have fallen into financial difficulties, administrative and psychological pressure on young people in the deep Russian provinces to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense. Recently, cases of sending foreign workers (mainly from Central Asia) who have recently received Russian citizenship to the front have become more frequent. Maybe comrade Kim Jong-un will come to the rescue again and send several tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers to die because of Putin's obsession with Ukraine.
- In recent months, there has been talk of possible agreements between Moscow and Kiev, including limiting attacks on energy infrastructure. Do you think there is a real chance that such agreements will be restored or expanded, or is military logic already prevailing over diplomatic signals?
- Yes, this month, US President Donald Trump even announced that Moscow and Kiev had agreed on an energy truce with American mediation. As often happens with Trump's loud statements, this turned out to be wishful thinking - Russia and Ukraine have not agreed on anything like this. But the situation has become clearer - the US is proposing an energy truce, President Zelensky said that Ukraine also supports it, and Russia rejects it. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov once again stated that Moscow does not intend to sign a sectoral truce and stop attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Kremlin continues to insist on some kind of general agreement on the future of Ukraine, its occupied territories and the European security architecture. In essence, the Kremlin is saying clearly – now we do not want any truce, because we believe that we will win.
- What does the situation on the front show at the moment – is there a side that manages to strategically change the course of the war, or are we in another stage of a war of attrition?
- No, the war has long been positional and this will not change soon. The front line passes through Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Kharkiv regions and over the past few months its outlines have changed very slightly. In the spring and summer, the Russians had more success, but during these months the Ukrainians successfully counterattacked in the Donetsk region and wiped out most of the Russian advance. There is a dead zone between the positions of the two armies, which is shot by drones, the more advanced they become, the more this zone expands. If you remember, in the first 1-2 years of the war there was a lot of talk about the supply of Western tanks and artillery installations to the Ukrainian army. Now the tanks are no longer on the battlefield, aviation is also not used to its full potential, the masters of the battlefield are drones and the people who control them.
- Ukraine continues to use drones to strike deep into Russian territory, including against energy-related objects. What does this mean for Russia's ability to protect its own infrastructure and could it lead to a new escalation of strikes on both sides?
- The escalation of air strikes against the two warring countries is already a fact. The change this year is that Ukrainian drones are reaching deeper into Russian territory. This month, there was an attack on energy facilities in Novy Urengoy (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), which is 2,800 km from the border with Ukraine. Russia is a huge country with many strategic facilities, it is impossible to provide reliable air defense for all of them. The improvement of drones and missiles significantly increases the chances of the attacking country and reduces the possibilities of defense. The Ukrainians have already hit almost all the oil refineries in the European part of Russia (however, this does not mean that they have put them out of action forever!) and managed to cause a shortage of gasoline and diesel at Russian gas stations - something that no one would have thought possible just 2-3 years ago. This was followed by strikes against the logistics bases of the largest retail companies in Russia - "Wildberries" and "Ozon". From a purely military point of view, this does not change the situation on the front, but it does great damage to the Russian economy and state budget and increases the feeling of anxiety among Russians.
- Russia has significantly greater human and resource capabilities, but the war has been going on for years. Where do you think the real limit of Russia's ability to maintain the current pace of hostilities is?
- Contrary to the cheerful statements that the Russian economy will collapse at any moment, I believe that Russia will be able to continue the war for many more years. The country has preserved a significant part of its pre-war revenues from oil exports, has a low level of state debt and still has a lot of unused financial resources "for rainy days".
The largest such resource is the savings of Russians in banks - I assume that there will come a time when they will be frozen, i.e. – stolen from the state, but it won't be in the next few months.
The standard of living of Russians will fall, but this is not something that will move Putin and make him give up his manic goals in the war. The situation with human resources is similar - Russia is in a much better position than Ukraine because it has about five times the population, including large groups of marginalized citizens who are more likely to go to war.
- In Kiev and the West, Moscow is expected to use the election result as evidence that Russian society is behind the Kremlin's policy. To what extent can the election result really be considered a measure of public support for the war, given that the elections were held in conditions of very limited political competition?
- As I have already mentioned - the elections in Russia are not fair and it is almost certain that the results are falsified. Yes, Putin uses the election result as evidence of the support he has, but few outside Russia believe him. It is precisely the limitation of political competition to only the circle of parties supporting Putin and the war that does not give us grounds to draw profound conclusions about the mood in Russian society. I believe that the majority of Russians are politically passive - they are not at all enthusiastic about the war, but they have no intention of taking to the streets and overthrowing the government and the president. And there is no one to lead such a rebellion - the real Russian oppositionists are either in prison or abroad. Some, like Alexei Navalny, were unfortunately physically liquidated.
- What is coming - a new major Russian offensive, a prolonged war of attrition or an attempt at political negotiation? And what are the specific signs by which we can understand in the coming months where the conflict is going?
- The Russian army does not have the strength for a new major offensive, and Putin is not in the mood for negotiation. So the third option remains - a prolonged war of attrition. In my opinion, in the coming months we will not understand where the conflict is going, because it will remain in the same place. A sign of change would be a serious breakthrough by the Russian army and occupation of the entire Donetsk region, but I think that this will not happen by the end of winter. Perhaps the more dramatic events in the coming months will take place in the rear of the two warring states. Ukraine is left without Patriot interceptor missiles for Russian ballistic missiles and is suffering huge damage from the strikes. There is still no reliable and cheap countermeasure against the latest Russian drones, Geran-4 and Geran-5. The Russians are already destroying not only Ukraine's energy infrastructure, but also commercial logistics centers and railway facilities, including locomotives. The winter in the attacked country will be very harsh, but I do not think that this will break the spirit of Ukrainians or cause many more of them to flee abroad.