During the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York, the disagreements between key players in the events in the Middle East were once again highlighted and confirmed. The eccentric US president, applying his signature style of public diplomacy, has delivered an optimistic message of a quick end to the crisis with Iran, while at the same time threatening the country with total destruction, writes Konstantinos Phillis, an adjunct professor at the American College of Greece and director of the "Institute for Global Affairs," in an article for Kathimerini.
With the midterm elections approaching and given the fact that a majority of Americans have opposed military action against Iran from the start, Donald Trump's approval ratings are plummeting - partly due to the consequences of the seven-month-long crisis in the Middle East and its visible impact on the US economy. As a result, it is logical to expect a solution - albeit temporary - to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This need of the US president is well known both to the Iranians (who, however, are facing severe economic difficulties) and to their allies such as Russia and China; Although not directly involved in the conflict, these countries support Tehran in various ways (with the economic aspect being particularly significant in the case of China). Russian and Chinese satellites are used to increase the effectiveness and accuracy of Iranian attacks on US bases in the region; in addition, Iran continues to receive military equipment from Moscow and Beijing, which also provide classified intelligence on the movement of US troops.
It is generally accepted that both powers benefit from the US being involved in a front that imposes a financial burden, depletes defense reserves (some of which Ukraine is deprived of), tests the resilience of the armed forces during a prolonged conflict (as shown by the eight recorded suicide attempts among sailors from the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group), undermines the image of the US as a guarantor of security in the eyes of host countries, causes serious damage to Washington's prestige and thus creates conditions capable of changing the status quo in the Middle East. In fact, the US president recently refused to assist Saudi Arabia in its conflict with the Houthis in Yemen - a critical moment for Riyadh, given that the country is facing attacks on its oil facilities, its capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz via the "East-West" pipeline is drastically limited, and ships carrying Saudi-related oil and goods have been targeted, effectively blocking the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Trump's message is twofold: he has no desire to get involved in yet another front in the Middle East - by investing additional diplomatic, military and economic resources to deal with the consequences of a war that was ultimately a personal choice - and, more importantly, he is putting American interests above the responsibilities and commitments arising from his role as an ally of the Gulf states.
The latter are certainly concerned about the general US position, starting from the failure to be informed about military operations against Iran, through the unwillingness or inability to "finish what was started" by overthrowing the regime or at least neutralizing its operational capabilities, and, of course, failing to protect them from Iranian attacks and - most importantly - to restore the normal functioning of the Strait of Hormuz, as it was before the war.
While there is no external power capable or willing to take on the role of the Americans or even partially replace them, it is no exaggeration to say that US hegemony in the Middle East has begun to weaken.
Washington's initiative to create a $10 billion investment scheme with eight regional partners is significant; it aims to restore the energy infrastructure damaged in the past seven months, as well as build and expand pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. However, the implementation of this plan will require significant time and funds, almost ten times the amounts initially promised. Given the often superficial way in which the various agreements brokered by the US are publicized, there is currently no concrete case for strengthening ties between regional states and the US or for fostering deeper engagement with Washington.
However, the US forces currently stationed at 19 bases (eight of which are permanent) are expected to be withdrawn. This is due, firstly, to the fact that these bases have proven highly vulnerable to attacks by cheap drones and missiles, and secondly, to their dispersion in different locations; their geographical consolidation makes sense, as it would also facilitate the redirection of strategic focus and military resources to Southeast Asia.
At this stage - whether before or after the US midterm elections - the aim is to find a temporary, transitional framework for understanding, not a final settlement. The problems to be solved are multifaceted and interconnected; they require building a basic level of trust before a gradual resolution can be pursued and positive momentum can be created. President Trump has realized that it is easier to start a war than to end one, a fact confirmed by history, as most armed conflicts over the past 80 years have not led to a sustainable diplomatic solution. This is even more true in today's Middle East, where numerous scattered conflict zones remain unresolved, capable of rekindling at any moment.
Source: news.bg