DV: Prime Minister Radev said yesterday that the attack on two ships in the Bulgarian economic zone in the Black Sea "is hardly the most serious incident". Is that right?
Ruslan Trad: There are several changes here. This is the first time a merchant ship has sunk in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone, and the strike was most likely coordinated and used both air and sea drones. This requires planning, route reconnaissance and logistics for launching far from the coast. The attack took place at around three o'clock in the morning, 70-80 nautical miles from the coast, i.e. far from any observation on land. The crew of the ABLE survived somewhat by chance, because a Bulgarian ferry was in the area at the time. If this ship had not been there, the death toll could have been much higher.
Therefore, the incident is serious not so much in terms of the number of victims, but as a precedent. It shows that the maritime space of a NATO country can be used for strikes without warning and without anyone facing consequences. The fact that the crew members of the ALFA WATAN are still being searched for adds to this burden. One of the worst messages is that the Black Sea front is clearly expanding and we should no longer look only to the Baltic as an opportunity for escalation and aggressive actions.
DV: Ukrainian President Zelensky said that everything has been discussed and clarified with the Bulgarian authorities and that this is a Russian attack. Why is the Bulgarian government saying nothing, including giving no indication that a conversation was held with the Ukrainian side?
Zelensky stated that "the entire volume of data has been clarified with the Bulgarian side", that the Ukrainian naval forces have contacted their colleagues in Bulgaria and that it has been established that this was a Russian combined attack with naval and air drones. He added that Ukraine has not conducted operations in this area. The wording speaks of contact between fleets, not of a conclusion confirmed by Bulgaria. Contact between naval headquarters is a routine channel and does not mean that Sofia has accepted the Ukrainian assessment. As we can see, there is neither Bulgarian confirmation nor refutation of this version, so the factual status of the conversation is unclear. It must be said that Bulgarian institutions have no experience with attribution of naval drones in their own zone. When the system is not secure, the safest institutional reaction is to say nothing until it is certain. This is a precaution, but it is also a political choice.
DV: One of the surviving sailors from the ABLE says he believes the vessel was hit by Russia because it was carrying Ukrainian cargo. Ukrainian President Zelensky has also blamed Moscow. Are there other indications that Russia is responsible for the attacks on the two ships?
There is currently no public evidence to resolve this issue. However, there are indicators of varying severity. The testimony of a surviving sailor that, in his opinion, a depth charge was used and that the Ukrainian cargo was the cause is an eyewitness assumption, not data.
However, the logic of the motive points to Russia, because it is the state that systematically threatens shipping to Ukrainian ports. On the other hand, no one has claimed responsibility, that the ships were dry cargo ships, not oil tankers, and that one of them sailed from Egypt to Sulina in Romania, with its cargo not identified. The profile of the weapon is crucial. The remains of the drones, the radio frequencies, the navigation module and the direction of launch usually indicate the manufacturer and type. Until such data is released, the most correct formulation is "probable but unproven Russian responsibility", without excluding another version.
DV: Bulgaria recently stated that it will not participate in NATO's anti-drone defense. In the context of the political situation in Bulgaria, what indications does the government's reaction to Bulgaria's partners - in NATO and in the EU - give?
The two things should not be mixed and this was not explained properly by the administration. The refusal of the initiative was argued with duplication with an EU project and a limited budget. But the incident is at sea, close to the coast. Ground-based anti-drone systems, which are the subject of similar programs, would not have prevented it. What is missing is maritime awareness: radar and sensor coverage, patrol platforms, the ability to detect small surface and underwater vehicles.
The partners will look at this. It is not about political loyalty, but about capabilities. The question for Sofia is what it can actually see and protect in its own zone and how quickly it can request and accept assistance. The first indicator will be whether Bulgaria will seek an allied presence in the region, strengthen cooperation with Romania and Turkey, and present a clear plan for maritime surveillance, and not just whether it will change its mind about the specific initiative.
DV: How will these two cases - in the Bulgarian economic zone and earlier near Romania - affect the security situation in the Black Sea?
Most of all, they will remove the illusion that the western part of the sea is a zone protected by its distance from the front. Romania and Bulgaria are NATO countries, and their economic zones lie on the routes to Constanta, Varna, and Burgas. This will increase the pressure for closer maritime surveillance, mine countermeasures, coordination between coast guards and intelligence sharing between allies.
A direct military response should not be expected. The exclusive economic zone is not sovereign territory, and the attack is on foreign merchant ships, so Article 5 is not automatically triggered. Russia knows this well. The real effect will be a hardening of the shipping regime: stricter recommendations for routes, higher insurance premiums and more difficult hiring crews. Economic consequences for local businesses can also be expected - imagine the impact on fishermen, for example, if they have to constantly return to ports due to fears of new attacks. This is the desired effect of such attacks.
DV: In both the Romanian and Bulgarian cases, it is a Turkish ship or a Turkish crew. Are there any indications of any reaction from Ankara and how much weight would this carry if Turkey decides to take any action?
The facts are that 11 of the ABLE’s 18 sailors are Turkish and that Turkish media describe both ships in the Bulgarian case as being owned by Turks. Ankara’s tone cannot be predicted solely by the nationality of the crew – it depends on whether Turkish citizens were killed and whether the strike appears to be deliberate.
Turkey has several levers: control over the straits under the Montreux Convention, the largest fleet in the Black Sea and the role of mediator between Moscow and Kiev. At the same time, it is strongly tied to Russia in trade, energy and tourism, so a unilateral military move is unlikely. More realistic is increased diplomacy, coordination with Bucharest and Sofia and pressure for shipping safety, possibly within the framework of the existing trilateral cooperation on mine action. If it turns out that Turkish citizens were killed in a targeted attack, Ankara's tone could become much tougher.