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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Borislav Tsekov: Freedom Cannot Be Revoked

The regime of Vladimir Putin also used this false narrative, introducing an extremely repressive foreign agents law in Russia in 2012

Nov 17, 2026 13:00 54

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Borislav Tsekov: Freedom Cannot Be Revoked - 1
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These days, partisan uproar has once again erupted over the Revival party’s bill on foreign agents. When it was first introduced several years ago, I wrote about its inadmissibility in a democratic society and thoroughly debunked the false narrative that such legislation existed in the United States.

The regime of Vladimir Putin also used this false narrative, introducing an extremely repressive foreign agents law in Russia in 2012. Following its example, a similar legislative framework was introduced in Hungary under Orbán, requiring non-governmental organizations receiving foreign funding above a certain threshold to register with the special status of “organizations receiving support from abroad.” The law required these organizations to publicly identify their status, disclose information about significant foreign donors, and be entered in a public register, while also providing for sanctions in the event of non-compliance.

The problem with this law was that, like the Russian one, it did not require proof of actual dependence on a foreign state or the execution of its instructions, but tied registration solely to the amount and origin of the funding. I use the past tense deliberately, because in 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union established that the law was contrary to EU law, which led to its repeal in 2021. In Georgia, torn apart by Russia’s attempts to keep it in its “prison of nations,” a Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence was adopted in 2024, modeled on the Kremlin’s approach. It introduced mandatory registration in a public register as “organizations pursuing the interests of a foreign power” for non-governmental organizations and certain media outlets receiving more than 20% of their annual revenue from abroad.

And in 2025, a separate Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents was passed, claiming to be philosophically closer to the American model. It explicitly introduced the status of “agent of a foreign principal” for individuals and legal entities acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or under the control of a foreign principal in certain activities, including political activity. Both Georgian laws have been the subject of sharp criticism from the standpoint of democratic standards and human rights. Although the second law largely reproduces the structure of the American FARA and ties registration to the existence of an agency relationship with a foreign principal, in an opinion issued in October 2025 the Venice Commission recommended its repeal or substantial revision because of the numerous vague concepts that open the door to administrative arbitrariness, as well as the disproportionate nature of the sanctions.

Given the risky geopolitical profile of today’s Bulgarian government, which thinks and acts more along the authoritarian tracks of the Kremlin than in accordance with the standards of democratic constitutionalism and the European Union, it is necessary to point out once again why the Russian foreign agents law and its aforementioned analogues, including the Bulgarian one, have nothing in common with the American Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Or, more precisely, they have as much in common as the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, concerning freedom of speech and of the press, has with Article 50 of the “Brezhnev” Constitution of the USSR from 1977, which also refers to “freedom of speech and of the press,” but only insofar as it is used to “strengthen and develop the socialist system.” The American law, known in the United States also as the “McCormack Act,” after its sponsor—the Massachusetts senator John William McCormack—was adopted and signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on June 9, 1938, on the eve of World War II, with the aim of limiting the influence of Nazi and communist propaganda on U.S. state policy. Since then, it has undergone numerous amendments, but the most significant ones, which substantially changed its scope and philosophy in line with changing historical circumstances and realities, were adopted in 1966 and 1995.

In principle, ensuring greater transparency in the political process from the standpoint of the influence of foreign interests is a legitimate legislative objective. But this objective does not justify the means; that is, it cannot serve as a cover for repressive measures against civil society and freedom of conscience. This is why the American and Russian laws are diametrically opposed. The American law achieves this objective and ensures such transparency, whereas the Russian law pursues a repressive goal—not transparency, but the stigmatization and exclusion from the political process and, to a large extent, from public life, of a particular group of entities designated as “foreign agents.” In broad outline, here are some of the more significant differences:

First, their scope is different. The American FARA defines a “foreign agent” as a person who is an agent, representative, employee, or acts in another capacity at the order, request, direction, or under the control of a foreign principal or of a person controlled by a foreign principal. The law strictly covers political activities carried out on behalf of or in the interests of a foreign principal, including work as a public relations adviser, advertising agent, information-service employee, or political consultant. It also covers activities involving the disbursement of funds on behalf of a foreign principal or representation before government authorities. Non-political activities, legal services, diplomats, religious and scientific organizations, and others do not fall within the scope of the law.

A “foreign principal” is understood to mean any foreign government, foreign political party, or person registered in another country. The key point here is the existence of an organizational, subordinate, and legal connection between the principal and the agent, rather than merely financial relations. The “foreign agent” acts on behalf of or in the interests of a foreign principal. This is why, for example, many major non-governmental organizations that receive funding from international organizations, states, and foreign foundations, such as “Amnesty International,” based in London, or “Reporters Without Borders,” based in Paris, do not fall within the scope of the American FARA. These are independent organizations that do not carry out the orders of a foreign principal. By contrast, the Russian law defines as a “foreign agent” any person, including individuals, media outlets, and NGOs, that receives any funding from abroad, without requiring that they be controlled or directed by a foreign principal. The Bulgarian bill broadly provides for the same. This opens the door to arbitrary decisions by the state authorities, without any need to prove an actual connection with a foreign principal.

Second, the legal consequences are different. The American law requires registration in a public register, in which the foreign principal, the amount, and the purpose of the funding received are disclosed. Failure to register within the prescribed period is subject to fines. The Russian law, however, provides not only for fines but also criminalizes violations of the law, with penalties of up to two years in prison. What is more, it introduces severe lustration and repressive consequences for registered persons. Article 11, for example, sets out 18 restrictions, including a ban on political activity, expert activity related to government, holding public office, and more. The Bulgarian bill provides for lustration restrictions along the same lines. Last but not least is stigmatization, since in Eastern Europe the term “agent” has a negative connotation and is associated with a “spy,” whereas in the United States the term “agent” generally denotes an “authorized representative.”

In other words, the Russian law has nothing in common with the American one because it is an instrument of authoritarian rule, used to restrict political pluralism, freedom of speech and conscience, and, generally speaking, to repress the opposition. The Bulgarian bill is a local imitation of the Russian law, contradicts the Constitution down to the last comma, and has no place whatsoever in a free and democratic society. It should therefore not only be rejected, but should not even be admitted for parliamentary debate. For restricting rights and freedoms and introducing authoritarian legislation is not a suitable subject for discussion in the parliament of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Freedom cannot be revoked!