Hungary: “Operation Purgatory” reaches ministers, the central bank and Orbán’s family
Following Péter Magyar’s electoral victory in April 2026, which brought an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule, the new government launched an anti-corruption campaign known as “Operation Purgatory”.
A specialised structure was established to locate and recover public assets, while investigations targeted former ministers, financial institutions and people close to Orbán.
Miklós Seszták, former Minister of National Development (2014–2018)He was detained in September 2026 on suspicion of receiving more than 37 million dollars in bribes and illegal commissions linked to state transport supplies and construction projects.
On 12 and 13 November, investigators discovered funds in various currencies worth a total of approximately 19.5 million dollars. Some had allegedly been buried in forests, while others were hidden in agricultural buildings, warehouses, homes and safes.
It took 12 state treasury employees eight hours to count the money.
György Matolcsy, former Governor of the Hungarian National Bank (2013–2025)He was detained in October 2026 on suspicion of financial crimes related to the management of public assets.
The investigation concerns a foundation established with central bank funds and provided with assets worth 288 billion forints, approximately 818 million dollars.
Prosecutors are examining alleged sham financial operations and investments from which affiliated persons may have benefited. Matolcsy denies any wrongdoing.
Ádám Matolcsy, son of the former central bank governorAn arrest warrant has been issued for him on suspicion of fraud in connection with the investigation into the financial operations. He is wanted, which should not be presented as an arrest having taken place.
Two other former ministers from Orbán’s governmentReuters confirms that a total of two former ministers, apart from the former central banker, have been detained in separate corruption investigations. Seszták is among them.
Viktor Orbán’s brotherHe was detained in a separate investigation into alleged human trafficking. The former prime minister described the actions as political revenge.
Thus, the investigations in Hungary now encompass former government members, the senior financial sector and the family of the former prime minister.
Serbia: from the criminal police leadership to the director of the country’s largest prison
Following the victory of the opposition backed by student protests in the parliamentary elections on 25 October 2026, Serbia experienced a series of arrests and investigations targeting senior representatives of the state apparatus.
Particular attention has focused on police officials, public-sector figures and employees suspected of electoral violations.
Marko Kričak, director of the Criminal Police DirectorateArrested on 1 November 2026, Kričak is among the influential representatives of the Serbian Interior Ministry and is regarded as close to the previous government. In 2025, he was personally decorated by Aleksandar Vučić. Prosecutors are investigating him for abuse of office and alleged violence and torture against a detainee.
According to the indictment, Kričak participated in actions in which the victim was beaten, including with a belt, and a hood was placed over his head.
Bosko Sekulić, head of the crime-fighting serviceHe was arrested together with Kričak on 1 November. He is being investigated for alleged abuse of office and the presentation of false or incomplete evidence in a murder investigation in Belgrade. Prosecutors suspect that the two police chiefs participated in the wrongful accusation of former Belgrade police chief Veselin Milić.
The chief prosecutor of Belgrade stated that the arrests were not connected to the results of the parliamentary elections.
Radoljub Rončević, director of the “Zabela” prisonArrested on 6 November 2026. Rončević runs Serbia’s largest prison, located near Požarevac. He is being investigated for alleged vote-buying and abuse of office. The case is particularly indicative of the possible use of state resources for political purposes.
According to Serbia’s Interior Ministry, between 15 and 25 October 2026 the prison was entrusted with storing 20,265 cartons of confiscated cigarettes.
Investigators suspect that the director ordered some of the cigarettes, as well as packets of coffee, to be distributed to inmates in exchange for voting for the “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” electoral list.
Some of the cigarettes were also transferred to other prisons.
Rončević was initially placed in police custody for up to 48 hours.
Here, the issue goes beyond an ordinary corruption scheme. The investigation is examining whether the head of a state prison used property entrusted to him to influence the electoral vote.
Rade Basta, former Minister of EconomyArrested on 11 November 2026, Basta served as Serbia’s economy minister in 2022–2023 and previously headed the municipal heating company “Beogradske elektrane”. The investigation concerns alleged abuses that caused losses of tens of millions of Serbian dinars.
According to Serbian media, he approved improper donations to sports organisations, including football, basketball and equestrian clubs.
Searches and other actions involving people connected with the investigation were also carried out during the operation.
Yugoslav Nikolić, director of the Republic Hydrometeorological InstituteHe was arrested on 3 November 2026 together with two other people. Nikolić, 71, is suspected of laundering at least 650,000 euros and concealing assets and income.
According to prosecutors, between 2019 and 2024 financial operations involving allegedly illegal funds were carried out, including the acquisition of real estate in Serbia and Montenegro.
On 6 November, Nikolić was removed as director by a decision of the Serbian government.
Predrag Vuletić, Vojvodina provincial secretary for social policyArrested on 5 November 2026. Diana Milović, chair of a commission for distributing financial assistance, was also detained with him.
The two are suspected of abuse of office in granting more than 130 million dinars, over one million euros, to people who did not meet the eligibility criteria.
The funds were intended for families with a third or fourth child.
On 7 November, the court ordered detention for up to 30 days.
Davor Macura, owner of Alta BankaArrested on 2 November 2026, Macura owns the Alta financial group, whose bank handled significant payments for Serbian state-owned companies.
According to prosecutors, he and two bank employees are suspected of unlawfully removing funds from the bank vault amounting to approximately 380 million euros.
The other two detainees are the director of cash management and an employee in the same department. All three were remanded in custody for up to 30 days.
The Serbian central bank revoked Alta Banka’s licence.
More Hungarian government representatives detained
Further checks also identified specific names in the investigation into the unlawful spending of funds from the National Cultural Fund.
Balázs Hankó, former minister of culture and innovation and Fidesz MP. Arrested on 1 October 2026.
Veronika Varga-Bajusz, former state secretary at the Ministry of Culture and Innovation. Arrested in the same investigation.
Balázs Bús, former Fidesz mayor of Óbuda. Arrested in June 2026.
Attila Ughy, former head of a body responsible for distributing cultural subsidies. Arrested in June.
Anikó Kruchinae Herter, director-general of the National Agency for Cultural Funding Management. Arrested in June.
According to the Hungarian prosecution service, between September 2025 and March 2026, National Cultural Fund resources were improperly distributed in 1,079 cases, with the alleged damage to the budget reaching 17.3 billion forints, around 46.3 million euros.
Investigators claim that some of the funds were used to finance election campaigns and for personal purposes.
On 11 November, a Hungarian court confirmed the continued detention of Hankó and Varga-Bajusz until 1 February 2027.
Bulgaria after Radev’s victory: there are arrests, but political dependencies remain. The government faces the decisive test of justice
While in Hungary and Serbia investigations have reached former ministers, senior police chiefs, bankers and heads of state institutions, in Bulgaria the anti-corruption actions so far have focused mainly on local authorities linked to the DPS. GERB’s long-serving mayors remain outside the publicly known large-scale operations for now, Boyko Borisov is displaying enviable calm, and the forthcoming election of a new Supreme Judicial Council and prosecutor general may prove the most serious test for Rumen Radev’s government. Because political change without institutional justice risks becoming yet another betrayal of public expectations.
Radev’s victory and expectations for dismantling the old modelOn 19 April 2026, Rumen Radev’s coalition “Progressive Bulgaria” won the parliamentary elections with 44.6% of the vote. With 131 MPs, it secured an outright majority in the National Assembly, and on 8 May Radev took the helm of the government.
Thus Bulgaria gained the opportunity for a government not dependent on complex coalition agreements, shifting majorities and constant political compromises. But this opportunity also brought enormous responsibility.
Radev’s victory was not merely an election result. It expressed accumulated public dissatisfaction with corruption, institutional dependencies, the opaque distribution of public funds and the political model associated by his critics with Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski.
The majority gave the new government the political instrument to undertake deep reforms. It did not, however, grant it the right to interfere with the (in)dependent judiciary, nor an excuse for inaction regarding institutional problems.
Seven months after the government began, the first conclusions can already be drawn. There have been police operations, local government representatives have been detained, and investigations into alleged corruption schemes involving public procurement have been launched. But there is still no sufficiently convincing picture of the systematic dismantling of dependencies built over many years.
This is precisely where Rumen Radev’s real test begins.
The arrests in Belitsa and Sungurlare: the investigation reached mayors, but not the political summitOn 20 and 21 October, the Directorate General for Combating Organised Crime carried out special operations in Burgas and Blagoevgrad provinces. Belitsa mayor Radoslav Revanski and Sungurlare mayor Dimitar Gavazov, representatives of the DPS, were detained. The investigation concerns alleged criminal conspiracy and influence peddling in public procurement worth more than 7 million euros.
According to information released by prosecutors, contractor companies were allegedly expected to pay between 25% and 35% of the value of certain public contracts. If proven, these allegations would concern not isolated violations but a mechanism through which public funds were turned into a source of illegal private gain.
On 22 October, the court remanded the two mayors in custody, but on 29 October the Burgas Court of Appeal changed their measures to house arrest.
The case gained even greater significance because of its connection to another investigation launched months earlier in Burgas Province.
Hristo Shirokov and the second charge: the investigations intersectBack in July, during a Directorate General for Combating Organised Crime operation in Pomorie, DPS regional chairman in Burgas Hristo Shirokov, who is also a long-serving municipal councillor in Pomorie, was detained.
Other defendants, including former Water and Sewerage–Burgas director Tsvetan Mirchev, were charged in the initial pre-trial proceedings for an alleged organised crime group (OCG). Subsequently, Shirokov was also charged with a second offence of participating in an organised crime group, allegedly involving the mayors of Belitsa and Sungurlare.
This development gives the investigation a new scale.
It is no longer merely a matter of individual municipal administrations or isolated public contracts. The prosecution’s theory outlines alleged links between political figures, local authorities, economic interests and mechanisms for distributing public funds.
Interior Minister Ivan Demerdzhiev said investigators had identified data concerning a company linked to one of the mayors that had won hundreds of contracts worth substantial sums in different parts of the country. He said alleged financial flows from public procurement to specific individuals had also been traced.
Demerdzhiev stressed that the operations resulted from prolonged work rather than a political or electoral timetable.
The important question is whether the investigation will establish if the alleged scheme operated independently or relied on broader political protection. This is the line between uncovering a specific crime and exposing an entire corruption mechanism.
GERB’s long-serving mayors remain outside the Interior Ministry’s actions for nowAgainst the backdrop of the arrests of DPS representatives, the absence of publicly known comparable large-scale actions against long-serving GERB mayors is striking.
This fact alone does not prove political selectivity. Nor can criminal activity be inferred solely from party affiliation or length of time in office. But it poses a significant problem for confidence in the declared fight against corruption.
In numerous municipalities governed by the same political figures for three, four or more terms, huge amounts of public money have over the years been distributed through public procurement, construction, concessions, municipal property and contracts with private contractors.
Long-term rule creates conditions for lasting administrative and economic dependencies. This does not automatically mean corruption exists, but it is sufficient grounds for increased public and institutional oversight, especially where there are specific reports and journalistic investigations into corruption and abuse of power.
Checks should cover the concentration of public contracts among a limited group of contractors, recurring participants in procedures, possible links between companies, municipal administrations and people in their political circles. Particular attention should be paid to cases in which the same companies receive a substantial share of municipal financial resources for years, while genuine competition in procurement raises legitimate doubts.
The assets of public officials, especially mayors, must also be examined where there are indications of unexplained wealth or a discrepancy between declared income and acquired property, including abroad, where a large part of the corruption cash has been transferred.
The fight against corruption cannot have a party boundary. If institutions show activity only against representatives of one political force while failing to adequately examine specific allegations against others, public confidence will inevitably be called into question.
Rumen Radev and his government cannot afford for such an impression to become a lasting characteristic of their rule.
Borisov is calm, smiling and joking again on televisionAgainst this background, Boyko Borisov’s behaviour deserves a separate political analysis. The GERB leader appears visibly relaxed. He smiles, jokes in front of the cameras and displays confidence and calm, as though the heavy electoral defeat and the new government’s declared intention to dismantle the old dependencies pose no immediate political problem for him.
This public behaviour does not prove the existence of deals, guarantees or hidden political relations. But the contrast is obvious.
On one side is Radev’s government, which declares its determination to reach the top of the oligarchic pyramid. On the other is the leader of the party that governed Bulgaria for a significant part of the past two decades, continuing to appear in public with the confidence of a political factor that has retained its influence.
An electoral defeat does not automatically mean a loss of positions in the administration, local government, regulatory bodies and the justice system. That is where the real problem lies. Political power can change in a day. Institutional dependencies built over years do not disappear when election results are announced.
Hungary and Serbia: political change reached the highest levels of the stateThe parallel with events in Hungary and Serbia is particularly revealing. After Viktor Orbán fell, Hungarian investigations covered former ministers, the leadership of the central bank, state administration officials and people close to the former prime minister. Alleged financial abuses worth hundreds of millions of euros, illegal distribution of public funds and possible use of state resources for political purposes are being investigated.
In Serbia, after the electoral change and Vučić’s fall, arrests followed of senior police officials, a former minister, a banker, heads of state institutions and a prison director suspected of using confiscated goods to influence the electoral vote.
The investigations in the two countries have different origins and legal histories, and some began before the change of government. What they have in common is that they involve officials at high levels of the state apparatus.
In Bulgaria, the most visible operations currently target local political figures, excluding the investigations into Delyan Peevski’s flights. The difference is significant.
To dismantle a corruption model, it is not enough to identify some of its participants. Financial flows, possible political protectors and the mechanisms that allowed the alleged abuses to continue must be traced.
This requires independent investigative bodies, a functioning prosecution service and a court capable of issuing decisions without political pressure.
The Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecutor general: the most dangerous political trap facing Radev’s governmentThe forthcoming election of a new Supreme Judicial Council and prosecutor general may prove decisive for the future of the government. This is a far more serious test than any individual police operation. The Supreme Judicial Council is crucial to the personnel management of the judiciary, while the prosecutor general occupies a central position in the prosecution system.
Whether the declared judicial reform will have real substance will depend on how the procedures are conducted, the publicity of the candidacies, the professional qualities of those elected and the guarantees of their independence.
It is precisely in the election of the Supreme Judicial Council and prosecutor general that Radev’s government could suffer its most serious political catastrophe.
If the procedures become yet another distribution of institutional influence, public trust may be lost much faster than it was gained.
If the new personnel decisions reproduce the old dependencies, the change of government will not lead to qualitative change in the justice system.
If a political agreement is reached on appointments without sufficient transparency, professional criteria and independence, it will be perceived as a continuation of the practices against which the new government gained public support.
It would be particularly dangerous for judicial reform to be reduced to replacing some politically dependent figures with others who are loyal to the new government, but also to its opponents.
This would not be reform. It would be a redistribution of control.
Radev has a parliamentary majority, but it does not give him the power to decide all personnel matters in the judiciary single-handedly. Constitutional procedures, the required qualified majorities and the independence of magistrates require decisions that cannot be reduced to party will. That is precisely why the forthcoming elections—for the Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecutor general—will show whether the government is ready to defend the principles of an independent judiciary, even when this limits its own political influence.
True success will not be the election of a convenient prosecutor general. True success will be the election of an independent prosecutor general who can investigate anyone, including members of the governing majority.
Justice cannot be postponed until the next termBulgaria does not need yet another political declaration on fighting corruption. Nor does it need arrests that end months or years later without convincing evidence, final convictions or the recovery of illegally acquired public funds.
The country needs institutions that work independently of political circumstances. It needs investigations that reach the actual organisers of criminal schemes when the evidence permits this. It needs a prosecution service that does not select defendants according to their political affiliation. It needs courts that are not influenced by political or economic interests.
It needs a state in which public resources are not treated as the property of those in power.
Rumen Radev has received a rare political opportunity. His outright majority allows him to bear clear responsibility for the direction of government without constantly blaming coalition partners. But this opportunity also has a reverse side.
The greater the concentration of political power, the less convincing excuses for the lack of results become.
The time for promises is gradually running out. The time for institutional decisions is beginning.
The arrests of mayors and local political figures may be the beginning of a broader fight against corruption. But they cannot be its end.
GERB’s long-serving mayors should receive neither prior immunity from investigations nor be turned into defendants merely because of their political affiliation. The law requires the same standard for everyone.
The same applies to former ministers, MPs, heads of state-owned enterprises, senior Interior Ministry officials, representatives of the judiciary and people who have exercised influence over public finances.
The greatest risk to Radev’s government is not resistance from Borisov and Peevski. The greatest risk is that the new government will fail to fulfil its own promise of change.
Because society may accept that reforms take time. It may show patience with complex institutional procedures. But it will find it difficult to accept yet another reproduction of the same dependencies under a new political banner.
The election of the Supreme Judicial Council and prosecutor general will be among the most important tests for this government. That is where it will become clear whether those in power genuinely want an independent judiciary or merely a different distribution of influence over it.
To a great extent, this choice will determine whether Bulgaria takes a real step towards justice or once again remains hostage to institutional dependencies.
A state in which governments change but the mechanisms of impunity remain intact has not experienced genuine change. It has simply received a new government of the old model. And justice is not an election slogan. It is the meaning of the rule of law and the most important criterion by which society will judge Rumen Radev’s government.