One of the specific elements of Iran's political system is that it is not a function of the will of the people, but rather sets and imputes the political preferences of its citizens. If in a democratic country its institutions are arranged according to the will of the voters, in Iran it is rather the opposite: the voters are framed by the institutions.
In the Persian state, this is done through institutions such as the Council of Guardians. It is a body of 12 members, half of whom are elected directly by the Ayatollah and the other half through a vote by the country's Majlis, but after the selection and recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Islamic Republic, who is also appointed by the Supreme Leader. This effectively turns the Guardian Council into an extension of Ali Khamenei's will. It is this body that stands at the beginning of the electoral process in the country, because it has the power to reject various candidates fighting to enter the Majlis, the Council of Experts (this is another institute whose most important task is to appoint the Ayatollah) and the presidency. For example, the Guardian Council prevented a wide range of candidates from the country's reformist and moderate forces from participating in the last elections for each of the country's institutions listed above. As a result, they were completely dominated by hardliners and conservatives. Therefore, in Iran the order is reversed: the elections are a function of the system rather than the system - of the elections.
The upcoming presidential vote in the country, which will be held on the 28th of this month, is no exception. Of the 80 candidates for the post who pre-registered to participate, the Guardian Council admitted only six (this body does not normally give reasons for rejecting a candidate). Three are hardliners, two are conservatives (the difference between these categories is not significant, but not to be underestimated) and one is a reformer. In a sense, and with a touch of irony, it can be said that this is progress on the part of the Guardian Council, as in the last presidential election in 2021 - then that vote designed to be won by President Ibrahim, who died last month Raisi - not a single reformer was admitted. In this case, a person who is not connected to the circles of the religious establishment passed through the sieve of the Council of Guardians. Why, if the system is oriented towards the marginalization of the reformist circles, does it allow their representative? There are several reasons for this.
First of all, when the system allows individuals associated with the country's moderate and reformist enclaves to stand for election, it aims to increase voter turnout. To the extent that the power structures in Iran can ensure the existence and basic stability of the system, its legitimacy goes precisely through the high voter turnout. The more people participate in the elections, the greater is the sympathy for the rules of the state system thus set. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself has pointed to the high voter turnout as an argument in support of the legitimacy of the system. And when moderate and reformist candidates are not allowed to participate in elections for various institutions in Iran, this leads to low voter turnout. For example, it dropped drastically in the last two votes for parliament and the one for president three years ago. Like all normal people, Iranians do not like to play in fixed matches.
Secondly, when the system admits moderate politicians and reformers, it tends to do so in a calculated and controlled manner. The case of the upcoming presidential elections, in which the reformer Masoud Pezeshkian was allowed to participate, is indicative in this regard. Pezeshkian, for example, is Azeri, in a country whose ethnic palette, however diverse, still has a Persian majority. He is also from the second echelon of politics - parliamentarian, former minister of health and deputy speaker of the Mejlis. He's not among the most recognizable faces in the country, which is a problem in itself when he has just three weeks until Election Day to change that. And last but not least, his candidacy is weaker than would have been that of the reformer Eshaq Jahangiri (Vice President of Hassan Rouhani) or the pragmatic-conservative Ali Larijani (former speaker of the Majlis, lately described as a moderate politician , but this is indicative of the extent to which the Iranian system has shifted in the direction of the hardliners).
However, both Jahangiri and Larijani were not allowed by the Guardian Council to participate in the presidential elections. In fact, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who, although he is a hardliner, is more likely to be perceived as a potential instability for the system, as it is more difficult to be controlled, was forbidden to appear at them. The exclusion of iconic figures from the electoral race - from reformers to moderates to hardliners - shows that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not at all experimental and adventurous. Hence, his priority is to retain full and tight control over the system, an opportunity that Raisi's presidency afforded him. In this case, it doesn't even matter that as the head of the executive branch, the president in Iran is stripped of key powers and often functions as the ayatollah's scapegoat for the system's failings (as was the case with Hassan Rouhani).
Following the example of the last presidential elections three years ago, as well as the upcoming ones, the system tries to program the final outcome of the electoral race. From here, the favorites to win the presidency are Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf and Said Jalili.
Ghalibaf is a cadre of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and had a close acquaintance with Kassem Suleimani, who was killed years ago (Pasdaran-affiliated media in the country began to support him). However, he left his mark in politics as a long-term mayor of Tehran, and is currently the chairman of the Mejlis. In terms of his ideological positioning, in recent years Ghalibaf has been trying to rebrand himself as a conservative politician-technocrat. The main advantage of his candidacy lies precisely in the fact that he thinks not only through the prism of the narrow catechisms of the ideology dominating the system, but also through pragmatism. However, his main disadvantage is that his electoral support is decreasing (this was also seen in his result in the last elections for Parliament, for which he ran from Tehran, where he was overtaken by several hardliners). His name is also involved in corruption scandals.
Jalili is a former secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (this is an important body relevant to strategic decisions in the country, especially against the background of the marginalization of the Majlis) and a consistent critic of the West, including the 2015- th year Nuclear deal. Jalili is a hardliner. His plus and minus are the same: he is the closest candidate to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But if already in 2017 it became clear that the ayatollah had chosen Ibrahim Raisi as the president of the country (then, however, he was defeated by the moderate Hassan Rouhani), then at this stage there are no such clear indications as to who among Jalili and Ghalibaf is the blessing of Khamenei.
What makes the task of the reformer Masoud Pezeshkian even more difficult is that he has to fight not only the competition of other candidates, but also the system itself. In itself, however, this does not necessarily condemn him to failure, as Hassan Rouhani, who was the country's president for the eight-year period between 2013 and 2021, is the most recent example of how it is possible for the presidency to be won by a candidate. , which stands up to the country's hardliners. Pezeshkian's chances are automatically increased by the fact that he is the only reformist candidate, while the status quo vote will be split between the remaining five candidates (probably most of them will drop out in the campaign process, supporting either Jalili , or Galibaf). And the fact that Pezeshkian is an Azeri has its advantages, as it can mobilize minorities in his support (in general, Azeri and Kurds in Iran vote mostly for moderate and reform-oriented candidates in the Middle Eastern country). And unlike his competitors for the presidency, Pezeshkian is not a negatively charged figure, insofar as his name has not been involved in scandals.
The key question about his prospects for success, however, remains whether he will be able to motivate voters who did not turn out in the last Mejlis and presidential elections to support him. The considerations of these moderate and reformist electoral segments are twofold. For once, Pezeshkian is far from their first choice candidate. The second time, they say, he was allowed to run to lose, but in doing so, to legitimize the regime by increasing turnout on election day. However, Pezeshkian has already won the support of prominent figures from the reformist and moderate sector of the country in the form of Mohammad Reza Aref, Eshag Jahangiri, Mohammad Javad Zarif and others.
Reformist and moderate circles in Iran are generally used to the judge playing against them. Since 2020, however, the referee either does not allow them to go on the field at all, or if he allows them to go, he determines their composition. And the outcome of the presidential elections in the country will depend on whether the supporters of the sanctioned team will meet the invitation to an arranged contest with apathy or with anger.