On the evening of June 23, militants attacked churches and synagogues in Makhachkala and Derbent. According to the data, 20 people are currently dead, six attackers were killed (how many were unknown). There are no public statements from the organizers of the attack, its motives are not clear, but the terrorist group "Islamic State" in Khorasan province welcomed the attack.
Such events, no matter where they happen, are always followed by shock. But the shock in Russia is of a special kind. The shell of slogans does not fall, living emotions do not break through. On the contrary, the terrible events are not talked about in a human way - but only in some unbearable clichés.
Are terrorist attacks back in Russia?
It cannot be said that the terrorist attacks in Dagestan came like a bolt from the blue. They are integrated into a chain of events that has already become quite long and which is increasingly difficult not to notice - although both the authorities and a significant part of society are making considerable efforts to do so.
A week earlier, in pre-trial detention center #1 in Rostov-on-Don, several prisoners took two FSIN - Federal Prison Service officers hostage and released a video message in which they called themselves "Mojahideen of the Islamic State" (four of them were convicted on terrorism charges). A few hours later, special forces stormed the pre-trial detention building, the invaders were killed, and the hostages were freed.
In addition, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province in March claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in the "Crocus City Hall", which left hundreds dead.
The fact that the targets of the attacks in Dagestan on June 23 were, among other things, synagogues, is reminiscent of a series of anti-Semitic actions in the North Caucasus in October 2023, after the start of the war in the Gaza Strip. Then in Nalchik a Jewish cultural center under construction was set on fire, and in Makhachkala a crowd took over the airport where a flight from Tel Aviv was arriving.
All this is happening against the background of the ongoing third year of war with Ukraine - and Russian officials at every convenient and inconvenient occasion hint or even directly talk about the "Ukrainian trail". The terrorist attacks in Dagestan are mentioned in these statements separately from the rocket attack on the annexed Sevastopol that happened the same day, June 23, and killed four people and injured more than a hundred.
Obviously, the internal crisis in Russia is deepening - both against the background of the war, and in addition to it. But Vladimir Putin does not want to talk about this with citizens. In planning a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he made two lengthy addresses to the nation. Made addresses on the occasion of the uprising of PMC "Wagner" in June 2023, and after the terrorist attack in Crocus in March 2024. However, there will be no special address on the occasion of the terrorist attacks in Makhachkala and Derbent.
How the system is silent
When extraordinary events occur in Russia (for example, terrorist attacks), one almost always gets the impression that the authorities have fallen into a stupor, that there has been a "system breakdown".
"The System" is a collective concept that describes the most diverse participants in the political process, public institutions and the rules for their interaction with each other. The Russian system is quite chaotic - and fails in every incomprehensible situation (although its representatives always deny any failures). Russian propagandists and officials try to cover up such systemic failures and obscure the reality. One of their main tools is the new language or new speech.
For the pro-government media (primarily television) it is not important at all what actually happened. It's much more important to choose the right words that don't reveal the scale of what happened, and also not to put "breakdowns in the system" in context. That is why terrorist attacks become a "clap", counterfeit goods become "parallel imports", economic decline becomes "negative growth", and war of conquest becomes a "special military operation". This newspeak, just like Orwell's, is designed to make it impossible not only to say, but even to think anything "wrong".
The confusion of both the state and the society after Crocus and the terrorist attacks in Dagestan is a direct consequence of the total transition to the new language. Please note: we hardly talk about "Crocus" anymore. No news about the official investigation, no one to ask "inconvenient" questions. No statement on this matter can be formulated to "justify" or "discredits" something that is not necessary.
And how is the stability?
For more than ten years, for most Russians, terrorist attacks were something that happened somewhere far away and to someone else. At times, the FSB issued vague reports of yet another crossing in an attempt to "destabilize the socio-political situation". Only prevented terrorist attacks appeared in the information space.
In March 2024, the situation changed. But for a while memories of those times when terrorist attacks and the anticipation of terrorist attacks were a terrible routine came to the surface: "Crocus" stood on par with Nord-Ost and Beslan.
However, this was a one-time effect and seems to have worn off now. The cult of stability was not undermined. The war did not undermine him because he was somewhere far away, in Ukraine. And even when he came to Belgorod, the rest of the country really wanted to ignore him, so as not to lose the sense of stability. Terrorist attacks in Dagestan probably won't undermine anything in that sense either.
But even if we assume that the country has lost stability, this does not mean at all that an uncontrollable collapse will immediately occur. Simply put, "stability" means absolutely nothing, but its mere mention is in favor of the authorities and convinces the population that the situation is under control.
In addition to the newspeak and the official cult of stability, another (and probably the most important) factor in the disruption following terrorist attacks is civic apathy. The authorities do not comment on anything and pretend that nothing extraordinary has happened. And it seems that the population needs exactly this: it has long and demonstratively disconnected itself from the information flow and does not read the news.
But here's the kicker: People aren't just refusing to follow the agenda and understand how the next piece of bad news will affect their personal lives. On the one hand, Russians have seen a lot in their lifetime: Afghanistan, Chechnya, coups, terrorist attacks, criminal and political murders, repressions. Collective feelings are blunted. It's not that the terrible events don't raise Russians' anxiety at all, but they do in a very short time.
On the other hand, Russians are used not only to fear disasters, but also to fear what the authorities will do about it. The general principle is roughly clear: after every high-profile event, the authorities "tighten the screws". In the year since Prigogine's rebellion, Wagner's PMC was actually reformed, Prigogine himself died, and "reshuffles" took place in the Ministry of Defense. In the months following the terrorist attack at "Crocus City Hall" the authorities carried out several "raids" against illegal migrants and "purges" of the authorities responsible for the integration of foreigners.
What will happen after the current terrorist attacks is unknown. But the Russians continue to avoid the "inconvenient" talks about war, politics and power, not only because they see no meaning in them, but also because they see in them only continuous risks for themselves.
"Let's not talk about it" is not just a remark in a conversation, but almost a life credo.