While US voters choose a new president, Europeans are anxiously waiting to see whether the winner will be Donald Trump - a nightmare for many - or Kamala Harris, who is seen as much better for transatlantic relations.
It is an inconvenient truth that American interest in Europe has been declining over the past 30 years. And neither candidate is likely to bring back the transatlantic boom of the early 1990s.
This does not mean that these elections will not affect Europe. One candidate is an admirer of Vladimir Putin, who wants to impose 100 percent tariffs on European goods and promises to end the war in Ukraine the day after he is elected. His threats to withdraw Washington from NATO should be taken seriously, because this time Trump is unlikely to be constrained by the "deep state". Harris, on the contrary, promises continuity in the US's global leadership role and has a Europhile advisor, Phil Gordon, on whom Europe has high hopes.
But taking a step back, the bigger picture is this: Europe is simply not as important to Washington as it once was. Aging and shrinking, allergic to power politics, steadfast and risk-averse, Europe increasingly evokes not affection from many Americans but sneering disdain—a place fit for holidays and not much else. What doesn't help is the performance gap between the US and European economies, which is widening inexorably in America's favor.
Transatlanticists will point out that US-EU relations were good under President Joe Biden. His support for Ukraine (including a $20 billion loan announced last week) has been steadfast, even if it has fallen short of hawkish hopes. His administration, through national security adviser Jake Sullivan, has forged a close relationship with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
Biden is America's last president since the Cold War. He is followed by a range of politicians who do not see Russia as a major threat to US interests or who have a deeply depressed sense of Washington's role in the world. But even Biden, when necessary, let the priority of the Indo-Pacific shine through in Washington. A good example of this is the AUKUS scandal, when the US snatched a major submarine construction contract from under France's nose. French President Emmanuel Macron was furious. Washington's muted response was reminiscent of Don Draper's famous line, "I'm not thinking about you at all."
Behind the scenes, the French tend to keep a sober eye on how Washington sees Europe. "This is not hostility," quipped one diplomat. "This is indifference. Sometimes that's worse."
To get an idea of how much things have already changed, it is useful (or masochistic) to look back to the days when the gold standard of Pax Americana* reached its highest level.
The date was June 6, 1994. America's allies had gathered in northern France to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landings. The saxophone-playing young president, Bill Clinton, was the star of the show. The US had won the Cold War and was now sprawling across Western Europe, unopposed militarily but still sending more than 120,000 troops. A few years earlier, Washington issued a call, and soon 40 countries, including several European ones, joined Operation Desert Storm. On the diplomatic front, giants still roamed: Richard Holbrooke towered over Berlin from the American embassy.
Culturally speaking, it was also a different era. The Dream Team, featuring NBA stars Michael Jordan, Charles Barkley and Larry Bird, effortlessly cruised to a gold medal at the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. EuroDisney — a kind of American colony, right on the outskirts of Paris — it had just opened its doors, imposing Mickey Mouse on an exalted French audience. The American media, from the Herald Tribune to the Wall Street Journal Europe, were still large, glossy representatives in European life, well-staffed and highly regarded.
It is good to compare and see the contrast with the state of things today. The US has withdrawn or reduced its European footprint in almost every direction except one - the digital sphere, where US tech companies like Facebook and X more or less reign supreme on European devices, but lack luster. And troop levels are well below 100,000, despite the hot war on NATO's doorstep.
American diplomats on the continent are, with the exception of David Pressman in Hungary or Brigitte Brink in Ukraine, timid creatures who watch their steps and avoid confrontations. The Herald Tribune is long gone, retreating back into the arms of its parent, The New York Times, while the Wall Street Journal has retreated back to its quarters in Lower Manhattan. Of the vibrant digital-first media outlets that have emerged in recent years (POLITICO, Semafor, Axios), only POLITICO has taken root in continental Europe. Even the tech giants are having second thoughts. After developing next-generation artificial intelligence (AI) tools for consumers, they largely decided not to release them for European consumers. The risk of violating the European AI Law is too great. Or maybe they just don't want to be bothered.
According to Jeremy Gallon, a Frenchman who has worked in Washington and is the author of a biography of Henry Kissinger, the decline of US interest in Europe is not a bad thing in itself. But according to him, this is an indisputable fact related to a change in the foreign policy elite of Washington. "There was a whole generation of senior officials who had organic ties to Europe either because their parents emigrated or because they were refugees from Europe. Kissinger, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright - they were all Europeans at some level,'' Gallon says.
The formal shift away from Europe began under former President Barack Obama, who launched the "Pivot to Asia" program, Gallon says. But Obama simply pushed through a process that was already in motion, and which can now be accelerated. "We now have a new generation rising up that reflects American demographics," he says. "They (US government officials and diplomats) are either connected to the Spanish-speaking world or looking to Asia. Those with connections to Europe are simply less present."
That Europe is of lesser priority in the psyche of American elites is reflected in the choice of education and career. Proficiency in Mandarin indicates more ambition for a headlong career as a diplomat than, say, French or even Russian. The study of Europe as a geopolitical subject, on the contrary, is a niche. Gallon notes: "At Harvard, the South Asian Studies Building is large, bright and modern, clearly a prestigious department. The Center for European Studies is exactly what you'd imagine: small, kind of run down."
The great irony of America being bored with Europe is that it is hard to pinpoint one specific reason why this is happening. According to Ben Hodges, who once commanded US forces in Europe, America's costs of deploying 450,000 troops on the continent at the height of the Cold War have been easily covered over the past 70 years and have brought benefits to the United States far out of proportion to the investment. "It's always been puzzling to me that people don't see what a huge advantage we have with our leadership in NATO and our relationship with European countries," he says. The idea that America is somehow unable to have a presence in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific is "surprisingly ill-informed."
Moreover, even now the economic relationship between the US and the European Union is greater than at any time in history. The volumes of transatlantic trade in goods and services are huge and growing year after year.
Some Europeans took it upon themselves to remind Washington of these facts. In a five-page document delivered to European foreign ministers in July, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski urged his colleagues to talk about the mutual benefits of the relationship and dispel negative perceptions of the transatlantic relationship, which have been pushed mainly by Republicans.
But it's a lonely quest, and one that doesn't seem to have much to do with MAGA isolationists. To Trump, who views NATO as a burden, or to his Vice President J.D. Vance, who equates deterring Russia with "warmongering," America's overseas presence seems like an irritation, a distraction from domestic priorities like deporting migrants or keeping at low prices.
As the clock ticks down to November 5, Europeans grapple with the prospect of further US withdrawal. It is believed that if Harris wins, the White House will continue to support Ukraine, but ultimately and in the not-too-distant future will steer Kiev toward a deal with Russia. Investments in NATO will remain consistent, although the main trend will be the further prioritization of the Indo-Pacific over Europe.
If Trump wins, there is a growing sense that all bets are off. Some believe that his administration will behave rationally, or at least rationally by his standards, and not turn the tables on NATO, that he will pursue a deal on the Ukraine war that will allow both sides to claim victory (e.g. by giving more weapons of Kiev and threatening to remove all restrictions on their use in exchange for Putin ceasing offensive operations and gaining territory).
But not everyone is so sure. "We want to believe that Trump will be rational, but no one can be sure," said a senior EU diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity to speak candidly about US policy. "The adults in the room are not likely to return."
Caught off guard in 2016, EU officials now say they are bracing for whatever Trump might throw their way. Diplomats and trade officials say they are ready to strike back " fast and hard" if Trump tries to start a trade war with the EU. Yet this kind of trade battle is perhaps the easy part when it comes to presenting Europe's long-term relationship with the United States. Far more challenging is planning for a future in which the US is significantly and permanently less involved in Europe's defense.
On this front, France is playing the role of Europe's Cassandra, warning that the bloc must act together in defense regardless of who is elected president. "We cannot leave Europe's security in the hands of voters in Wisconsin every four years," French Minister Benjamin Haddad said on LCI television last week. "Let's give up collective denial. Europeans must take their destiny into their own hands, regardless of who is elected president of the United States."
The tune was picked up by the European Commission in Brussels, which wants Europe to be more independent in terms of technology, defense and raw materials. But the truth is that when it comes to envisioning a future with less America, the bloc is deeply divided. However enthusiastic the proponents of European "strategic autonomy" may be, there is no momentum behind the creation of a European army or a European nuclear umbrella.
Some countries - namely the north and some central and eastern nations - see the pressure from Paris as a ploy to strengthen French companies. They see the proposals for a stronger Europe with unified strategic and military objectives as a Trojan horse that would only ensure the submission of the larger states, i.e. France and Germany. For others, Putin's Russia is simply an existential threat. Losing America's protective umbrella is simply unimaginable. This would expose them to the brunt of Russia's nuclear and conventional arsenal without a reliable counterweight.
Some believe these attitudes will have to change if Trump wins. But the alternative is just as likely - faced with further US withdrawal, EU countries will retreat to an ``every nation for itself'' mentality, treating each other with greater suspicion and seeking advantage through deals with other superpowers, namely - with Russia and China.
"Without the United States, Europe is lost," French analyst Nicolas Tenzer wrote last year. Far more dangerous is the risk that Europe will not admit that it has already lost and as a result will remain immobile and paralyzed.
*Pax Americana - (American peace", Latin, similar to Pax Romana and Pax Britannica), term for the concept of relative peace in the Western Hemisphere after the end of World War II in 1945, when the United States became the dominant economic, cultural and military power in the world. Part and beginning of this concept is the "Marshall" plan, as well as the extension of the clauses of the NATO treaty, incl. Art. 5