This time was different. The accusation of genocide against Israel came not just from some institutionally charged representative of Saudi Arabia, but from the very embodiment - functionally and organizationally - of the Kingdom: Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman. The accusation was also expressed from the highest forum possible - at the joint session of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in Riyadh these days. In this way, Saudi Arabia shortened the distance between itself and countries such as Iran and Turkey, which otherwise lead the accusations in the region against Israel for genocide in the Gaza Strip.
In the speech of the Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler of the Kingdom, there was another emphasis: the call for Israel to "respect the sovereignty of the fraternal Islamic Republic of Iran and not strike its lands". This is happening against the background of intensified diplomatic contacts between Saudi Arabia and Iran: the foreign minister of the regime of the Ayatollahs, Abbas Araghchi, was in Riyadh last month, and these days a meeting was held in Tehran between the chiefs of general staff of the two countries. At the end of last month, the two countries, along with others, also participated in joint military exercises in the Gulf of Oman, after a week before Saudi Arabia was one of the countries that observed the military maneuvers carried out by Iran, Russia and Oman in the Indian Ocean. In fact, the dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran, which has been going on for more than a year, is one of the few positive trends developing in the Middle East region in recent years (although given the Sunni-Shia rivalry between them, the bar is set quite low). .
The process of increasing security in the Persian Gulf as a function of overcoming the shared hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran was supported by the Americans and logistically carried out by Iraq and Oman, but actually achieved fruition only after receiving an imperative push from China's intervention in The year 2023. What, however, "crush" the cogs of the chain driving this process was something else: the war between Hamas and Hezbollah on the one hand and Israel on the other. It was this conflict that gave further traction to the rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. And not only him, as the war in the Middle East also contributed to the neglect of problems of a bilateral nature between Egypt and Turkey. Seen from Israel's geographic coordinates, the bloodshed in Gaza has helped condition two thematic vectors directed against Tel Aviv - northwest (Turkey and Egypt) and southeast (Saudi Arabia and Iran). Although the differences in interests between these countries will continue to shape their relationship, it was the war in Gaza that caused these differences to be softened, giving way to their consolidation under the common denominator of opposition to Israel's actions towards the Palestinians and the Lebanese.
The above-mentioned words of Mohammed bin Salman correspond to a situation in which Saudi Arabia and Iran accept the search for points of contact between them as a shared interest for both countries.
For Riyadh, working relations with Tehran provide the basic opportunity to avoid obstructions in the functioning of the trade-transit dimensions of the Strait of Hormuz, through which the Kingdom exports its hydrocarbons. But in decent communication with Iran, Saudi Arabia also sees the need to reduce the physical risks to its own security coming from the Houthis in Yemen (although the Houthis are not a proxy for Iran in the sense that Hezbollah is, the close military relationship between them and Tehran make Riyadh believe that the ayatollahs' regime can play a role in containing the Houthis). Through the dialogue with Iran, Saudi Arabia aims to stay away from the ever-possible escalation of tensions between Tehran and Tel Aviv (therefore, Riyadh also closed its skies for possible attacks on Iranian territory by the Israeli warplanes).
For Tehran, upgrading relations with Riyadh pursues the basic goal of preventing the creation of an Arab-Israeli axis directed against Iran. The latter is particularly important at a time when Iran's network of proxy forces is suffering a systematic derogation of its combat capabilities under pressure from the Israel Defense Forces. And the chances of Israeli-Arab consolidation automatically increase with Donald Trump's return to the White House, since the current Democratic administration in Washington has been much more nuanced in its dealings with both Israel and Iran. While Tehran alone cannot prevent the eventual expansion of Israel's Abrahamic Accords to include Saudi Arabia, by improving its relations with Riyadh the ayatollahs' regime can at least remove one of the main motivations for a similar move by the Kingdom.
The war in Gaza put a cog in the wheel of the otherwise shared desire between Mohammed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu to formalize relations between their countries, and the Saudi crown prince had reason to be more angry with the Israeli prime minister than with Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei. Given the sentiment on the Arab street exacerbated by the civilian casualties in Gaza, as well as King Salman's traditionally conservative and pro-Palestinian stance, it has become virtually impossible for his son to pursue the normalization of relations between the Kingdom and Israel.
Therefore, for its accession to the Abrahamic agreements, Riyadh laid an additional condition (to the already existing ones - that the US give them additional security guarantees against Iran and technology for the development of nuclear energy): a real path to the creation of a Palestinian state. However, the current Israeli government is not only opposed to such a plot involving the prospect of a Palestinian state, but the return of Donald Trump to the White House has given rise to exactly the opposite tendencies in the Tel Aviv executive, which is already talking about absorbing lands from the West Bank and North Gaza (this was also part of the failed "Deal of the Century" that Donald Trump's team proposed in the Republican's first term). However, if there is one thing that Saudi Arabia has learned in the past year, it is that Tel Aviv would sacrifice the normalization of its relations with Riyadh, and indeed with the entire Arab world, if that is the price of not allowing a Palestinian state.
And this is a conundrum that the incoming administration of Donald Trump will have to solve, which is otherwise good news for both Riyadh and Tel Aviv. It is the Republican who has the ambition to join Saudi Arabia to the Abrahamic Agreements, as well as to realize this time the "Deal of the Century", providing for the resolution of the Middle East conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. But instead of waiting, Saudi Arabia and Israel are already upping the ante, deliberately piling up excess ballast in advance, which they can then, in the process of negotiations, throw away, making compromises, so as to arrive at results acceptable to them.
With accusations of genocide against Tel Aviv and solidarity with Iran, Riyadh wants to show that it should not be taken for granted by the new Republican administration and that if the Kingdom cannot guarantee cooperation with Israel, it can at least minimize the risks arising from Iran. Hasn't Saudi Arabia been against the war in Gaza since day one? Therefore, if he likes, Mr. Trump should not ask for too many compromises from Riyadh.
With its talk of absorbing territories from the West Bank and northern Gaza into Israel, Tel Aviv is trying to motivate the "most pro-Israeli president", in Trump's own words, to act according to his own political requests (to lay hands where his mouth is, as the Americans would say). Even if the Republican activates the policy of "maximum pressure" against Iran, didn't Israel remain the only country to continue it in the meantime? Therefore, if he likes, Mr. Trump should not ask for too many compromises from Tel Aviv.
Certainly, both Saudi Arabia and Israel are pleased with Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election. But the crackle that comes from Riyadh and Tel Aviv is not from champagne, but from friendly fire.