Russian forces continued to advance tactically significantly to the north and northeast of the city of Kharkiv on 13 May, and the priority now appears to be the rapid establishment of a "buffer zone" along the international border before going deeper into the northern part of the Kharkiv region. Geolocated footage released on May 13 showed that Russian forces had entered Gulboke (north of Liptsi) and had raised a flag in the center of the village, but Russian sources said they had not yet captured the whole of it and had not advanced west of the settlement on the western (left) bank of the Kharkiv River.
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War.
Additional geolocation footage shows that they advanced southwest of Oliynikove (northeast of Liptsi) and north of Lukyantsi (northeast of Liptsi and southeast of Oliynikove). The Ukrainian General Staff announced that Russian forces had achieved an unspecified tactical success near Lukyantsi. Russian bloggers claim that Russian forces have entered Lukyantsi, but ISW has not seen visual confirmation of this claim. Russian forces also continued to attack in the direction of Liptsi near Pilna (northeast of Liptsi and Oliynikove), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces were counterattacking near Gulboke.
Geolocated footage released on May 12 shows Russian forces have captured the Volchansk meat processing plant, and Russian bloggers claim a shoe factory in northern Volchansk was captured on the morning of May 13 and have advanced into central Volchansk to northern (right) bank of the river Volcha until the evening. Russian sources claim that fighting continues between Liptsi and Volchansk salients near Zelene (on the international border between Liptsi and Volchansk) and that Ukrainian forces have partially withdrawn from Ternova (immediately southeast of Zelene).
The relatively rapid pace of the advance and the destruction of several bridges across key waterways in the settlement suggest that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a "buffer zone" ahead of going deeper, as ISW previously estimated they would. ISW has not yet seen any claims or confirmations that Russian forces have crossed to the south (left) bank of the Volcha River in Volchansk or its immediate vicinity. Russian forces specifically struck bridges over the Volcha River immediately west and east of Volchansk on 12 May and began attacking bridges over the river and logistics lines in Volchansk itself on 13 May, reportedly leaving Ukrainian forces with only two usable bridges above Volcha via Volchansk. It is unclear why Russian forces would primarily target bridges that would need to be crossed and provide stable logistics across the Volcha River for offensive operations deeper into northern Kharkiv Oblast, so these strikes suggest that Russian forces may prioritize immediate gains in an unfortified area in the north of Ukraine.
Russian forces are also reported to have armored vehicles in the area - Russian sources report that Russian forces launched a mechanized attack with an unspecified number of tanks against Volchansk on the night of 12 May and continued armored attacks during the day on 13 May.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have often proposed that Russia create a "demilitarized buffer zone" in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian territory from Ukrainian strikes, and Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov directly linked this buffer zone to intense Russian offensive operations south of Belgorod Oblast on May 13. Ukrainian and Western officials have also recently said that Russian forces intend to establish a 10-kilometer buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast. ISW recently noted that this buffer zone would both bring Russian forces within tube artillery range from Kharkiv and remove major Russian logistics centers from the Ukrainian tube artillery range.
A Ukrainian battlefield commander recently expressed concern that Ukrainian fortifications in northern Kharkiv Oblast are not along the immediate international border zone, allowing for a rapid and relatively shallow advance by Russian forces. More senior Ukrainian commanders recently said that Ukrainian forces have established a multi-layered defense in depth deeper into the area, which is consistent with reports from other battlefield commanders.
Newly appointed Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu attended his first Security Council meeting as secretary on May 13, amid continued reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin is focusing on mobilizing Russia's economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov specified that Shoigu will also head the Russian Military-Industrial Commission, but will not lead it.
Russian opposition publication Meduza reported on May 13, citing sources in the Russian government and presidential administration, that Shoigu's alleged criticism of the CEO of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, for not providing a sufficient number of modern weapons of Russia's military over the past few months contributed to Shoigu's removal from the Russian Defense Ministry. This statement further emphasizes that Putin is focused on improving the capacity and ability of the Russian DIB to modernize and produce new technologies. Several Russian bloggers expressed hope that Shoigu's removal as defense minister and the appointment of Andrei Belousov would improve the bureaucratic problems in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the effectiveness of the Russian DIB.
Russian bloggers have also largely sought to play down concerns that Belousov's lack of military experience would hinder his ability to serve effectively as defense minister and portrayed him as a competent manager who could root out corruption. Belousov's lack of military experience is not unusual in the context of Putin's ministerial rule, and Shoigu also had no military experience before becoming defense minister. Putin has always appointed a civilian defense minister after firing Boris Yeltsin-appointed defense minister Marshal Igor Sergeev in 2001. Putin's decision to remove Shoigu from the Russian Ministry of Defense also appears to have opened the door for some of Shoigu's cronies to leave the Ministry of Defense, which is probably one of the expected effects of Putin's recent cabinet changes.
Several Russian bloggers and insiders said on May 13 that two deputy defense ministers - Ruslan Tsalikov and Aleksey Krivoruchko - submitted their resignations to Shoigu a week before Putin removed Shoigu as defense minister. Russian bloggers claim that Tsalikov was Shoigu's "right-hand man" for many years and led the support of the troops and the Department of Information Policy and Information Warfare of the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is also reported that Krivoruchko is close to Shoigu and has been in charge of military technical support, the development of weapons, special equipment and the execution of state defense orders.
Russian sources claimed that both Tsalikov and Krivoruchko were involved in corruption scandals, and a blogger associated with "Wagner" noted that frontline troops suffered directly as a result of their corrupt practices. Russian insiders say Russian authorities questioned Tsalikov about possible corruption charges in late April and suggested at the time that he would be forced to retire. Russian authorities recently removed former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, also considered a close Shoigu ally, from his post on corruption charges. Tsalikov and Krivoruchko may have resigned in hopes of getting new positions outside the Ministry of Defense to avoid prosecution on charges similar to Ivanov's.
The Kremlin-awarded blogger suggested Tsalikov would also take on a new role in Russia's Security Council after Shoigu. Russian insiders speculate that Belousov, as the new defense minister, will want to keep a maximum of two to three Shoigu-linked officials in the Russian defense ministry, suggesting that more Shoigu-linked officials may resign or to be fired in the coming weeks. One Russian blogger speculated that Shoigu and his cronies are part of the alleged "pro-China" party in the Russian MoD and suggested that other MoD officials linked to Russia's China policy would be removed or resign along with Shoigu, Ivanov and others, although ISW could not confirm this speculation.
Putin may have used constitutionally mandated ministerial resignations after taking office and the subsequent nomination of new senior officials as an opportune moment to fire ineffective officials.
Ukrainian forces have reportedly carried out successful missile strikes against a Russian air defense base in occupied Crimea and successful drone strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia. Russian opposition publication Astra reported, citing a source in Crimea's occupation emergency ministry, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense base of the 3rd radio engineering regiment on May 13, possibly with several Storm Shadow missiles.
Astra reported that the strike killed an unspecified number of Russian servicemen and possibly the commander of the 3rd Radio Engineering Regiment. Ukrainian publisher Ukrainska Pravda reported on May 13 that one of its sources in the Ukrainian military confirmed the strike on Mount Ai-Petri. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces shot down four Storm Shadow missiles and seven drones over Crimea.
Ukrainian publisher Suspilne reported on May 13 that its sources in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said it carried out a drone strike on the Oskolneftesnabzheniye oil depot near Stari Oskol, Belgorod Oblast, and the Yeletskaya electrical substation in Lipetska area that supplies traction substations to Russian Railways, the Stanovaya oil pumping station and transit between the energy systems of Lipetsk, Oryol and Bryansk Oblasts.