The Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region and the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine were not the decisive military operations that won the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability for single decisive operations and must conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far from victory but can generally achieve strategic objectives. It is too early to assess the results and operational significance. But they will matter insofar as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.
Scale prevented either side from resolving the war in a single, decisive campaign. ISW recently published "Ukraine and the Maneuver Recovery Problem in Modern Warfare", where Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan note that Ukraine and Russia have the ability to establish deep defense positions and reserves that will prevent every single campaign of achieving the war's strategic objectives before it reaches its climax.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely view maintaining the initiative as a strategic imperative to win a war of attrition against Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region and the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine will determine whether Russian forces can maintain the initiative in the short term. Russian forces have been conducting successive offensive operations across eastern and northeastern Ukraine since November 2023 as part of the campaign.
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
The Russian military has not launched a new operation in recent months to maintain a steady offensive pace in Ukraine, especially in the Donetsk region. Putin and the Russian military have accepted that months will continue to yield marginal tactical gains.
Putin expressed a theory of victory in Ukraine - gradual creeping progress indefinitely while preventing Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations.
The Russian military appears to be trying to maintain its offensive pressure in the Donetsk region and likely hopes that a sustained offensive pace will draw enough Ukrainian resources into defensive operations in the area to prevent Kiev from countering the battlefield initiative elsewhere. taking advantage of the theater-wide impact of the invasion of the Kursk region. Just because Russian forces are prioritizing the offensive operation against Pokrovsk, however, does not mean that Ukraine should decide to prioritize there over efforts elsewhere.
Currently, Russian forces are seeking to capture the entire Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the Russian military is likely measuring the success of Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine by how much closer Russian forces are getting to that goal. ISW has long assessed that Russian efforts to capture Chasov Yar or push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast were pursuing operationally significant objectives, but Russian forces instead increasingly prioritized capture efforts of Pokrovsk and an advance west and southwest of the city of Donetsk, an objective of relatively less operational importance.
Russian forces may focus on advancing in these areas because these sectors of the front provide opportunities for greater territorial gains and because these areas allow Russian forces to advance closer to the borders of Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces seek to build pressure, but to pursue limited territorial objectives and have given up pursuing more operationally significant objectives.
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has no long-term territorial objectives, but instead aims to generate operational and strategic pressure on Russian forces across the theater. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that Ukraine is not interested in holding territory in Kursk Oblast in the long term and aims in part to defend itself against Russian strikes while forcing Russian forces to redeploy forces from elsewhere in the theater and complicating Russian logistics.< /p>
There are no discernible operationally significant territorial objectives in the area where Ukraine launched the invasion of Kursk Oblast, and Ukraine has not committed the resources to the operation necessary to pursue actual operationally significant territorial objectives further into Kursk Oblast, such as the capture of the city of Kursk . Therefore, the success of the Ukrainian invasion should not be judged in terms of Russian territory captured by Ukrainian forces.
The Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region has already created operational and strategic pressure on Russian forces. The next phases of the fighting in Russia are likely to generate even more pressure on Putin and the Russian military. The Ukrainian invasion has prompted the Russian army to redeploy up to 11 battalions so far.
US officials reportedly told the New York Times in an article published on August 15 that Russia had committed reserves to the Kursk region that would otherwise have committed to deepening offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming months.
The redeployment of Russian forces and the commitment of elements of the operational reserves allowed Russian forces to slow the initially rapid Ukrainian advances in the Kursk region and begin to limit the scale of the Ukrainian invasion.
Putin and the Kremlin will almost certainly try to reclaim Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized, as continued Ukrainian occupation of Russian territory would be a strategic blow to Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability. security and geopolitical revival.
A Russian counteroffensive operation to recapture territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower, equipment and materiel. Russian sources say that Ukrainian forces are consolidating their positions in the Kursk region and building fortifications, although it is too early to assess how strongly Ukrainian forces will defend occupied positions in Russia against possible Russian counteroffensive operations.
It is also too early to judge when Russian forces will completely halt the Ukrainian advance in Kursk Oblast and seize the initiative on the battlefield to launch a larger counteroffensive operation. Russian forces have expended significant combat power in the effort to retake Pokrovsk, which began in mid-February 2024 after capturing Avdeyevka, and have since advanced approximately 23 kilometers into the area in six months of Ukraine's most intense fighting in 2024 Mr.
Russia and Ukraine had reportedly planned to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the meeting following the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast . The Washington Post reported on August 17 that people and diplomats familiar with the matter said Ukraine and Russia plan to send delegations to Doha in August 2024 to attend Qatar-brokered discussions on the proposed moratorium.
According to the Washington Post, citing a diplomat who wished to remain anonymous, Russia postponed the meetings after Ukraine's invasion of the Kursk region, but did not completely cancel the talks. The Washington Post reported that two sources familiar with the talks said unspecified senior Ukrainian officials believed the meeting had a 20 percent or less chance of success even if Ukrainian forces did not conduct the operation in Kursk Oblast. Russia and Ukraine are reportedly discussing such a moratorium from June 2024, following Qatar's proposals to Ukraine and Russia.
The Washington Post diplomatic source said that after Russia suspended its participation in the talks, Ukraine wants to hold bilateral meetings with Qatar, but Qatar does not see unilateral meetings as useful. The Washington Post reported that the Ukrainian presidential office said the meetings in Qatar had been postponed "due to the situation in the Middle East" and that the discussions will be held via video conference on August 22. It is not clear whether the August 22 discussions will include the Russian delegation or not.
Russia remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations, regardless of desire for a possible moratorium on strikes on energy infrastructure.
Britain is reportedly waiting for US approval before giving the "green light" of Ukrainian forces to use Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. The Times reported on August 16 that a request for US approval was submitted more than a month ago (approximately mid-July 2024) and is still awaiting a response from US President Joe Biden's administration.
A second UK government source told The Times that discussions about Storm Shadows "continue" with UK allies, and a third source described the approval process as "routine". The Times said the UK, US, France and another unspecified NATO ally must unanimously approve the policy change. UK policy on Ukraine's ability to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia has become increasingly unclear in recent months following several conflicting statements by British officials.
The Kremlin has resumed its absurd information operation alleging that Ukrainian forces are preparing false-flag attacks, potentially with "dirty bombs," against Russia's Kursk nuclear power plant. (KAPP) and the occupied "Zaporozhka" NPP (NPP), which is likely to undermine broader Western support for Ukraine amid Russian battlefield setbacks in the Kursk region. Several prominent Russian leaders, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear power operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats and occupation authorities said on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities were preparing a false flag attack on the nuclear power plant.
Russian state news bulletin RIA Novosti claimed, citing a source in Russian authorities, that Ukrainian forces planned to carry out this attack with warheads containing radioactive material, and several Russian bloggers and prominent Kremlin mouthpieces widely expanded this narrative of " ;dirty bomb".
Russian officials, most notably former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, last pushed the dirty bomb story on this scale in October 2022 amid ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts in southern Ukraine and just weeks before those efforts force Russian forces to withdraw from the western (right) bank of the Kherson region. Shoigu's October 2022 statements were also intended to scare Western officials into abandoning support for Ukraine amid Russian battlefield setbacks, and that goal remains unchanged. Russian information operation under a "false flag" is based on assumptions that contradict or undermine this narrative and ignores the fact that Russia has proven to be an unsafe nuclear operator.
Ukrainian forces have consistently demonstrated their ability to strike the rear of Russia and occupied Ukraine at ranges further than the approximately 60 kilometers between the Kursk NPP and the international border, or approximately 30-40 kilometers from the current limit of the claimed Ukrainian offensive in Kursk area with its current capabilities.
Prominent Kremlin-linked bloggers have undermined this intelligence operation, noting that Ukrainian forces already have the capability to strike at that distance and assessing that a dirty bomb would be "too complicated".
The Kremlin is also re-testing threats to nuclear plants. Russian forces fired on the Zaporizhia NPP during the March 2022 seizure of the plant, store and operate military equipment within the nuclear plant.