After three weeks of fighting, Russia is still struggling to push back Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region - a surprisingly slow and restrained response to the first occupation of its territory after the Second World War, writes BTA, citing AP.
It all comes down to the personnel of the Russian forces and Russia's priorities. And with most of the Russian military focusing on the offensive in Ukraine, the Kremlin does not seem to have enough reserves to push Kiev's forces out for now.
President Vladimir Putin does not appear to view the attack - or at least not give the impression that he does - as a serious enough threat to justify withdrawing Russian troops from Ukraine's eastern Donbas region, which is his priority target. "Putin's focus is on the collapse of the Ukrainian state, which he believes will automatically render any territorial control irrelevant," commented Tatyana Stanovaya, senior researcher at the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center.
Months after launching the full-scale invasion in 2022, Putin has illegally annexed Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions as part of Russian territory, and their full conquest is a top priority. In June, he said Kiev must withdraw its forces from parts of those regions it controls as a condition for peace talks, a demand Ukraine rejects. "In mobilizing forces in response to the Ukrainian incursion, Russia is doing everything it can to avoid drawing parts of its own offensive into the Donbass," noted Nigel Gould-Davies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "At the moment, Russia assesses that it can contain the threat on its territory without compromising its most important goal in Ukraine," he added.
Even as Ukrainian forces entered Kursk Oblast on August 6, Russian troops continued their slow advance into the strategic city of Pokrovsk and other parts of Donetsk Oblast. "Russia is very keen to continue attacks on Pokrovsk and not divert resources from Pokrovsk to Kursk Oblast," said Niko Lange, a senior researcher at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis.
Unlike Pokrovsk, where Ukrainian forces have built extensive fortifications, other parts of Donetsk Oblast still under Ukrainian control are less well defended and could be significantly more vulnerable to a Russian attack if Pokrovsk fall down Speaking about Kursk Oblast during meetings via video link with officials, Putin described the incursion as an attempt by Kiev to slow Russia's offensive in Donetsk Oblast, where he said the Russian advance had only accelerated despite events in Kursk Oblast.
Russia has also been conducting long-range strikes on Ukraine's power grid. Monday's attack on energy facilities was one of the largest of the war - involving more than 200 missiles and drones - and caused widespread power outages. This highlighted the gaps in Ukraine's air defenses, which must simultaneously protect frontline troops and infrastructure. Focused on seizing Ukraine's four regions, Putin is trying to downplay Kiev's push into Kursk Oblast. "Instead of mobilizing the population against the threat to the homeland, the Kremlin is seeking to play down the invasion," commented Gould-Davies of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Faced with the reality of the occupation of Russian territory, the state propaganda machine is trying to divert attention from the apparent military failure by focusing on the government's efforts to help the more than 130,000 residents forced to flee their homes.
The state-controlled media presented the attack in Kursk Oblast as proof of Kiev's aggressive intentions and further evidence that Russia had the right to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Stanovaya noted that while many Kursk Oblast residents are angry at the Kremlin, the general mood in the country may actually be beneficial to the authorities. "While this is certainly a blow to the Kremlin's reputation, it is unlikely to cause a significant increase in social or political discontent among the population," she said. "The Ukrainian attack could actually lead to a rally around the flag and an increase in anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western sentiments," Stanovaya added.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that the entry into Kursk Oblast was aimed at creating a buffer zone to deter Russian attacks. The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Oleksandr Sirsky, said that Kiev's forces control nearly 1,300 square km. and about 100 settlements in the region - a claim that cannot be independently verified.
Because the fighting environment in Kursk is volatile, unlike the static front lines in Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian units could roam the region without establishing a permanent presence in many of the settlements they claim. Observers say Russia does not have sufficiently well-coordinated resources to pursue Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. "Moscow's efforts to counter the new Ukrainian offensive appear to be limited to sending units from across Russia, including militia units and non-regular duty forces," said Ben Barry, senior research fellow on land warfare at the International Institute for strategic research.
Until the invasion of Kursk Oblast, Putin had refrained from using conscripts in the war to avoid a public backlash. Young conscripts called up for mandatory one-year service served far from the front, and those sent to defend the border in the Kursk region became easy prey for Ukraine's battle-hardened mechanized infantry units. Hundreds of them were captured and 115 were exchanged for Ukrainian prisoners of war over the weekend. Observers note that Putin is also reluctant to call up more reservists, fearing domestic destabilization, such as happened when he ordered a highly unpopular mobilization of 300,000 in response to a Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2022. Hundreds of thousands of them left Russia, to avoid being sent into combat.
Since then, the Kremlin has been bolstering its forces in Ukraine with volunteers attracted by relatively high salaries, but in recent months that flow has slowed. Tens of thousands of Russian troops are needed to completely push back Ukrainian forces, believed to number around 10,000 and using the region's dense forests as cover. Clearly lacking the resources for such a large-scale operation, Russia has so far focused on halting deeper Ukrainian advances by blocking roads and targeting Kiev's reserves, a tactic that has been partially successful.
Meanwhile, Ukraine confused the Russian military by destroying bridges over the Seym River in the Kursk region, disrupting the logistics of some parts of Russia in the region and creating conditions for the establishment of an isolated area of control.
Lange predicted that Ukrainian troops could use the river to carve out a buffer zone. "I would expect the Ukrainians to find a few more bottlenecks for Russian logistics and infrastructure, not necessarily just bridges, and take them under control," he said. By seizing part of Russian territory, Ukraine has put the Kremlin in an awkward position and changed the shape of the battlefield. The redeployment of some of the country's most combat-capable forces from the east, however, is a risk for Kiev. "All of this poses a significant risk, especially if efforts to exhaust Russian forces lead to the exhaustion of smaller Ukrainian forces," Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes.
The attempt to establish a foothold in the Kursk region will further extend the more than 1,000 km front line and increase the challenges facing the understaffed and poorly armed Ukrainian forces. Defending positions on Russian territory would present serious logistical problems, and extended supply routes would become an easy target. "The Russian system is very hierarchical and rigid, so they always need considerable time to adapt to a new situation," Lange stressed, "but we will have to see how Ukraine will be able to hold on there after Russia adapted and came full force".