Mohammad Mokhber, an advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, said on social media that energy supplies from the Middle East to the United States would be cut off if the recently signed agreement with the United States remains only “on paper”. The diplomatic pressure comes at a critical moment as delegations from both sides try to agree on the details of the historic “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding” signed in mid-June by Presidents Donald Trump and Massoud Pezeshkian. The situation in Lebanon is also adding to the rift. Although the memorandum calls for a ceasefire, Israel continues its airstrikes against the Hezbollah group, leading Tehran to accuse Washington of not controlling its main ally in the region. What to expect... Journalist Ruslan Trad, a non-resident fellow at the DFRLab at the Atlantic Council, spoke to FACTI. He is the chairman of the Forum for Arab Culture and the creator of the first Bulgarian blog about the Middle East - Intidar.
- Mr. Trad, what is the explanation for the initial failure of the talks in Switzerland - the military escalation in South Lebanon or the deeper distrust between Washington and Tehran?
- Both, but the immediate reason is Lebanon. The talks in the Bürgenstock resort were canceled hours before they were to take place on June 19, after Iran postponed sending its delegation due to the ongoing Israeli strikes on South Lebanon. Washington officially announced “logistical reasons”, but the real reason is precisely the escalation in Lebanon. The distrust is structural – it existed even when the ceasefire was digitally signed just days earlier, and key issues such as nuclear enrichment remained unresolved. Israel has not committed to the Lebanese clauses of the memorandum, which is the main driver of the crisis and the main evidence that the distrust goes beyond the purely military context.
- To what extent is Iran using the situation in Lebanon as a diplomatic lever for pressure in the negotiations on its nuclear program?
- Lebanon is both a real problem for Tehran and a positioning tool. Iran has set as a precondition for the negotiations precisely the cessation of the war on all fronts, especially in Lebanon, which is a tactical lever. Through “Hezbollah” Iran maintains an active military front, which it can include or exclude for political reasons. The very fact that the cancellation of the meeting in Switzerland was motivated by strikes in Lebanon shows that Tehran is willing to sacrifice diplomatic deadlines in exchange for pressure on Washington to contain Israel. This, of course, causes anger in Israel.
- Can we talk about a serious diplomatic failure of the Donald Trump administration, after the negotiations were canceled literally hours before they were to begin?
- I would not call it a complete failure, but it is a serious signal of the fragility of what has been achieved. The memorandum of understanding was signed digitally on June 17 and formally remains in force - for now. However, the cancellation of the ceremony in Switzerland shows that the Trump administration has failed to synchronize the positions of Israel and Iran before the key date. The White House claims that “negotiations are never easy”, and Witkoff is on his way to Switzerland, which suggests that Washington has not abandoned the process, but has lost the pace and the previously achieved effect.
- Israel seems unwilling to comply with the Iranian conditions for withdrawal from South Lebanon. To what extent does this make a future agreement between the US and Iran practically impossible?
- Israel is the main structural obstacle to any lasting agreement. Tel Aviv has directly stated that it does not consider itself bound by the Lebanese clauses of the memorandum, and the condition that “Hezbollah” leave South Lebanon without a prior full Israeli withdrawal is unacceptable to both Beirut and Tehran. “Hezbollah” is ready to withdraw from the area south of the Litani River only if Israel withdraws at the same time and there is a complete ceasefire - a condition that Israel rejects. This does not make the agreement impossible in an absolute sense, but it significantly narrows the room for maneuver and puts Washington in the position of choosing between its ally and the process with Iran.
- What is the role of “Hezbollah" in this process? Is the organization becoming a factor that can block or accelerate diplomatic efforts?
- “Hezbollah“ is both an obstacle and a necessary participant. The organization welcomed the memorandum on June 14-15 and announced its support for a comprehensive ceasefire. But “Hezbollah” continued to act, and its operations gave Israel the pretext for the strikes in Lebanon that led to the cancellation of the meeting in Switzerland. As long as the organization maintains a combat-ready military structure and political freedom of action outside the direct control of Tehran, based also on a certain degree of nationalist sentiment, it can block or accelerate the process depending on its internal calculations - and this is precisely what makes it an unpredictable but key player.
- It is clear that Iran refuses to part with its stocks of enriched uranium and its enrichment infrastructure. Is there any room for compromise on these key issues?
- There is a limited space, but it is gradually taking shape. Iran officially insists on its right to enrich uranium and retain control over its stockpiles. The memorandum stipulates that Iran will dilute highly enriched uranium inside the country, and the mechanism for this will be specified within 60 days. Washington has also considered a proposal for a 10-year pause in enrichment, after which Iran will be allowed to produce low-enriched uranium in limited quantities. In other words, the compromise is technically achievable, but politically extremely difficult, because for Iran, nuclear enrichment is a matter of national sovereignty and internal legitimacy.
- How realistic is it within the 60-day period for the parties to achieve progress on such complex issues as the nuclear program, regional proxy forces and the Strait of Hormuz?
- Extremely ambitious and difficult to achieve - 60 days are not enough to finalize an agreement, but they may be enough to build a framework. Only the Strait of Hormuz is in a relatively better position, as Iran has already taken steps to open it under the memorandum. The nuclear program and regional proxies involve dozens of technical and political details, and the negotiations in Islamabad have shown that 21 hours of talks are not enough even for a framework agreement. The 60 days are more of a political signal - a tool to extend the ceasefire - than a real deadline for a comprehensive agreement.
- What would be the consequences for the region if the negotiation process ultimately fails and the memorandum remains only on paper?
- The consequences would be extremely severe. The Strait of Hormuz could be closed again, and oil and gas prices would immediately soar, triggering a regional economic crisis. Israel is on standby for renewed direct strikes against Iran, and if Iran accelerates its nuclear program to a weapons level, the risk of a wider regional war with a possible nuclear dimension is real. The Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq would likely step up their activities, which would put both shipping in the Red Sea and US bases in the region at risk.
- Do you see a risk that Lebanon will become the main front in a wider regional confrontation between Iran and Israel?
- Lebanon is already a main front, but the question is whether it will remain manageable or escalate to an uncontrollable level. Since February 28, Israel has been carrying out some of the largest airstrikes on Beirut and southern Lebanon, killing at least 47 people before the memorandum was signed. “Hezbollah“ is among the few factors capable of escalating directly to a regional war, and it is the ongoing clashes in southern Lebanon that led to the latest diplomatic crisis. If Israel continues its operations, Iran will face domestic political pressure to respond militarily, and then the risk of a full-scale war increases significantly.
- If you had to predict the next few weeks, what will be the decisive condition for the return of the US and Iran to the negotiating table - the development of hostilities in Lebanon or the willingness to compromise on the nuclear program?
- Lebanon could ignite a new crisis, but the nuclear program is the real test for Iran. In the short term - the next 2-3 weeks - the key condition is the success of a new ceasefire in Lebanon, as Tehran has made it clear that it cannot sit at the table while its ally is under active attack. Washington is already putting pressure on Israel to accept a new ceasefire, and Witkoff is heading to Switzerland, which suggests that the process is not dead. But a lasting return of both sides to the table - and above all, reaching an agreement - will depend on whether Iran and the US find the formula for nuclear enrichment: it is both the last and most difficult test of mutual trust.