Daniel Smilov's comment:
Boyko Borisov – the leader of the largest party in Bulgaria – is once again faced with a critical highway choice. In front of him is a straight road, above which hangs the sign "Rule of Law" and a turnoff, the sign for which reads "Delyan Peevski". The tires squeal and the car of the one who thinks he deserves to be prime minister takes the turnoff again. As he has always done so far (although with slight hesitations in 2013).
There are three specific reasons for the current choice. The first is the I.F. Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov, for whom the Supreme Judicial Council and the prosecutor's office were apparently instructed, is to be defended to the last. Details about the instruction are not actually known - was it actually issued or is it one of those commands that soldiers in the barracks start giving themselves when they are sufficiently trained (according to Ivan Hadzhiyski and Michel Foucault). This does not really matter, because the current Supreme Judicial Council has proven that it acts in full synchrony with the Peevski-Borisov tandem.
The Supreme Court of Cassation's decision on Sarafov is fully justified
The situation is curious, however, because the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) yesterday issued a decision to treat Sarafov's acts as null and void. In a country governed by the rule of law, this should be the end of Borislav Sarafov as acting prosecutor general. The court's decision is, moreover, fully justified, because there is a specific law prohibiting the same person from performing the functions of chief prosecutor for more than a certain period of time. Which in Sarafov's case expired months ago. The Supreme Court of Cassation is the country's highest court in criminal cases, which means that if Sarafov remains in office with administrative grips, the Bulgarian legal system will face a severe institutional crisis.
The acts of the prosecutor's office as a whole can be questioned in court, since the prosecutor general has sufficient powers to intervene even in specific cases in the form of control over legality, to determine personnel policy, etc. The Supreme Court of Cassation and the prosecutor's office will clearly embark on the path of institutional ruin, and this cannot happen without the consent of Peevski and Borisov. The first consent is clearly present, and the second is a matter of the choice that was mentioned. And which has probably already been made.
Attempt to remove the opposition from key positions
The second reason for the critical choice before Borisov is the ongoing saga with the investigation of opposition mayors. And it is already clear to the blind that this is an organized campaign by services, the prosecutor's office and certain courts, which aims to denigrate the opposition, remove its key mayors and concentrate power. Only the ruling majority, who are the beneficiaries of this process, do not see this. In fact, they pretend not to see it, because Borisov himself has said several times that at least for Blagomir Kotsev, his detention in custody is completely unjustified. And that if it depended on him, he would release him.
In Bulgaria, alas, the release and imprisonment depends on political figures. And people have correctly oriented themselves towards Borisov, as the supposedly most influential political figure among those in power. So he is either playing dead with regard to Kotsev, or power has really slipped away from him in the direction of Delyan Peevski.
The problem with the opposition has become international
The case of the persecution of the opposition in our country is now international - and not only because of the open request of the group of liberals in the EU to cause a suspension of funds under the PPA for Bulgaria. The tranches under this plan are key to the budget this year and if they are postponed, our financial accounts will not come out, just when we are about to enter the eurozone.
The problem is not with the PP-DB and the “bad” liberals, who, you see, want to screw up Bulgaria. The position of Chancellor Merz and Germany on these internal issues of ours seems to be similar to that of the liberals, which also explains Borisov's stern expression when he discusses the topic and wants to distinguish himself from Peevski on it. After all, the German ambassador does not go to all the protests in the country, and when he goes to a protest as a citizen, it means a lot in diplomatic terms.
Despite all this, however, Borisov's "choice" seems to have been made and it is not in the interest of either the rule of law or European solidarity. What are the reasons for this choice is an interesting question, but they do not seem to be in the field of open politics.
Concentration of power and thugs
The third reason why Borisov should think about where he is going is the excessive concentration of power in certain figures in the ruling majority, and it is not guaranteed that he is among them. The election of heads of services by the National Assembly is such a case. The idea is to send out Peevski-Borisov's confidants through the parliamentary majority, but it seems more to Peevski than to Borisov. This topic is speculative, but Borisov himself paradoxically confirms the doubts: after all, if the anti-corruption agency acted without his knowledge and approval in Varna, then it is more loyal to someone else. And the very fact that it was used to deal with Dogan's APS shows who this other person is. The same analysis can be applied to the State Security Agency.
In addition to control over the services (which is concentrated entirely in the Peevski-Borisov tandem), the issues with the country's finances are in a similar way. While the financing of the municipalities of the DPS “New Beginning“, for example, is going smoothly, GERB mayors cannot boast of the same.
And in places, discontent and quiet grumbling are beginning to simmer, as well as a reorientation in favor of the stronger. It may be a question of isolated incidents, but there seems to be some basis in Peevski's claims that significant resources are not distributed without his approval. Which is somewhat understandable in a coalition government. But it is also extremely paradoxical, because it represents an overconcentration of power in one of the smaller parties participating in the government.
The masks are falling
So far, Borisov has managed to both take advantage of his control over the services and the judiciary, and not dramatically destroy the facade of the rule of law. On the turnoff he is taking, however, there is no longer any room for masks and pretense. If the state functions with an illegitimate prosecutor general who is the “master of the investigation”, by which the opposition is imprisoned, any semblance and facade of a rule of law state would disappear.