Realistic explanatory models are experiencing a revival unseen since the end of the Cold War. One question dominates the global security agenda: how do states and alliances guarantee their own survival? This is what researcher Ayhan Sari writes for TRT.
"The international order is undergoing a profound transformation. On the one hand, traditional alliances are weakening, and on the other, the proliferation of drones and unmanned weapon systems is fundamentally changing the nature of modern warfare.
Even countries with limited industrial capacity can now inflict serious damage on great powers. Europe is directly affected by both trends.
The transatlantic alliance is losing its credibility, while the war between Russia and Ukraine is shaking the European security system.
The United States increasingly looks like an unreliable guarantor of European security, and Russia continues to increase its military pressure.
However, Europe has so far failed to establish independent security leadership or sufficiently strengthen its defense capabilities.
Under such conditions, it would be logical to rethink existing alliances and build new partnerships.
The most important potential partner in Europe's neighborhood is undoubtedly Turkey. Yet the country continues to be overlooked by many European politicians and decision-makers.
For example, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently put Turkey in the same category as China and Russia, stating that "the European Union must build its future" away from these three countries. A similar position is found in a recent report by the European Foreign Policy Council (EFPC).
This analysis uses this report as a starting point and examines why Europe often finds itself unable to address security challenges on its own.
"Making defence European again" - but how exactly?
The authors of the EFPC report outline three steps to restore Europe's ability to defend itself: a common decision-making architecture incorporating NATO structures, EU instruments and flexible coalitions; powerful and rapidly deployable armed forces; and a coordinated European defense industry as the industrial backbone of this system.
The first reaction when reading such proposals is: that sounds reasonable.
The second question, however, is: how exactly will it happen?
And the third leads to the real problem: if these ideas are so obvious, why has Europe not implemented them in recent decades?
Let alone a European army - even a common defense mechanism has never been created.
Since Donald Trump's first term in the White House in 2016, it has become clear that American security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted. Meanwhile, war has been raging on Europe's borders for years.
So why has the promised shift in security policy never happened?
A look at the positions of leading European politicians provides part of the answer.
As early as 2015, then-European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for the creation of a European army as a signal of resolve towards Russia.
However, European Commission Vice-President Kaia Kallas recently described such an idea as "extremely dangerous" and questioned whether its supporters had considered the practical implications.
The most categorical assessment came from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who told the European Parliament that anyone who believes that Europe can defend itself without the US should "keep dreaming".
According to him, a European army would create largely duplicative structures within NATO.
Ultimately, the report itself provides the answer to why these plans have been failing for years - albeit unintentionally. It describes the goal without convincingly explaining the path to it.
Bringing together 27 sovereign states with different budgets, defence industries, threat perceptions and strategic interests in a common defence architecture is not simply a matter of political will. This is a structural problem.
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how limited European solidarity is even on relatively simple issues such as the supply of protective equipment.
Anyone who thinks that these same institutions can seamlessly coordinate common command structures, weapons programs and nuclear deterrence underestimates the power of national interests.
What makes the report unconvincing is not so much what it demands as what it omits.
The key question remains unanswered: what has fundamentally changed today that would allow success where there was failure over the past decade?
Neither the Russian threat nor the uncertainty surrounding American security guarantees are new.
Yet the report is written as if listing the right measures is enough to implement them.
The world is not waiting: why Europe must give up its illusions
The real problem is deeper than any strategic report. Many European politicians and experts do not perceive the world as it is today, but as it was in the past.
The asymmetry of power that Europe benefited from for decades no longer exists.
Economically, Europe remains one of the most important global players, but militarily, other countries have caught up with it or even surpassed it.
The American security umbrella has long concealed this reality. If Washington continues to reduce its commitment to defending Europe, the continent’s military and strategic weaknesses will become painfully apparent.
The history of international relations shows that rivals invariably exploit weakness.
It is therefore all the more remarkable that a report on the future architecture of European security almost completely ignores Turkey.
And the country is a factor of considerable weight, both militarily and geopolitically.
In recent years, Turkey has been among the few NATO countries to achieve concrete and practical results in its relations with Russia.
Ignoring such a partner for political or ideological reasons is not an analytical judgment, but a strategic error.
This omission says less about Turkey’s importance than about the limitations of European strategic thinking.