Markets rarely say openly what governments are doing. Sometimes, however, the prices of little-known raw materials reveal more than official declarations. Such is the case with tungsten – the metal with the highest melting point, indispensable for hard alloys, high-speed tools, aircraft engines, missiles and armor-piercing ammunition.
The European price of ammonium paratungstate – APT, the main intermediate product in the tungsten trade – is already reaching almost $3,000 per ton, an increase of 8.5 TIMES since the beginning of 2025. This seems even more extraordinary given that estimates suggest that a price of around $600-700 should be enough to stimulate new Western production. Chinese state-owned enterprises operate at much lower costs, and the marginal cost for the industry is estimated to be around $500.
In theory, a market that trades many times above the incentive price should trigger a wave of new mines. But tungsten is no ordinary market. It is built around a highly concentrated and hard-to-substitute supply chain.
In 2025, China produced approximately 67,000 tons of tungsten out of a total of around 85,000 tons worldwide - nearly 80% of global production. Following it, at a great distance, are Vietnam, Russia, Kazakhstan, Bolivia, Rwanda, Austria, Spain and Australia. There are also deposits in Canada, South Korea, Portugal and the USA, but most Western projects are small, closed or still in development.
However, the dependence does not end with the mines. After extraction, the concentrate must be chemically processed in APT, and then into oxide, powder, metal, tungsten carbide or ferroalloys. It is in these intermediate and refining stages that Chinese influence is even stronger. Europe has separate capacities in Austria, Germany, Portugal and Spain, but remains dependent on imports of processed products. In 2025, for example, 68% of the value of European ferrotungsten imports came from China.
The current price increase is by no means the result of just a normal increase in industrial demand. In February 2025, Beijing introduced a permit regime on the export of a number of tungsten products, and subsequently limited mining quotas. The US responded with tariffs, restrictions on Chinese materials in defense supplies, state funding and the accumulation of strategic reserves. The wars in Ukraine and Iran are further accelerating the consumption of ammunition - a use in which the metal is not recycled, but disappears in the explosion.
The history of Australian mines is most indicative. Before the First World War, Queensland was among the largest producers of tungsten, with a significant part of the ore even exported to Germany. The war turned the metal into a strategic raw material and interrupted these trade links. High wartime prices stimulated mining, but after the peace, many developments declined again.
The Hatches Creek mine in the Northern Territory began operations in 1915, almost simultaneously with the war, but lost importance after the fall in prices. The mine was revived in the 1930s, and in 1942 the Australian state took control of it due to a tungsten shortage. After the war, production declined again and finally stopped in 1957. Today, the deposit is being explored again.
The cycle is similar at the Mt Carbine mine. The area was developed from the late 19th century, grew during the war and price shocks, became a major industrial mine in the 1970s and 1980s, and closed when cheap Chinese tungsten conquered the market. Mt Carbine is now producing again, first by processing old dumps and then from an open pit. The historic Wolfram Camp is also preparing for restoration.
The same is happening outside Australia. South Korea’s Sangdong is returning after a decades-long hiatus, the UK is trying to revive Hemerdon, Canada is developing Mactung, and Spain is expanding its role as one of the few remaining European sources.
This does not mean that a high price will automatically secure new supply. The real constraints are permits, financing, processing capacity, and the years it takes to build a mine. The global market is reporting a series of deficits that will reach almost 20% of annual consumption by 2026, but new production continues to lag behind.
Bulgaria also has an opportunity to gain through the “Grancharitsa” deposit near Velingrad, which is said to have a potential production of about 860 tons of WO₃ per year. However, the project remains blocked. While other countries are turning geopolitics into investment, profits, and jobs, Bulgaria is once again just watching.
Tungsten does not prove that a world war is inevitable. It shows that major countries are already rearranging their supply chains as if a prolonged military conflict were a completely realistic scenario. When mines that were revived in previous world wars reopen and the price breaks away from production costs, the warning cannot be ignored.
It smells like a big war. Not because the metal predicts the future, but because countries seem to be preparing for it.
Of course, this is just my opinion and should not be taken as investment advice.