Much speculation surrounds the Kremlin's motives for refusing to consider a ceasefire in Ukraine. Is it hoping to extract more concessions from Donald Trump, who recently imposed a 50-day ultimatum to end the conflict under threat of economic sanctions? Does it think it can achieve more successes on the ground? Or is there something else?
In an interview with the French daily L'Express, Russian military propaganda expert Ian Garner offers a different perspective. An associate professor at the Center for Totalitarian Studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw, he believes that although Russia is "on the brink" of recession - in the words of its own economy minister - it probably cannot wage war indefinitely at the level to which Vladimir Putin has committed. Yet, according to Garner, the military effort is currently a key tool for economic and social stability for the Russian autocrat: "He simply cannot do without it."
But what if the US president's tough stance changes the situation? Garner is cautious in his predictions, but points to a key weakness of the Moscow regime: "The Kremlin's problem is that it almost always acts reactively, rather than anticipating events. So there is no guarantee that it will be able to adequately respond to future challenges." According to him, in most cases, Putin is not the Machiavellian strategist he presents himself to be.
L'EXPRESS: Despite Vladimir Putin's stubborn reluctance to consider a ceasefire in Ukraine, most analysts agree that putting this conflict on hold would be the logical next step for Russia, exhausted economically and in terms of human resources. But you think the Russian president has no intention of ending this war. Why?
IAN GARNER: Your question is asked from a Western perspective. However, if we try to understand this conflict and Vladimir Putin’s logic through a rational cost-benefit analysis, as is traditionally done in Western Europe or North America, then we are on the wrong track. This war was not started for rational reasons. Despite some territorial gains, the Russian state had no chance of achieving the maximalist goals it had set for itself.
Therefore, we must try to understand the Kremlin’s logic in a different way, in order to understand what led Putin to embark on this crusade and what motivates him to continue it, despite the obvious exhaustion of his army. In the twenty-five years he has been in power, the Russian president has consistently argued that periods of struggle, sacrifice and ultimately conflict are beneficial for Russia. War, he says, is a way to restore the country's spiritual energy, and much of this rhetoric is dictated by the close relationship between the Orthodox Church and Moscow.
Obviously, this is a problem. Because his dreams of rebirth and national renewal are at odds with reality. Namely, the Russian state probably cannot wage perpetual war at the level it has committed itself to. But from the Kremlin's perspective, there is an even greater disadvantage to a quick exit from war.
L'EXPRESS: Who is he?
IAN GARNER: In the past two or three years, Moscow has practically completely restructured its economy and accelerated the militarization of culture, schools, and the relationship between the state and private business. In some previously neglected regions, new gyms, shops, and cafes have sprung up in rural villages. Consumer spending is increasing, especially in the economically depressed provinces, from where the Kremlin draws most of its soldiers.
Currently, about 1.5% of Russia’s GDP is spent on conscription. In some regions, the bonus paid to those who join the Russian army can reach tens of thousands of dollars. A sudden end to the war would likely cause a huge economic shock. But also a sociocultural shock! Because the implicit promise of this war is that if you suffer, if you fight for Russia’s greatness, it will be worth it, because life will improve immeasurably.
For many people in rural areas, it has been very difficult to escape poverty, at least since the early 2010s. For years, they harbored very little hope of ever joining the middle class and reaping the benefits of Russia’s rapid rise to wealth in the early 2000s. So, on the one hand, there is the risk of dying on the front, but on the other, the war opens up a life perspective that many Russians could never have imagined four or five years ago. Vladimir Putin simply cannot do without this lever for social and economic stability.
L'EXPRESS: Doesn't the fact that the Kremlin is betting on this war as a lever for economic and social stability betray a lack of long-term vision for Russian society?
IAN GARNER: Absolutely. In Putin's Russia, the long-term vision boils down to this grandiose spiritual narrative. The problem, as you might guess, is that this narrative condemns Russia to endless war. It promises that spiritual renewal will come with the fight against the enemy... Essentially, it's a variation on the fascist myth, demonstrating the short-sightedness of the Russian state apparatus.
L'EXPRESS: If the war is over, is there a possible revolt against Putin among the Russian population?
IAN GARNER: A mass uprising seems highly unlikely. The Russian opposition, if it can still be called an opposition, is so fragmented that it lacks the structural, communication and organizational means to confront the Kremlin.
Moreover, the general public does not really express a serious desire for a change of course. The main issue, however, is related to the veterans, who are already numerous: 30,000 Russians have been going to the front every month for several years, and they represent at least a million soldiers.
If they feel cheated, if the money promised by the Kremlin does not reach them or allow them to have the new life they aspire to, we could see waves of violence similar to what Russia experienced in the 1990s.
Instead of a general uprising, we could see localized clashes and an increase in police repression. But in the end, the state will probably bring back some of its military personnel to assert its superiority and increase violence.
L'EXPRESS: The day the war in Ukraine ends, won't Vladimir Putin's power be undermined to its very foundations?
IAN GARNER: I don't think victory or defeat - unless absolutely catastrophic - can have a real impact on Putin's power. At no point during this war has he been really challenged in any profound or systematic way. Some commentators like to speculate that defeat would lead to a loss of legitimacy.
But Putin will simply come up with another excuse based on the idea of revenge, as other very influential historical figures did in Germany in the 1920s. Moreover, Putin is already resorting to this "stab in the back" mythology since the late 1990s.
So even if the war stops, Putin will find a way to justify the need for an even bigger war, first against so-called traitors at home, before potentially spreading abroad. Simply because he cannot maintain his power without martial law.
L'EXPRESS: In Russia, oil sales to countries like China and India keep much of the economy afloat. With Donald Trump's 50-day ultimatum, and in particular the "secondary sanctions" component, aimed at Moscow's allies - including Beijing and New Delhi - could Putin be cornered and agree to a ceasefire in the near future?
IAN GARNER: If Trump stays tough, that could really change the situation. But the American president, as we have already seen, tends to change his mind every week. Everything depends so much on his will that we can only speculate about the meaning or scope of his new promises, and when he will actually fulfill them, if he does.
But if that happens, then we could witness a confluence of circumstances - for example, if in rapid succession the Europeans finance more weapons for Kiev, the Russian economy collapses faster than expected, and China begins to distance itself - that could put pressure on Putin and lead to a freeze in the conflict. But we have no evidence that Trump will keep his word...
For now, at least, there are very few signs that the Russian state is about to consider a ceasefire. Indeed, the Kremlin continues to publicly affirm its desire to take full control of Ukraine. The "root causes" that Moscow has put forward that are supposedly responsible for this conflict have not disappeared from Vladimir Putin's mind.
Moreover, Putin is traditionally a very difficult negotiator. He usually practices Canadian wrestling until the last moment. So, could things change in the near future? I hope so. But so far there are very few signs pointing in that direction.
L'EXPRESS: The latest developments in this war are full of tactical and political mistakes on the part of the Kremlin. Is Vladimir Putin still in control of the situation or is he acting on intuition?
IAN GARNER: The Kremlin’s problem is that it almost always reacts to events rather than anticipates them. Its decision to invade and attempt to subjugate Ukraine for three days in 2022 was clearly a serious error of judgment. Moscow was unprepared for a long war and was surprised both by the difficulty of recruiting troops for the front and by Ukraine’s reactivity and military progress. The Russian president was also very surprised by Trump’s recent change.
In reality, Putin almost always improvises, relying primarily on the country’s vast human and material resources. All he does is adapt and improve his tactics on the fly. His greatest achievement has been raising the funds needed to motivate Russians to enlist in the army. But none of this was planned.
So, as the situation unfolds, there is no guarantee that the Kremlin will be able to adequately deal with future challenges. In most cases, Putin is not the Machiavellian strategist he portrays himself to be: he and the entire Kremlin are simply trying to cling to power. For now, they have found a lever that works. It remains to be seen how things will develop in the future.