Baltic Maginot Line Won't Stop Russia. Commentary by Michael Peck for Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.org):
In early 2024, the Baltic states announced their desire to build a joint defense line to prevent a Russian attack. The idea is simple – Working together, the three small countries want to compensate for their numerical and geographical weaknesses against their aggressive Russian neighbor.
Despite their picturesque landscape, the Baltic states were not built for defense. Lakes and marshes provide some benefit, but there are no mountains, jungles or rivers the size of the Rhine to stop an invader. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cannot be Switzerland.
Estonia plans to build 600 bunkers along its 300-kilometer border with Russia, and Latvia is building anti-tank “dragon teeth.” Lithuania announced a plan last month to build a multi-layered border defense system.
American General George Patton, one of the leading commanders in World War II, said that stationary fortifications were monuments to human folly, because anything built by man can be destroyed by man. Fortifications are a sensible and cost-effective idea, but by no means a stand-alone solution.
One of the most famous examples in this regard is the “Maginot“ line, with which the French hoped to stop the German army. However, Hitler surprised the French generals and invaded through the Ardennes - something the French did not expect, and thus bypassed the system of fortifications. However, the fault lies not with the fortresses, but with the lack of mobile reserves and the slow decisions of the French military command, which had not yet encountered anything like Hitler's blitzkrieg.
The Baltic defensive line will be useful for limited missions: delaying a Russian offensive, repelling small Russian attacks and providing a small degree of deterrence against Russian aggression. But the backbone of the defense will be the reserves - probably supported by air power – which would block the Russian blades and eventually drive them from Baltic soil.
The question is whether NATO is ready to implement this plan.
The armed forces of the Baltic states are small in number: Estonia has fewer than 8,000 active duty personnel, supported by 230,000 lightly armed reservists, better suited to defense than counterattack. The main burden for counterattack will have to come from countries such as the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
NATO currently has four battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, totaling several thousand soldiers. They are reinforced by a German armored brigade, which will be permanently stationed in Lithuania. But if Russia were to launch a Baltic offensive on the scale of its Ukraine campaign, these NATO forces would be little more than a hindrance.
The main question is how long it would take NATO to mobilize a fully equipped and well-supplied army to support the Baltic states, especially if the isolationist United States does not join the coalition. It is doubtful whether a purely European army can be formed in sufficient time and composition.
For Europe, there is an even bleaker scenario: a shortage of weapons and soldiers, as well as uncertainty about public support for war with Russia. If so, there would be an economic and psychological temptation to rely on the Baltic defense line to deter a potential Russian attack.
The French hoped that the fortifications would save them from the Germans. NATO cannot afford to make the same mistake.