Assoc. Prof. Milen Ivanov to FACTI: The truth is that the Ministry of Interior's system reacts post factum

What is broken in the "system" of the Ministry of Interior, to talk about additional training for police officers who work in the field. Can they and do they know how to handle a critical situation, are they well prepared, do they have the necessary tools to do their job well? The case of the death of Yavor from Varna raised many questions. But let's not forget that soon the salaries of uniformed officers were also raised significantly… Assoc. Prof. Milen Ivanov, former deputy rector of the Academy of the Ministry of Interior.

- Mr. Ivanov, do you think there was police violence in the case of Yavor, who died in Varna?
- Talking about police violence at this stage is hasty and may lead to wrong conclusions. The investigation will establish the facts and provide grounds for an objective assessment. What was seen on the security camera recordings does not show overt violence, but rather the use of excessive physical force, resulting from insufficient professional training and incorrect assessment of the situation by the two officers. This is worrying and raises questions about the training and approach to handling incidents of this type.

- Why is continued force exerted on a person who is already in handcuffs?
- Such actions, unfortunately, are not an exception, especially when young and less experienced officers are involved in the situation. There are several reasons – adrenaline shock, inadequate risk assessment and, above all, the lack of a built-in dynamic stereotype for action in crisis situations. The young officer often wants to "master" the situation at all costs, which in the absence of experience leads to uncontrolled use of force - even when it is already unnecessary or illegal.
Therefore, the good practice, proven in many professional circles, is for patrol pairs to be made up of an older, more experienced officer and a younger colleague. This provides not only real leadership on the spot, but also continuous training through practice. The experienced officer does not just make decisions - he models behavior, demonstrates composure and serves as a shield against escalation of tension. When both officers on a patrol are inexperienced, the risk of excessive actions, aggression and wrong decisions increases sharply. That is why the right personnel policy and professionally selected duty are key to everyone's safety - including detainees.

- What is the level and quality of training of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?
- It is not constructive to judge the training of the police force based only on a single case. When similar cases begin to repeat, when a tendency towards a lack of coordination and professional behavior is observed, this already points to a systemic problem in the training of employees in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
One of the main deficiencies is the lack of a key phase in training - one in which young police officers solve realistic, typical situations for their work in a controlled, but dynamic and simulated environment. In other words - training must move from lecture halls and kimonos on tatami mats to a hyper-realistic, field environment with a practical focus.
Here we are faced with a serious paradox:
- cadets from the Academy of the Ministry of Interior study hand-to-hand combat techniques and the use of aids on tatami mats, in gyms and with kimonos
- these cadets will subsequently lead teams, make decisions in a real situation, but have no idea what a street conflict, tension in a crowd or an aggressive citizen during detention looks like.

On the other hand, trainees in the CSPP (Centers for Specialized Professional Training) receive far more practically focused training, but remain subordinate in the hierarchy to the same people who have never acted on the street, but only on the mat.
To this we must add another key problem - the detachment of teachers and instructors from real practice.
Many of them have not been in a risky situation for years, but they train others on how to react under pressure. This leads to inadequacy in methods and a complete discrepancy between theory and reality.
The solution is to switch to a model of rotating (seconded) instructors from the active police force, who will lead the practical classes - after completing an instructor course.
This guarantees:
- updating the training in relation to real tactics and challenges;
- authority in front of the cadets and trainees;
- linking the training to the real rhythm of street work
Full-time instructors with outdated schemes, without field expertise, cannot prepare a police officer who will be placed in a real, rapidly escalating environment.

- There is also a lot of comment on the fact that one of the Ministry of Interior employees was wearing a body camera, but it did not work because it did not have a battery. Then what is it for?
- Body cameras are an extremely important tool – not only for protecting citizens, but also for protecting the police themselves from unfounded accusations. However, in order to be effective, they must function reliably. In this particular case, we see a serious gap – the technology was introduced formally, without a real mechanism for maintenance, charging, wearing and accountability. This speaks of a systemic problem – The Ministry of Interior has ordered the use of body cameras without building comprehensive logistics around their effective operation.
Currently, there is a lack of clarity on key issues:
- who is responsible for the condition of the cameras, where and how they are charged
- how are the recordings archived
- what are the consequences of non-use
Without these answers, any such measure becomes a good idea compromised by poor implementation.

- Who and how monitors the recordings from these body cameras. We are talking about thousands of hours of recordings - if they are working and used while on duty?
- It is important to emphasize that the purpose of body cameras is not to exercise constant control over police officers, but to have a reliable and objective recording that can be used if necessary - either to protect civil rights or to confirm the lawful actions of the officer. It is practically impossible to create a structure that can review thousands of hours of video every day. Therefore, the recordings are stored in an established order and are reviewed when reports, complaints or official inspections are filed. However, the effectiveness of this system depends on clear rules, technical support and guarantees for the integrity and access to the recordings.

- Are Bulgarian police officers provided with the necessary equipment when they are on duty, or can they only respect with their physical strength and force?
- Unfortunately, this issue has remained unresolved for years. The truth is that Bulgarian police officers do not have the full range of necessary equipment. Not all field officers are provided with quality uniforms, bulletproof vests, personal protective equipment or aids such as stun guns, flashlights, handcuffs and helmets. In many cases, they are forced to purchase some of the necessary equipment themselves – something unacceptable in a professional security system.
This lack of security often leads to the use of physical force as the only option for controlling incidents - not because this is the best solution, but because there is no alternative. This creates a risk of accusations of police violence, even when the officer's intentions were correct. The truth is that modern aids exist precisely to prevent escalations and to guarantee the safety of both citizens and the police themselves. They should not be locked up “for reporting“, but should be used in a real environment, regardless of their cost - because human life and health are at stake.

- The Gendarmerie will create a team that will train police officers on the spot. Why now? Why did it have to come to the death of a person for there to be a reaction?
- This is a completely natural question. And yes - this should not have happened after the tragedy, but before it. The truth is that the Ministry of Interior system reacts post facto. Only when public pressure becomes unstoppable do measures that have long been needed begin to be taken.
But what is even more worrying is something else - the reaction is again fundamentally wrong. Instead of making a real assessment of why the fatal incident occurred, the system is once again proposing a forceful solution in the wrong place - now through “training by the Gendarmerie“.
If the cause of the tragedy is excessive use of force, lack of communication, inability to de-escalate tension - then sending a paramilitary structure to train police officers in working with citizens is the worst possible solution. This is like sending firefighters to train psychologists on how to talk to people in crisis.
The Gendarmerie does not have the necessary profile for such training. It is militarized in structure, tactics and culture. Its job is to respond to riots, terrorism, armed groups - not in a domestic incident, a civil dispute or the detention of a person with suspicious behavior.

The real problem is not the lack of training, but its quality and focus.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs lacks a phase in training where young police officers solve typical situations for the service in a controlled but realistic environment, with psychological tension and the need for judgment. Instead, they receive theoretical classes and hand-to-hand combat on tatami mats - while on the street everything is dirty, chaotic and real.
In this context, something more fundamental should be noted: all new entrants to the “Security“ sector – including the Ministry of Interior and other law enforcement agencies and security services – must undergo six months of basic military training. This training is not just physical training. It builds discipline, stress resistance, teamwork skills and, most importantly, – a foundation for tactical thinking in stressful conditions. Without this basic platform, many officers enter the profession unprepared for the reality that awaits them. Therefore, the question "Why now?" should be expanded to "How long will we pretend that the problem lies with the police, and not with the system that makes them so?"
The solution is not more force, but more reason. Not more gendarmerie, but more psychology, communication, practical training.
And most importantly – more responsibility on the part of the institutions.