Drones have become the main weapon in the war in Ukraine. Drones are causing chaos at airports in the EU. NATO will build a “wall against drones“. Can we defend ourselves in Bulgaria… Retd. Colonel Willis Tsurov speaks in front of FACT.
- Col. Tsurov, drone war – is this what the strategic war with guns, tanks and planes has become?
- In principle, scientific and technical achievements in various fields develop fastest where they are most needed by people. We still remember the development of pharmaceuticals during Covid. There were periods of the “Cold War” before, in which the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, competed for supremacy in the military field as the leading direction. After the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against sovereign Ukraine, the introduction of innovations in the conduct of combat operations and the introduction of increasingly new weapons and equipment by both sides began, at first slowly, until the old stocks of weapons were exhausted, and then quickly and now extremely quickly. Naturally, the country with fewer resources for fighting seeks to compensate for its combat capabilities with more innovations and more economical use of its combat potential, including manpower. Suddenly, what was learned in military schools and academies turned out to be useless, even harmful, with the introduction of new technologies on the battlefield. What's more - the ways of thinking, decision-making, management, regrouping and independence of the smallest combat units have changed, reaching the individual fighter.
“Drone warfare“, as we have come to call it, including all kinds of unmanned aircraft - land, surface, underwater, air and space, has begun to prevail over the classic use of the previous methods of warfare.
The time is probably approaching when we will stop comparing armies in terms of manpower, tanks and aircraft, and will consider them as systems of potential combat capabilities for achieving certain practical goals based on exercises and their participation in combat operations. At the moment, we already have several such armies - the US, Ukraine, Israel, Russia, to some extent North Korea, etc. Unmanned aerial vehicles have also begun to determine the parameters of conducting operations, contact zones and the possibilities for use in sabotage and special operations far behind enemy lines, and why not recently in the interior of sovereign states by launching from merchant ships, trucks, buildings, etc., causing panic in the designated governments, interrupting flights and disrupting the activities of many facilities. For now, in my opinion, this is only a trial unceremonious testing by Russia in NATO countries in order to collect information about the Union's preparedness for such situations, but in no case should it be underestimated by NATO.
- Small, fast, cheap and effective - drones are on their way to reorganize warfare. What does the war in Ukraine show us…
- The prerequisites for the creation of combat drones start from the value of human life, where it is valued to one degree or another, to delivering quick and effective strikes on the enemy and achieving certain goals or his refusal to fight. With each passing month, the value of drones decreases, and their qualities are optimized and enhanced with the introduction of elements of artificial intelligence and pre-set trajectories and tasks.
As an example, the experience in Ukraine can be cited and information presented at the defense technology exhibition HEMUS 2024 on how small drones with a charge equivalent to a shell worth several hundred dollars hit a combat vehicle (tank) with a probability of 96-98% when launching two drones.
In the classical method, at least one ammunition load of shells would be fired by an artillery battery with very good artillery instrumental reconnaissance. This is more than 60 shells and the commitment of a lot of human resources. Not to mention taking the risk of an attack with drones! Even programmable shells are less effective due to the high cost and the exceptional accuracy that reconnaissance systems must provide. According to the latest data, Ukraine has already developed sea and air drones to combat aircraft and drones, drones that control drones, the implementation of drone control elements in cruise and ballistic missiles, and also in increasing the payload and the distance for drones to be carried. Due to the intensity of the fighting, it has come to the point that all drones are equipped with cameras and are designed for strikes. They collect intelligence information throughout their lives, which is processed, summarized and redistributed for the next raid, as the assumed mean square error for the next 6 hours is assumed to be overcome with sufficient accuracy for practice.
All this fundamentally changes the concepts of conducting classical combat operations and forming an increasingly wide area of contact between the warring groups, which in places can reach up to 15-20 km, in which any moving body can be a target for drone strikes. Success under these conditions will be determined by the faster reaction and earlier occupation of control points by the relevant operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which automatically leads to an improvement in the use of aviation weapons for strikes, long-range artillery or tactical missiles, as well as drones with a larger radius of action on the other side.
- Drones in the airspace of Poland. The incident raised many questions - sabotage, test or just coincidence. What do you think?
- There are many versions of this, but for NATO and the EU the correct conclusion for a lesson and countermeasure is important. In general, this was a test (or provocative sabotage) by the Russian side for NATO's reaction in a similar situation. In no case can we talk about coincidence. Let's not forget that it was carried out at the beginning of the joint exercise between Belarus and Russia "West 2025" (and why not as an element of the exercise, which cannot be confirmed) probably in order to see NATO's reaction and to further shape the operational-tactical situation against the background of which the exercise is taking place. NATO's reaction was extremely firm and decisive, despite the incommensurately huge resources that were applied. Treaty mechanisms were quickly put into action (Article 4 for political consultations was triggered in connection with the case) and subsequently elements of the NATO Immediate Reaction Force were activated, with allied aviation equipment being sent to Poland and several exercises initiated on the eastern flank. Subsequently, drone flights also appeared in other places such as Denmark, Romania and Germany, which further strengthened the initiative in the EU and NATO to build a system to counter such raids, the so-called "Drone Wall" on the eastern flank, which was clearly formulated as a strategy for detecting, tracking, intercepting and even destroying unidentified aircraft that violated EU space. For now, the process is still under discussion. At the European Leaders' Meeting in Copenhagen, they did not make a final decision, determining that within two weeks or by the end of the month there would be complete clarity and certain financial parameters.
- NATO is reorganizing units to protect Poland's airspace. Planes for billions of dollars, against drones for hundreds of dollars. Is it relevant…
- In no case is this strategy relevant, but let's not forget that war is not fought only with drones, and the multi-role fighters that were redirected to Poland will have other tasks to defend NATO territory, up to the densification of airspace and with other, specialized ground and air assets for combating drones. Are we not mistaken that in the event of an aggression by Russia against NATO, the war will be fought only over the territory of the Alliance, and there will be no proactive and preventive actions far behind the enemy's back? Forward-deployed fighters would be extremely useful in detecting drones before they enter NATO airspace, even at the launch points of the respective drones, and would help neutralize them and provide comprehensive protection for the Alliance's territory. Problems would arise in the event of massive airstrikes, but then NATO would be able to use its preventive mechanisms and full arsenal of defensive means without restriction. Let's hope it doesn't come to that!
- The EU is considering building a wall against enemy drones. How long will it take us?
- As a formal idea, it will probably be decided by the end of the month where it will be located and how it will be structured and serviced, but in terms of implementation it will probably take years. We have already lost more than three and a half years, while the war against Ukraine continues, to take such measures. Now we need to quickly catch up, using Ukrainian experience, which is significantly rich in this area, not to say the richest in the world for now. Currently, Israel, the USA and Russia also have rich experience in this area, but Ukraine remains the country with the most built-in innovations in drone and anti-drone technologies. It is no coincidence that the USA recently concluded an agreement with Ukraine to work together on drone systems and anti-drone technologies. Israel also cooperates in production in this area, and even imports some drones from Ukraine. But not only production is crucial. The accumulated combat experience, tactics of use, adaptation to new systems that change every 3-6 months, strong motivation, all qualities that cannot be acquired in a peaceful environment and during training, are decisive for success in war!
- Is there and what is the most effective protection from drones?
- When talking about protection from drones, in my opinion, we should divide the issue into two aspects - tactical and technical.
The tactical aspect also includes elements of emission, mock-ups, etc. and depends exclusively on the experience of commanders, their independence in making decisions about security, defense and regrouping of forces, setting up ambushes with false targets, etc., including well-trained snipers and shooters, light anti-aircraft systems, etc. in the units. portable surface-to-air homing missiles, comparable in value to the price of unmanned aerial vehicles.
The technical aspect includes the currently developed anti-drone technologies.
In Bulgaria, we have already developed, by a member of SORA, the 5th generation anti-drone technology using a passive method (radiation of interference), which can detect drones, distinguish a bird from a drone and neutralize the command and engine equipment of the drone with barrier interference.
Unfortunately, the power of the interference is incompatible with a peacetime situation in the country, as it affects aviation, communications and radio communications and other systems. Our members of SORA have created a National Anti-drone and Drone Association with the participation of international companies and other countries to unite efforts in this area. Two days after the entry of drones into Poland, a presentation of Israel's BARAK-HM air defense system was organized at the Ministry of Defense by experts from the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI). It has the ability to destroy aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles), cruise and ballistic missiles and is mainly object-oriented in one space, together with the "Iron Dome" system, with coordination of tasks on targets at different distances, heights and priorities, using everything from the emission of targeting and blocking interference to the physical destruction of aircraft with artillery or missile weapons at a price commensurate with the target. Unfortunately, the interest shown by the Ministry and the Defense Headquarters was very low, and representatives of the Air Force were almost absent.
For NATO and the EU, the most effective option, in my opinion, for building such a protective wall against drones is to study and make maximum use of Ukrainian experience on the ground. This should be done by increasing investments and funds in the already built Ukrainian defense against drones. This will significantly compensate and reduce the resources for building the entire anti-drone wall, which according to calculations for the eastern flank of NATO is a little more than 3000 km.
The good news is that there are already developments for effective protection from single or small groups of drones.
- Drones raise another issue, which until now had its importance in military affairs, but now takes on a completely different dimension. The GPS navigation system, because this is how drones fix their targets. How will the GPS system be protected?
- A lot can be said about the GPS system. This is the most developed navigation system, which guarantees that at any given moment of time at least 4 satellites pass over a given territory, which can be used to determine the location of a given object. We cannot speak of a complete disruption of the GPS system, because the USA, which created and owns it, is unlikely to allow such a situation. Rather, the GPS receivers of the relevant aircraft or ships would be affected by ground jamming stations. Depending on the type of aircraft, this impact may not be effective if it is controlled by cable or is set to select its target after flying a certain distance, or when controlled by an operator monitoring the flight terrain using the camera of the aircraft itself and selecting the target to hit.
- Where is Bulgaria in this military race. Can we adequately protect ourselves?
- Bulgaria is a country with developed innovative defense technologies, most of which are in the private sector. In SORA alone, we have several owners of companies producing drones and anti-drone technologies with very high characteristics and at a world level. Unfortunately, the interest of the state administration, the power ministries and municipalities in these technologies is currently quite weak, and due to a lack of investment, production is limited. The reason for this is the still weak awareness in this area and the presence of competition and, to a certain extent, protections and priority of the state sector. A few months ago, the idea was adopted and a Center for Defense Innovations was created, but, unfortunately, there is still no equality between the state and private sectors. The lack of objectivity in assessing capabilities based on results will likely lead to a delay in the modernization of the armed forces and the protection of the sovereignty of our country. The problem is this - before Bulgaria begins to carry out tasks to build an anti-drone wall (probably along the Black Sea coast), efforts should be focused on the site security and defense of military sites, airports and important strategic and infrastructure areas and administrative units from attacks by drones and other aircraft.
- We have a strong drone industry, but can we guarantee the necessary security?
- Of course we can, if the state invests the necessary financial resources in this industry. This way it will be able to largely guarantee its security, since this drone production industry is very largely integrated with Ukrainian companies and draws from the best possible experience at the moment. Moreover, Bulgaria can become a leader in this area in NATO and absorb a large part of the EU funds provided for this, but everything is a matter of national policy.