In the fall of 2015, the Kremlin entered the war in Syria with the ambition that it would be both a geopolitical move and a gigantic exercise: to test new weapons, to "harden" the officer corps, to practice inter-service operations. Vladimir Putin, the then Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov spoke of "priceless experience". However, when the full-scale war against Ukraine began in February 2022, it turned out that the "Syrian school" gives less than expected: many of the generals who commanded the Russian group in Syria stumbled upon the realities of an equal opponent, high intelligence and firepower, deep logistics and political-moral pressure, incomparable to the Syrian theater.
Alexander Dvornikov
The first commander of the Russian group in Syria (2015-2016) became the face of early euphoria: nearly 9 thousand combat sorties from "Hmeimim", demonstrative launches of cruise missiles from the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas, the first "liberation" of Palmyra and the halo of "Hero of Russia". However, the failures were just as significant: the downing of a Su-24 by a Turkish F-16, the escalation with Ankara and reports by human rights activists about strikes on hospitals. In Ukraine, Dvornikov was portrayed as the "strong hand" - the first general commander in the spring of 2022, informally associated with the siege of Mariupol. After only weeks, he was removed, and his career "softens" to the public organization DOSAAF (clubs for paramilitary training of youth) - a sign of how quickly Syrian glory is eroding in the face of a real enemy.
Alexander Zhuravlev
Twice at the helm in Syria (2016; 2017-2018), with Aleppo as a trophy and the repeated loss of Palmyra as a shadow, Zhuravlev also entered the chronicles with the night near Hisham, when American aviation destroyed columns of the PMC "Wagner". In Ukraine, he headed the Western Military District and was publicly blamed for the cluster bombs on Kharkov. In September 2022, another general, for whom the "Syrian experience" did not turn operational chaos into a sustainable command.
Andrey Kartapolov
His short Syrian rotation (late 2016 - early 2017) coincided with the first Russian-Turkish "joint" actions and the media triumph "Palmyra - the second time". His real role after that was political: as a deputy from "United Russia" Kartapolov became one of the ideologists and faces of the wartime legislative framework - for "discreditation", electronic summons, expansion of the mobilization scope. In his case, Syria was a stop on the way to public power, not to more effective field command.
Sergey Surovikin
The most recognizable "Syrian" general, at the head of the group in 2017 and 2019, associated with the defeat of the "Islamic State" near Deir ez-Zor, with the exit of Syrian forces to the Euphrates River and to the Iraqi border, and with the proximity to "Wagner". Awarded the title "Hero of Russia", he headed the Air Force and entered Ukraine as commander of the Southern Group, and then the entire invasion. His name is behind the "difficult decisions" - the tactical retreat from Kherson and the construction of fortified lines in Zaporizhia, which complicated the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. After the Prigozhin rebellion, his career spilled over to the periphery - "advisor" in Algeria. He became an example of how high operational culture does not guarantee political stability.
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Sergey Kuralenko
As a commander, in a matter of weeks in 2018, he found himself at the center of a major failure - the downing of a Russian Il-20 by a Syrian S-200 while repelling an Israeli strike. He later became head of the military police - a key instrument of the occupation regime in Ukraine, which performs the functions of a commandant's power, with routine complaints from both local and Russian military personnel. The Syrian experience here was transformed into police-administrative practice, not into field mastery.
Alexander Lapin
A classic "textbook general" - experience as a tanker, military academies, leadership of the Central Military District. His mission in Syria (2018-2019) was short and without notable events. In Ukraine, he was first awarded for the capture of Lysychansk, then he was publicly defeated by Kadyrov and Prigozhin for the "moving front" in the Kharkov direction. The scandal with the awarding of his own son under the light of the cameras and anecdotal "heroic" clips in the Belgorod region added to the erosion of authority. In 2025 - dismissed from the Leningrad Region and sent to his native Kazan. Syria did not save him from the reality of maneuver warfare and communication failures.
Andrey Serdyukov
Airborne troops (VDV) are in his DNA. He led the operation to land at Pristina airport - a noisy action with zero results, which failed to keep Kosovo as part of Serbia. In Syria in 2019 - progress in Idlib/Hama and the strategic agreement on Tartus. But the real test came on February 24, 2022: the planned blitzkrieg towards Kiev, the "Gostomel" landing hub and the catastrophic losses of the elite units. Only by the summer of 2022 - removed from the post of commander of the VDV. Syrian raids and "projections of force" did not prepare the Airborne Forces for an integrated defense environment and deep, coordinated defense.
Alexander Chaiko
Two-time commander in Syria (2019-2020; 2021), under whose leadership were Operation "Dawn in Idlib", the capture of the base in Qamishli and the deepest crisis with Turkey, overcome with a Moscow ceasefire and joint patrols. In Ukraine, he headed the eastern direction and was linked by Kiev to the crimes in Bucha and removed in the summer of 2022. Returned to Syria, after the fall of Assad, he formally remained in command of the remaining Russian group - a post that looks more like "exile abroad" than a rise.
Sergey Kuzovlev
A participant in the Ukrainian theater since 2014 in Donbas, he commanded the "2nd Corps" of the LPR under various call signs, then the 58th Army. In Syria (2020-2021) his rotation went smoothly, without noisy operations. In Ukraine - one of the few who not only survived, but rose: he commanded the Western and Southern Districts, and in 2024 - headed the restored Moscow District. Kuzovlev is an example of a "pragmatic staff officer" who retains Gerasimov's trust - a sign that the Moscow vertical values discipline more than Syrian media laurels.
Evgeny Nikiforov
Another officer from the "Donbass generation" (since 2014), with early scandals in his personal file, but with continuous growth. His Syrian tour (2021) was routine, but after 2022 he went through command of the Western District and in September 2025 headed the Leningrad District. The Kuzovlev-Nikiforov tandem embodies the personnel line in which Syria is just a tick on the CV; loyalty and manageability are important.
Roman Berdnikov
Commander in Syria from late 2021 to fall 2022, when the Syrian direction was already secondary, sanctions were heavy, and logistics were cumbersome. He briefly returned to command the Western District and fell into silence. Paradoxically, it was this "invisibility" that kept him off most sanctions lists - a rare exception among "Syrian" generals.
Lessons from Syria
Syria was a war of air superiority, a limited enemy, point-to-point operations, minimal counter-battery threat, and almost zero risk of deep strikes on rear bases. Ukraine is the opposite: a satellite and drone reconnaissance dome, massive artillery fire, networked air defense, long-range means, electronic warfare and "transparency" on the battlefield. In Syria, Russia projected power; in Ukraine, it encountered an equal opponent and a coalition of technologies, doctrines and logistics.
"The "Syrian school" gave birth to three types of careers. First, the media generals - brilliant in Palmyra and Aleppo, but with brief successes in the Kiev, Kharkov and Kherson reality (Dvornikov, Zhuravlev, Lapin). Second, the political generals - Syria as a springboard to the podium and normative control (Kartapolov). Third, the gray staff officers - less ostentation, more manageability and loyalty, which guaranteed survival and elevation (Kuzovlev, Nikiforov). Even Surovikin - closest to the idea of "operational adaptability" - turned out to be a victim of domestic politics, not operational failure.
The lesson is simple: the "testing ground" teaches only what it is designed for. Syria is not a rehearsal for war against a motivated, well-armed adversary under a global intelligence dome. That is why the "priceless" experience was devalued in the first clash with the reality of a high-intensity conventional war in Europe. In the end, it was not the concert in Palmyra, but the counter-battery fight near Kupyansk, not the successful raid in Idlib, but the logistics under long-range strikes that decided the outcome. And there, the "Syrian generals" turned out to be more the past than the future of the Russian war.