A new analysis by the BBC, "Mediazone" and independent volunteers, based on a list of names of Russian servicemen who died, reveals deep social and economic inequalities in the way Russian society bears the human cost of the war in Ukraine.
The 152,120 names identified show a clear and systematic pattern: the war takes its victims mostly from small towns and poor regions, and least of all from large and wealthy urban centers.
According to the data, 67% of the dead come from villages and small towns with a population of less than 100,000, even though they are home to less than half of the country's population. At the same time, in large cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, the level of losses is dozens of times lower in proportion to the number of male residents.
The study highlights a link between poverty, lack of prospects and participation in the war. Economist Alexei Zakharov of the University of Chicago points out that the strongest factor predicting how many people from a given settlement will go to war and die at the front is the extent to which the local budget depends on state subsidies.
The more dependent a region is on the state, the more likely its residents are to sign a service contract.
This is how a specific Russian pattern emerges. In small towns, areas with a high concentration of budget jobs or a strong dependence on state programs, military service is perceived as one of the few real ways to earn money, pay off personal debts, or secure a future.
For people in poor regions, the army is a path to income that many times exceeds local wages. A typical salary in Buryatia, for example, is about 56,000 rubles (1,213 BGN), while signing a contract brings over 210,000 rubles per month (4,548 BGN) - a difference that for many is incomparable to any other professional opportunity. A one-time bonus of 1.6 million rubles (about 34,600 BGN) is paid separately.
The social impasse is particularly evident in personal stories, including that of Moscow resident Mikhail Grinin, who died just two months after leaving for the front. Grinin, who had never shown any interest in the army, signed a contract in an attempt to avoid the inhumane conditions in the pre-trial detention center, where he was placed on a drug case.
His case is rare for Moscow, as the capital has the lowest level of casualties - only five deaths per 10,000 men. For comparison, the same indicator in Tuva reaches 33 times higher.
Similar examples are repeated in other regions. In the Kirov region, casualties are more than 15 times higher than in Moscow. Andrian Semyonov, a disabled man who nevertheless signed a contract, also lived there. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to build a career, working in the army became the only opportunity for income and stability. He died just two weeks after arriving at the front.
Experts explain that in regions with high mortality rates, low life expectancy and limited economic prospects, war is perceived as an extension of the risk that accompanies everyday life. Where life is difficult and opportunities are limited, the motivation to seek a chance in the army is greater, even when the risk is deadly.
Similar social models are also known in the US or European armies, where conscription is traditionally higher in poor regions. But in Russia, this is compounded by the special role of the state as the main employer and source of income in the poorest areas, as well as political influence over local administrations. This makes conscription more of an administratively managed process than a voluntary choice fueled by patriotism.
However, the real Russian losses are probably significantly higher. Experts estimate that the available list of names may cover only 45-65% of the actual victims, as a large part of the bodies remain on the battlefield or are not publicly disclosed. Thus, the total number of dead could reach between 234,000 and 338,000 people, and if fighters from the former DPR and LPR are included - up to over 360,000.
These figures paint a disturbing picture not only of the scale of Russian losses, but also of the deep-rooted social inequality that determines whose lives pay the price of war.
Russia is not just waging a conflict in a foreign country - it is experiencing an internal crisis in which the poor are dying and the rich are staying away from the front lines. As one Russian demographer sums up, "the war in Ukraine is not only exacerbating old faults in Russian society - it is turning them into chasms".