The Ghost and the Shadow: The Hidden Tool of Russian Intelligence

As “Maririme News“ reported, Russia’s global “shadow fleet“ entered a consolidation phase last month after months of expansion. The operational fleet carrying Russian oil increased by 16 ships in a single month and transported 337 million barrels of oil and petroleum products in October, with China and India remaining key centers of demand. The constant switching of flags between open registries and the continued reliance on aging, unfit ships highlight both the adaptability and vulnerability of this system. Much attention has recently been paid to Russia’s use of its tanker fleet for subversive activities against maritime security and infrastructure, and it is clear that Russian intelligence services play a key role in this.

To understand the mechanisms by which a source of petrodollars is transformed into an instrument of modern maritime “hybrid warfare“, it is worth assessing the ways in which the Kremlin’s tanker crews are assembled. The recruitment and hiring of personnel for ships of the Russian “shadow“ and “ghost fleet“ is formally carried out according to the same procedures as for other ships controlled by Russian owners. The main nominal player here is Russian crewing agencies, which simultaneously try to imitate “compliance with international conventions“, primarily MLC and STCW. Such crewing agencies may be affiliated with powerful Russian transport or logistics corporations (such as „Sovcomflot“, „BF Tanker“) or be „daughters“... of global maritime structures („V.Ships“, „Marlow“, „CMA CGM“, etc.) or be associated with the occupied maritime areas of Ukraine, primarily Crimea.

The recruitment of personnel is carried out through the offices of such agencies, mainly in St. Petersburg, Novorossiysk or in third countries, for example, in Georgia. Regardless of which crewing company provides the corresponding employment to Russian citizens, the control over its activities by the Russian special services is constant and total, while the activities of the Russian „shadow and ghost fleet“ is under constant surveillance by authorized officials of the Russian presidential administration (such as Denis Agafonov and Maxim Oreshkin) and federal government officials at the level of deputy prime ministers (in particular Denis Manturov and Vitaly Saveliev), who are actually under their control.

Crew members are usually recruited through a system of advertisements on the websites and social pages of crewing agencies, as well as on aggregator websites and through the initiative of seafarer candidates sending their own vacancies to the email addresses of crewing structures, while recruitment by advertisements is carried out specifically for “traditional“ positions for crew members. The recruitment of crew members, even “non-standard“, i.e. actually intended to perform tasks other than work on the ship itself, outside of crew activities, is unlikely, since the crew ensures that the candidate will receive the necessary maritime certificates in related training centers and maritime documents from the ship's flag administration, and also provides visa and logistical support for the employee.

At the same time, the recruitment of personnel specifically for a “non-standard“ position should be determined by a certain logic: either commercial due to the special needs of the ship on a particular voyage, or another that goes beyond the scope of commercial shipping. And here, to understand the specifics of “non-standard“ crew members of the Russian tanker fleet will allow us to understand the ship roles of the crews of individual tankers, such as “Boracay“ with IMO number 9332810 under the flag of Benin, which previously had the names “Pushpa“. and “Kivala“.

As follows from the crew lists, “Pushpa“ left the Russian port of Primorsk for the Indian port of Sika in early July 2025. It is very likely that the crew for this voyage was formed to board at the end of June 2025 in Primorsk. “Pushpa“ later left the port of Primorsk for the Indian port on September 20. The crew that boarded in September differed significantly from the crew formed in June, with a complete replacement of the enlisted men and a partial replacement of the officers; in both cases, the majority of the crew members were citizens of China or Myanmar.

But both times only two people in the position of “Technician“ were noted as the only Russian citizens in the crew list. Such an optional position of “other technical personnel“... obviously requires the issuance of a smaller number of seafaring certificates for such a person or even allows for their absence, while at the same time not establishing for such a crew member mandatory additional knowledge and skills, the lack of which in a “regular“ crew member is very easy to detect during the inspection.

Thus, in June, Russian citizens Artyom Tomilov and Stanislav Babichev boarded the “Pushpa“ in Primorsk as crew members, and in September, Maxim Dmitrenko and Alexander Tishchenko boarded the “Boracay“ as crew members. Meanwhile, Stanislav Babichev, born on December 11, 1978, registered in military unit 71628 in the Toropetsk district of the Tver region of Russia, until 2022 lived in the city of Kubinka-1 in the Moscow region of Russia, where the "Kubinka" Special Purpose Center of the Russian Military Intelligence (Main Directorate of the General Staff) is located. Similarly, Artyom Tomilov, born on March 23, 1995, lives in St. Petersburg, but has long served in various patrol positions in the Russian police, and in this capacity has also been on a "business trip". in the Russian-occupied territory of Luhansk Oblast in May-August 2022.

Similarly, Maxim Dmitrenko, born on November 26, 1986, lives in Bataysk, Rostov Oblast, Russia, and in 2020-2021 worked as a collector in the state-owned “Rostov Regional Department of Collections“. It is also known that Alexander Tishchenko, born on April 1, 1991, previously served in the Russian Aerospace Forces. In general, sea practice involves the inclusion of a person in the crew for the optional position of “Technician“. as an employee with some specific skills and one-time (for example, painters or repairmen to perform work during a specific voyage), and not as a permanent “crew addition“.

At the same time, this activity of these persons included in the crew lists is fully responsible not only for the master and the shipowner, but also for the maritime administration of the flag state. Thus, the flag administration, which gives permission to include such positions in the ship's list, beyond the minimum required crew, is obliged to provide appropriate explanations to the port or coastal state authorities regarding the necessity and feasibility of such an expansion of the crew.

The above shows that the crew of the aforementioned tanker systematically includes persons who, unlike the rest of the crew, are Russian citizens, have no maritime work experience or training in their previous biography, and possess skills in military service and handling weapons. At the same time, it is obvious that these individuals are directly subordinate to the Russian military and intelligence structures, most likely the Main Directorate of the General Staff, as well as the relevant units of the Russian FSB, and that these individuals are officially hired by Russian crew agencies under coordinated instructions to these crews by their leaders from the Russian special services.

At the same time, the tanker IMO 9332810 itself was subject to British sanctionsin October 2024 and was later included in the sanctions lists of Canada, the EU, Switzerland and New Zealand. In April 2025, this tanker was detained in Estonian waters by the local coast guard due to suspicion of lack of national registration. It should be noted that the participation of such individuals from among Russian citizens associated with the Russian special services in the crews is standard practice for the Russian tanker fleet.

For example, on the tanker “Lebre“ with IMO number 9255672 under the flag of Sierra Leone, which on October 18, 2025 sailed from Primorsk to Vadinar, India, the crew included as a “technician“ Ruslan Pogorelov, born on October 16, 1988, who in 2019 was identified as an “employee of the Ministry of Defense of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic“ and who holds a Russian passport No. 517489981 with series 51, which is issued in Russia to officials and representatives of Russian intelligence. Thus, on the tanker “Lebre“... Boris Rudakov, born on December 19, 2003, was included in the crew as a “technician“, who previously worked at the central office of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and in the Rostov-on-Don police department. We add that this tanker is included in the sanctions lists of the EU, the UK and Switzerland in 2025.

In addition, on the tanker “Maini“ with IMO number 9319870 under the flag of Gambia, which left Ust-Luga for Vadinar, India on October 18, 2025, Alexander Strokov, born on March 23, 1986, and Vladimir Radko, born on December 26, 1986, were included in the crew as “extraordinary employees“ (an optional position similar to the “technician“ described above). The tanker “Maini“ was included in the sanctions lists of the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Switzerland in 2025. Thus, on the tanker “Mystery“ with IMO number 9332834 under the flag of Gambia, which left Primorsk for Sika, India on 21 October 2025, the crew as “overnumbered“ included Damir Sakharov, born on 29 August 1986, and Taras Moskvichev, born on 29 May 1990. The tanker “Mystery“, formerly known as “Sooraj“, was included in the sanctions lists of the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ukraine and Switzerland in 2025.

So on the tanker “Kira K“ IMO number 9346720 under the Panamanian flag, which left Primorsk for the Indian port on 21 October 2025, the crew as “overnumbered“ included Alexander Malakhov, born on August 24, 1975, and Viktor Alexandrov, born on October 26, 1965, listed in the “Peacemaker” database as a participant in the “Wagner” terrorist group and the war in Ukraine. The tanker “Kira K” was also included in the sanctions lists of the EU, the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland in 2025. At the same time, the tankers “Maini”, “Mystery” and “Kira K”... The specified persons were the only Russian citizens in the crews, which were formed mainly by citizens of Myanmar, China, etc.

At the same time, the crew of the tanker “Lebre” is formed mainly by citizens of Russia and Georgia, while it is characteristic that in this case the experience of service in the military structures of the aggressor in non-standard positions of the participants in this crew as “technician“ Ruslan Pogorelov and Boris Rudakov is clearly greater: it is obvious that this voyage included a greater number of illegal “tasks“ for crew members from the Russian special services. Thus, the practice of participation of crew members of the Russian tanker fleet in optional positions in a special contingent directly controlled by the Russian special services is stable and systematic. In this regard, in November “MarineTraffic“ reported an interesting story that the Russian oil tanker “Seahorse“, IMO 9266750, flying the flag of Cameroon and subject to sanctions by the EU, the UK and Switzerland since the summer of 2025, made three unsuccessful attempts to reach Venezuela after the US Navy destroyer “USS Stockdale“ blocked its route.

“Seahorse“ left the port of Matanzas in Cuba on the morning of November 9, but while en route to Venezuela, the ship made a U-turn on November 14, significantly changing its course after the aforementioned US destroyer began to close in on it. The loaded tanker made another U-turn on November 16, returning to its original route, before being intercepted again early in the morning of November 17, after which it made another attempt to continue its journey. However, by the end of November, the ship reached the coast of Venezuela and was docked near the port of Puerto la Cruz. The tanker “Seahorse“ was exporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products during the G7 and EU oil embargo, as well as the policy of limiting the prices of Russian oil.

It is noteworthy that the ship visited ports in the occupied territories of Ukraine, in particular in June 2025 in the port of Kamysh-Burun, and in July 2025 in the ports of Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. Before that, until 2022, the tanker was engaged in the transportation of Iranian oil and participated in the Iranian-Venezuelan trade. However, it is obvious that such a fear of stopping and inspecting the tanker by an American ship is connected not only with the cargo of oil and sanctions, and it is worth assuming that in the Cuban port this ship did not receive oil on board, but it is quite possible that it took a group of “Russian specialists“ into the “crew“.

In addition, in the summer of this tanker in the occupied Crimea, both the relevant "specialists" and "their necessary equipment", in particular Russian sea and air drones, could have been taken on board without hindrance. Let us recall that in recent months the Venezuelan authorities have actively requested military and technical assistance from Cuba, Iran and Russia, which they have linked to alleged US operations against drug cartels that operate en masse in this country. It is obvious that the inclusion of Russian special services representatives in the crews of tankers from the "shadow fleet"... is carried out not only with the help of Russian crewing, as a permanent tool of Russian intelligence, but is also actively concealed by the activities of the "Russian seafarers' unions", since they register such persons, in particular, under the guise of labor and collective agreements, the "compliance with international standards" of which is declared and "controlled" by such "unions".

The key such structure is the Moscow-based "Federation of Trade Unions of Maritime Transport Workers" („FPRM“), tax code 7709043712, headed by Yuri Sukhorukov, with key participants such as the „Russian Trade Union of Maritime Transport Workers“, code 7709044427, headed by Valentin Sirotyuk, and the „Union of Seafarers of Russia“. („RPSM“ or „SUR“), code 7709039346, registered to the same Sukhorukov. These structures are entirely under the control of the Russian authorities, the aforementioned Sukhorukov was awarded the Russian Order „For Merit to the Fatherland“, and „RPSM“ claims to cover about 70 thousand sailors and that it covers over 400 ships with its own contracts, among other things, this structure has signed a collective agreement with the aggressor's key transport structure “Sovcomflot“.

It is worth recalling that “Sovcomflot“ was constantly used by Soviet special services to conduct special operations, including military operations, in third countries. “RPSM“ also calls “Volzhskoe Parakhodstvo“ and global ship crewing structures, such as “V.Ships“, “Marlow Navigation“ and “Tsakos Shipping and Trading S.A.“ as “social partners“ on its own website. We should add that these structures were revealed in journalistic investigations not only as supplying sailors to the Russian tanker fleet, but also as actively cooperating with the Russian special services through their corrupt networks of influence in European countries.

Moreover, it is the “RPSM“, together with the London-based “ITF Seafarers' Trust“, that are co-founders of a structure such as the “International Seafarers' Center“ fund – Novorossiysk, code 2315121845, which is a traditional “umbrella“ of the Russian special services for activities among foreign crew members of ships arriving in Russian-controlled Black Sea ports. The “Federation“ also includes the “Trade Union of Maritime Transport Workers of the Republic of Crimea“, “registered“ in occupied Kerch under number 9111000387 for Irina Chernenko, the so-called “deputy of the State Council“ from “United Russia“. Thus, “RPSM“ is a structure that actively concludes the relevant collective labor agreements for the ships of the Russian tanker fleet. Among other things, the participation of this structure in the provision of documents to the sanctioned tanker “Unity“ with IMO number 9388792 under the flag of Lesotho has been established. At the same time, as of the summer of 2025, part of the crew worked under labor contracts with the Moscow LLC “Argo Tanker Group“, tax number 9703142189, and another part was hired through the company “FMTC ShipCharter LLC“ from the UAE.

Following the statements of „RPSM“ about „settlement of issues regarding crew payments“ in Murmansk in October, however, this ship, after changing its flag and „updating documents“, left the Russian Ust-Luga in November 2025 with a cargo of oil towards the Malaysian port of Tanjung Pelepas. And earlier, in January 2025, this tanker was in the English Channel for a long time, explaining its stay in this artery, which is the busiest for sea shipping, with „mechanical failure during a storm“. In January 2025, „Agro Tanker Group“ received sanctions from the USA, and in 2025 the tanker itself, while sailing under the flag of Gambia, was included in the sanctions lists of the UK, EU, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and Ukraine, after which the ship officially “changed the shipowner“, but, as can be seen, retained influence over the tanker crew. Currently, the founder of “Agro Tanker Group“ is the Moscow “ATG Holding“, code 9703166782, but earlier this company was registered in the name of Dmitry Kolyadin, now the official founder of companies such as “Tomsk Oil Refinery“, “Tomsk Oil and Gas Company“ and “Tomskneftepererabotka“. Kolyadin was also a director of the aforementioned “ATG Holding“ from 2017 to 2022.

The “Full namesake“ of this boss of “Agro Tanker Group“ is “a man with a difficult fate“, the son of Russian weapons designer Viktor Kolyadin, convicted in 1998 for allegedly “selling secrets about the “Iskander“ missile to Western intelligence services. But his father's fate did not affect his son, and after his youth in London he was employed at the Moscow “Tax Quadro Securities“. But in 2016 Dmitry Kolyadin “surfaced“ in the raider scandal around the “Izhmash“ concern with a certain Zoya Galeeva and Alexander Pervuninsky, an employee of the “P“ department of the FSB Economic Security Service, which is responsible for “issues of the fuel and energy complex“.

“RPSM“ also appeared in 2025 in stories with the Russian ships “Leonid Zayakin“ with IMO number 8972259 and “Yuri Poltoratsky“, IMO number 8986389 under the Panamanian flag, which transported cargo in the Black Sea basin, in particular to the Bulgarian Varna. In addition, “RPSM“ was noticed in 2025 in a situation in the port of Nakhodka with the sanctioned tanker “Sagar Violet“, renamed “Noble Walker“ with IMO number 9292981 under the flag of Palau. This tanker has been sanctioned by the EU, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand for massive violations of the oil embargo. In particular, in 2024 the ship transported Russian oil from Primorsk to the Lakonikos Bay, west of the Greek island of Kythira. “Greenpeace“ refers this tanker to the “shadow flotilla“, which transports Russian oil around the world and threatens the environment; in November 2025, “Noble Walker“ transported Russian oil to the Indian port of Vadinar.

Similarly, “RPSM“ “stands out“ in 2025 in the situation with the payments of the deceased second engineer from the crew of the tanker “Sun“ with IMO number 9293117 in the amount of 125 thousand dollars. This tanker, previously flying the flag of Antigua and Barbuda, received sanctions from the EU, Great Britain, Ukraine and Switzerland in 2025 for transporting Russian oil; it is on the list of “Greenpeace“ as a vessel that threatens the marine environment. But in November “Sun“ under the flag of East Timor transported Russian oil from the port of Ust-Luga to India.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the activities of the aforementioned “P“ department of the Economic Security Service of Russia. FSB, which formally should be engaged in “counterintelligence support for Russian industry“, and although another FSB department, “T“, is responsible for transport, the oil and gas sector remains with people from “9th Department “P“, which at least until recently was headed by Naib Nagumanov. Oleg Khotyun is considered his deputy, allegedly from a “family of gas workers“, and it was in “9th Oil Department “P“ that the son of the head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev, Andrey, worked for some time, who was later placed in the structures of “Rosneft“ and “Zarubezhneft“ and became a member of the board of directors of “Gazprom Neft“. Another "native of the 9th department", Alexei Torop, was hired in the Russian presidential administration.

Therefore, it is worth noting that the systematic recruitment of persons who do not actually perform the functions of sailors, but are executors of tasks of the Russian special services, into the crews of the Russian tanker fleet is carried out with the systematic assistance of crewing and trade union organizations controlled by Russia. Such actions grossly violate the requirements of the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC) and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), and at the same time contradict the very definition of a merchant ship under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and turn tankers from the "shadow fleet" into auxiliary military vessels of Russia. In the event that such "crew members"... commit active military acts, including sabotage, that cause actual damage or casualties, these acts may constitute a war crime of perfidy, as this constitutes an abuse of the immunity of a supposedly "peaceful" merchant ship. Furthermore, the saturation of the "shadow fleet" with "sailors" by the Russian special services is an additional violation of Resolution A.1192 (33) of the IMO General Assembly regarding the inadmissibility of maritime fraud and the criminalization of crews.

Currently, the activities of the “shadow tanker fleet“... are closely intertwined with the activities of the Russian special services, which, on the instructions of the Kremlin administration and with the assistance of Russian oligarchs, ensure the activities of the “shadow fleet“: logistics, cargo transportation, crew recruitment, the functioning of crewing operators and classification societies, assist in finding potential partners for the supply of oil and oil products, other cargoes in circumvention of international sanctions, and participate in lobbying and corruption schemes in third countries.

For example, as it became known from published investigations, Russia has kept a structure like the “Russian Maritime Register of Shipping“ (“РМРС“) afloat until recently, despite the sanctions imposed by the EU, thanks to the work of the relevant Russian services. “РМРС“ does not hide its own activities in support of the transport of dangerous goods, which “РМРС“ actively manipulates to this day. Russia also uses another register, the “Russian River Register“ (now “Russian Classification Society“), which for a long time was a “minority“ in the “navigation safety“ system and therefore is often used by the Kremlin as a “gatekeeper“ in these dubious operations, including those related to ensuring the activities of the Russian “shadow fleet“, with a previous “image“. of “not risked in vain“.

“PMRS“ itself also has subsidiaries, namely OOD “Marine Engineering Consulting Center“, OOD “RS“ “Marine Warranty Supervision“, which are used to service flagships of the Russian military industry such as the shipbuilding plants “Yantar“, “Vympel“, “Admiralty Shipyards“ and “Rosatomflot“. OOD “Rstech“, founded by “PMRS“ together with LLC “TIM“ “Management Solutions“ and LLC “Sea Cargo Bureau“, which, among other things, previously had contracts for sea transportation with the federal “Tambov Gunpowder Plant“ for 1.7 million rubles. The most notable “internal phenomenon“ is such a creation of “PMRS“ as the private “Association Russian Register“ („APP“), whose current founders and beneficiaries are carefully hidden.

However, the revealed activities of the „APP“ structures, for example, in Sevastopol and Belarus, are only a vivid example of the purpose of creating this private network under the omophorion of „PMRS“: creating a system of private structures with „quality standards certification“ and not only in Russia, but also in the widest possible space, as an additional network convenient for use by Russian special services. Under the guise of „ISO certification“ this structure penetrates not only the maritime industry, but also all critically important structures of a given state, from energy and broadcasting to educational institutions and security institutions. In addition to „ARR“, „RMRS“ works actively in third countries and directly, offering not only “classic“ maritime certification, but also providing MLC compliance certificates, which provide opportunities for “tracking“ of crew activities, as well as “technical monitoring of offshore pipelines“, “floating drilling platforms and offshore fixed platforms“ and “performing construction, modernization and decommissioning operations“ on these structures.

In the dimension of crew agencies, we note that the study of this issue shows the role in the business empire of “BF Tanker“ and “Inok TM“, Rishat Bagautdinov and Russian oligarch Vladimir Lisin, Evgenia Putraim, whose father, Alexander Putraim, “coincidentally“, was the head of the “Maritime Management Systems“ department of “PMRS“. The conducted and published research on this issue shows not only the connection of this international octopus, controlled by the Russian special services, with the “Lukoil“ empire, but also its influence on the networks of crewing agencies for hiring sailors for the Russian “shadow fleet of tankers“ with the active cooperation of the Russian special services. At the same time, the concealment of “BF Tanker“ and “Inok TM“... from the sanctions of civilized countries was implemented by including them in the European Commission's implementing decision 2024/411 of 2024, which led to the initiation of a process of conducting anti-corruption investigations by a number of European countries in 2025.

And therefore it is not at all surprising that the aforementioned “Inok TM“, which supplies sailors with tankers to the Russian tanker fleet, is a structure controlled by “PMRS“, registration number 37164, just like “BF Tanker“, with registration number 49008. Similarly, vessels under the Russian flag that transport oil products in the interests of Russia are controlled by “PMRS“, namely “Balt Flot 1“. with IMO number 9751872 (registration number 141660), which operated in Russian ports on the Baltic Sea in the summer of 2025, and “Balt Flot 2“ with IMO number 9751884 (registration number 141707), which in August 2025 returned to Russian inland waterways after illegal visits to the occupied ports of the Ukrainian state. “Balt Flot 3“ with IMO number 9751896 in the summer of 2025 (registration number “RMRS“ 141726) transported Russian oil from Rostov-on-Don to the Black Sea, a similar voyage was made by “Balt Flot 6“ with IMO number 9751937 (registration number 141798), the same transport from Azov was made by “Balt Flot 4“. IMO number 9751913 (registration number 141711), and their sister ship “Balt Flot 5“ IMO number 9751925 (registration number 141783) was returning from Azov to Volgograd at that time.

In addition, other shipowners from the Russian tanker fleet are also under the supervision of “RMRS“, an example of which is the Rostov-based “Konaro Shipping“ (registration number 68318), which operates the sanctioned tanker “Bavly“ IMO 9621560, and this tanker itself is also under the supervision of “RMRS“ (registration number 111665). For example, the company „Gazpromneft Shipping“, controlled by „RMRS“, from St. Petersburg (registration number 22695), which in the summer of 2025 was included in the Ukrainian sanctions lists, its sanctioned tanker „Gazpromnext Zuid East“ with IMO number 9537109 is also on the lists of „RMRS“ (registration number 081031), but as „Orenburg“. Of course, these are just examples of the systematic practice of RMRS to serve the Russian tanker fleet.

Istanbul JSC „Classification and Certification of Ships of RMRS“ is headed by Andrey Kulagin, who was previously Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Industrial Policy, Innovation and Trade of St. Petersburg. As can be seen, where the biography of the functionaries of the “RMRS“ has any traces in open sources, these individuals are far from random either for the Russian state machine or for the Russian special services. At the same time, the most extensive structures of the “RMRS“... in the Republic of Korea and in China are publicly visible. In China, in addition to a separate representative office in Hong Kong, there is a “RMRS“ representative office in Tianjin, a branch in Shanghai, opened in 2014, and LLC “RMRS (Tianjin)“. It is known that the “Registry Services“ cover more than 400 Chinese enterprises, including “nearly 20 service providers, 8 shipyards, 10 repair shipyards“, separately noting that “45% of the total staff of “RMRS“... specialists in the region are citizens of the PRC“.

In 2025, “RMRS“, among other things, announced the certification of the Chinese factories “Changzhou Zhonghai Marine Propeller“, which produces propellers for the PRC fleet, “Qidong Qianhai Heavy Industry“, which builds ships, drilling rigs and offshore platforms, “Deyang Rongfa Energy & Equipment“, which produces steel components for ships, the shipyards “Shandong Julong Intel-Tech“ and “Zhenjiang Huigang Machinery Equipment“, which builds ice-class tugboats, as well as engines from “Zichai Machines“. “RMRS“ Cooperation with communist China has all the signs of symbiosis, with the register being used as a seal to circumvent sanctions and serve not only Chinese enterprises that have Russian orders for shipbuilding and ship repair, but are also significant components of the Chinese economic and military-industrial complex itself.

In such conditions, it is quite difficult to determine where the Kremlin's sphere of interests in “RMRS“ actually ends and the territories of the Chinese authorities and special services begin. In this dimension, we will cite the characteristic activity of “RMRS“ functionaries in India, which took place in October 2025 under the auspices of the Indian Maritime Week. At this event, representatives of the “PMRS“, including Kulikov, actively lobbied for the approval of a separate agreement with the Indian Maritime Administration for cooperation, for “legal consolidation of the powers of the PMRS“ in the field of “conventional surveillance“ of Indian ships.

Who is more interested in strengthening the influence of the “PMRS“ in the Indian Ocean - the Kremlin itself and its oil fleet, or the “Chinese friends“ from the register, is an open question and India's further steps in this regard remain difficult to predict. In the context of this activity, it is worth mentioning the “NIKIM“ structure. Visits to Crimea by ships controlled by the “PMRS“ are often carried out at terminals controlled by the aforementioned “NIKIM“. The history of the "Research Institute of Weighing Instruments and Instruments", founded in 1947 on the basis of the Soviet mortar design bureaus and the Moscow Experimental Plant of Measuring Instruments and renamed in 1959 to the "Research and Design Institute of Testing Machines, Instruments and Means of Mass Measurement" (NIKIMP), is directly related to certification and standardization. So, this structure was controlled in the KGB of the USSR by the same people as the "PMRS", this practice apparently continued after 1991. When, starting in 2014, it became necessary to form an additional structure to manage sea supplies to Crimea, this very "convenient" a structure that at that time was in a practically “withered“ state.

Working with the sanctioned tanker fleet, “PMRS“ systematically violates the imposed sanctions and develops ways to circumvent them; “PMRS“ itself systematically circumvents the sanctions imposed on it by the EU, in fact continuing to operate in European jurisdiction. At the same time, the activities of “PMRS“ contribute to obtaining significant revenues for the Russian budget from the tanker fleet, from maritime operations in the territories occupied by Russia, from the work of “PMRS“ certified enterprises, which are now used for military needs, with the explicit support of the activities of the special services of the Russian Federation.

The corresponding use of the “shadow fleet“ by the Russian special services was also carried out through the use of interference in navigation systems (GPS spoofing), launching drones, cutting cables and allegedly transporting containers with missiles and other weapons.

Thus, on June 17, 2025, Poland registered interruptions in the GPS signal in the Baltic Sea and attributed this to hostile actions by Russia, including those carried out with the assistance of the Russian special services. At that time, 13 EU Member States appealed to the European Commission with a request to urgently take measures due to problems with the Global Navigation Satellite System on the territory of the European Union, which is clearly related to the Russian hybrid threat.

The Russian intervention was carried out by units of the Russian FSB and the Russian General Staff to disrupt the operation of the navigation system and in March 2024 and January 2025 against multi-tonnage ships and small fishing schooners in the Baltic Sea. Methods of effective signal jamming are a method of “hybrid warfare“ against NATO countries and a means of combating the methods of the Alliance countries to counter the activities of the Russian “shadow fleet“, which are becoming increasingly effective despite many difficulties. Among the goals that Russia pursues in its interference in the operation of navigation systems at sea is an attempt to increase its influence in the region where Russia is conducting or is capable of conducting combat operations.

Among the documented cases of Russian interference in the operation of navigation systems are facts of sabotage, for example, during the large-scale NATO exercises in Norway and Finland “Trident Juncture 2018“, when massive damage affected not only ships, but also military units operating in clearly defined closed areas. Then the analysis showed that the source of the interference was located on the Russian Kola Peninsula, where the military base of the Russian Northern Fleet is located. Also, similar techniques were tested by Russia during key NATO operations from 2024 to 2025, namely “Steadfast Defender 24“, “Baltic Sentry25“, as well as during the Greek naval exercises in 2024, the aim of which was to close the waters to tankers from the Russian “shadow fleet“, which used the waters for the transportation and transshipment of oil (the so-called “ship-to-ship transfers“), as well as to protect underwater infrastructure (cables, pipelines) from sabotage, which the Alliance countries associate with the activities of the “shadow fleet“.

On December 16, according to information from the Swedish Navy, it became known that Russian activity in the Baltic Sea is manifested in the form of military warships, as well as personnel in military uniforms on board “shadow tankers“, as reported by the Swedish publication SVT. The Swedish Navy has once again confirmed that it has reliable information about the presence of armed military personnel, who are believed to belong to private military security companies, said the Chief of the Navy, Marko Petkovic.

The proven direct connection with the actions of the Russian military and Russian special services is no longer just an international crime, but a reason to assess such actions by Russia as a “casus belli“, that is, “pretext for war“ – a formal pretext, recognized by international law, for the initiation of military action by one state against another or a group of states.

Technologies for disorganizing the satellite navigation system, GPS spoofing, were tested by Russian special services against Ukraine in the Black Sea region in the area of the occupied Crimea, where, according to the results of the American non-governmental organization C4ADS, they used Russian electronic warfare equipment more than 10 thousand times. Distortion of the signal leads to the fact that the navigation system incorrectly determines the location of the object (in this case, a ship) and cannot determine its own location, losing access to positioning. It is important to note that these barbaric methods of the Russian special services are the reverse side of another Russian method – disabling the AIS system for ships from the “shadow fleet“ so that they can move secretly.

According to the report of the US Director of National Intelligence, Russia attaches great importance to the ability to jam American satellite systems. Russia has repeatedly used false alarms against ships near the coast in the Kaliningrad region and the occupied Crimea, which poses a significant threat to GPS systems of civilian users, shipping, maritime security and, of course, as follows from the report, is an element of the architecture of promoting the illegal activities of the Russian “shadow fleet“. With its actions, Russia directly ignores Article 47 of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, which stipulates that the members of the Union undertake to take all necessary measures to prevent the transmission or dissemination of false distress, urgency, safety or identification signals or those that are misleading, and to facilitate the detection and identification of stations under the jurisdiction of their country and transmitting such signals.

The activities of the Russian special services and the Russian “shadow fleet“ were also associated with damage to underwater infrastructure, that is, in fact, we are talking about sabotage and diversion. Thus, in October 2023, damage was recorded to the “Balticconnector“ gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia and the “EE-S1“ telecommunications cables between Estonia and Sweden, “FEC-1“ between Estonia and Finland, which created a picture of a coordinated attack on the infrastructure of the Baltic Sea. This involved ships such as the “NewNew Polar Bear“ IMO 9313204, first under the flag of Hong Kong, and then of Panama. After that, the Finnish police officially stated that they considered the ship to be involved in the illegal activities of the “shadow fleet“. Jamestown's analysis indicated the re-registration of the ship's operator to the Chinese-Russian company “Torgmoll“. immediately after the incident and the use of the sea route, which fits into the scheme of synchronized hostile Chinese-Russian activity with the support of the special services.

It is indicative that the Russian nuclear cargo ship “Sevmorput“ IMO 8717283, under the Russian flag, was located in the same region. AIS data and the European investigation show that this ship was also present in the area of damage to the “Baltic Connector“ and the cables, together with the ship “New New Polar Bear“. The appearance of this type of Russian ship together with the Chinese ship should be seen as an element of a deeper Russian strategy to use the tanker fleet for hybrid operations, which are reconnaissance, demonstration of sabotage, diversion and testing the reaction of NATO and EU countries. It is noteworthy that China officially admitted its guilt for the damage to the gas pipeline, Russia denied its involvement, but this is not surprising, because Russia's role is obvious. The very fact of the simultaneous damage to the gas pipeline and several cables, plus the presence of a Russian nuclear ship, creates a logical connection with the Russian hybrid strategy supported by China against NATO and EU countries.

In November 2024, two fiber optic cables in the Baltic Sea were damaged, namely the Finland-Germany line and the Sweden-Lithuania line. The cables run between four NATO countries - Finland, Germany, Sweden and Lithuania. Investigations showed that the bulk carrier “Yi Peng 3“ IMO 9224984, flying the flag of China, dragged its anchor along the bottom for more than 100 nautical miles right in the area of the cables, with the AIS periodically being turned off. Experts directly note that the incident with “Yi Peng 3“... is part of a chain of sabotage of cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea since 2023, where Russia has been operating through “occupied“ or third-party-controlled ships to provide plausible deniability. Western intelligence agencies had noticeable suspicions about the “Russian trace“, that is, the use of a Chinese ship in a sabotage operation, without directly accusing official Beijing. It is noteworthy that China, after consultations with Russia, immediately limited the inspection of the ship by the Swedish police as observers, and the Swedish prosecutor was denied access, which significantly narrowed the possibilities for collecting evidence. Today, this fact is an indirect but real sign of the hostile activity of the “shadow tanker flotilla“ with Russian assistance, where the work of the special services and military bodies of Russia is evident.

On December 25, 2024, an incident occurred with the tanker from the “shadow tanker flotilla“ “Eagle S“. IMO number 9329760, under the flag of the Cook Islands, as a typical jurisdiction for the “shadow fleet“. This crude oil and oil product carrier is owned by “Caravella LLC-FZ“, UAE, and is the only ship of this company, which is another sign of a “special structure“ for operations to circumvent sanctions and illegal activities. Previously, the ship operated under other names, such as “FR8 Pride“, “LR Mimosa“, “Norstar Intrepid“. The ship was old and poorly insured, with opaque ownership, which is typical for the “shadow fleet“. The location of the incident is the Gulf of Finland, namely the area between Finland and Estonia, where the infrastructure was damaged – the underwater power cable “Estlink-2“, critical for the export and import of electricity from Estonia during the winter. Four of the five existing telecommunications cables between Finland and Estonia were destroyed due to the ship's activities.

The Finnish investigation found traces of an anchor dragging on the seabed with a length of 90-100 km, which coincide with the trajectory of the ship's movement with the intersection of the cable lines and Estlink-2. Finnish law enforcement officers gathered evidence and reports that part of the crew was actually ready to continue “cutting the cables“, and on board they found special equipment for radio reconnaissance and monitoring military activity in the region, which is often used, for example, by the Russian General Staff.

Finland detained the ship on December 26, 2024, and in 2025 officially charged the captain, chief officer and second mate with sabotage and telecommunications interference. This was the first criminal case in a NATO country in which a specific tanker from the “shadow fleet“ was directly accused of deliberately damaging underwater cables. It should be emphasized that the interception of the hostile activities of the aforementioned “shadow flotilla“ from NATO countries prevented further damage to another power cable, gas pipeline and other lines.

In general, Russian special services used the “shadow flotilla“ and “ghost ships“ more than a dozen times from 2023 to 2025. - old tankers and cargo ships with opaque ownership and flags to circumvent sanctions, similar in their actions to an attempt at outright sabotage and diversion. All of these ships essentially act as a platform for reconnaissance and illegal, if not hostile, activities against the underwater infrastructure of NATO and EU countries.

In the final document “ISIKKIVIK 2025“ of the Danish intelligence service, published on December 2, 2025, notes that Russia is shaping its policy and actions as if it perceives a “challenge“ from the West and is significantly intensifying military actions and responses in the Arctic direction. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO should increase the readiness of the Western Arctic states to complicate the hostile activities of the Russian Federation and the formation of a full “dominance“, which would pose serious threats to the Alliance. FE emphasizes that even after the transfer of part of its resources to Ukraine, the Russian Federation retains key assets in the Arctic: the Northern Fleet, submarines, including nuclear ones, and the ability to quickly redeploy part of its aircraft back to Arctic bases.

The document mentions that this gives Russia the opportunity to strike Western targets in a short period of time in a significant part of the Arctic and the North Atlantic. Separately, the icebreaker fleet is a tool for ensuring the maneuverability of ships in war, since there is evidence that the Russian Federation is able to re-equip some of its icebreakers with missiles to hit sea and land targets. The Russian Federation considers the northern direction vulnerable to attack, which is why it seeks to increase monitoring of the situation. FE emphasized that the Russian Federation has already restricted shipping in parts of the Arctic seas and may further tighten the “rules of the game“ by unilaterally imposing restrictions on shipping and dictating its terms for access to the resource base of the Arctic, which contradicts the established norms of international law.

The Danish military intelligence service explicitly defines the space between Greenland – Iceland – The Faroe Islands – Great Britain as a strategic maritime zone that the Russian Federation seeks to “mark“ and “control“. The publication of the FE report confirms recent conclusions by several senior EU officials, including Estonian Prime Minister Kristina Michal, quoted by Bloomberg, and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who gave an extensive interview to the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine about the threats posed by the Russian “shadow fleet“.

The point is that the “shadow fleet“ of Putin's Russia is being used as a “slow-acting“ weapon aimed at circumventing the sanctions regime and obtaining half of the budget funds that go to military needs. The activities of the “shadow fleet“ also pose significant risks to the security and ecology of water areas. FE clearly registers the growing military threats, which are connected, among other things, with the intensity of transportation of the “shadow fleet“, a significant part of which passes by sea, in particular through the Baltic and Denmark Straits.

The FE report unites the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea into one strategic maritime space, where the “shadow fleet“ is not a local need, but an element of the broader naval strategy of the Russian Federation, directed against the West. The indicative is that the Russian Federation “significantly protects“ ships that secretly or non-transparently transport cargo through the Baltic and Denmark Straits, and these ships are economically critical because they circumvent sanctions. In the reports, the “shadow fleet“ is not just “economic“, but an element of the military infrastructure that the Russian Federation is ready to provide by force. There is also a direct reference to the hybrid tools of the Russian Federation, such as interference in navigation, which affects military and civilian ships, aviation, which is a separate risk block for the safety of shipping and a real rehearsal of the conflict with the Russian Federation block.

It is no coincidence that the FE focuses on interference in the work of GPS, because this is a test of the Russian Federation's response, a check for vulnerability and the creation of “controlled chaos“ in civilian shipping. This is a classic hybrid tool that does not look like a military act, but has direct consequences for maritime security. In addition, Russia wants the ability to restrict or disrupt the movement of NATO ships, including by interfering and attacking underwater infrastructure, and movement at sea. The Russian Federation has a solid position for permanent presence thanks to a combination of civil logistics (project infrastructure) and a decade-long construction of military bases oriented towards the Arctic, FE summarizes.

On December 31, 2025, another incident occurred involving serious damage to the Elisa cable link and communications between Finland and Estonia in the Gulf of Finland. The incident involved the cargo ship Fitburg (IMO 9250397), flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which was sailing from the Russian port of St. Petersburg and was in close proximity to the scene of the incident at the time. The ship's anchor chain was deliberately lowered into the water. The ship is owned by Fitburg Shipping Company LTD. Fourteen crew members on board are from Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The bulk carrier Fitburg sailed from St. Petersburg. In addition, other vessels registered in Turkey and controlled by Russian beneficiaries of Albros Shipping and Trading Ltd, linked to Raim Alekperov, have repeatedly violated sanctions related to maritime traffic to temporarily occupied Crimea over the past decade.

The Finnish Border Guard has detained the vessel. The Finnish police have opened a criminal investigation to investigate the incident, verify the vessel's involvement in the cable damage and take procedural action. At present, law enforcement authorities have serious grounds to suspect a deliberate act of serious sabotage by the vessel, as Helsinki Police Chief Jari Liuku has publicly stated. In turn, the Estonian Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs reported a malfunction affecting a second telecommunications cable operated by the Swedish company Arelion, connecting Estonia with Finland. The Estonian and Finnish authorities are cooperating closely and actively exchanging information on cable failures in the Gulf of Finland.

It should also be noted that since 28 December 2025, failures have been detected on the Estonia-Sweden cable, owned by CITIC, on the Telia cable between Lönne County and the island of Hiiumaa, as well as on the Arelion cable between Hiiumaa and Sweden in two locations since 30 December 2025. On 1 January, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaia Kallas, publicly stated that Europe's critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea remains at high risk of sabotage by the Russian Federation. She also pledged to step up action against Russia's so-called "shadow fleet". which serves as a platform for hybrid attacks.

Just five days after Finnish police detained a cargo ship traveling from Russia to Israel on suspicion of sabotaging an undersea telecommunications cable running from Helsinki across the Gulf of Finland to Estonia, a new incident has been reported. Another undersea telecommunications cable has been damaged in the Baltic Sea. Lithuania's National Crisis Management Center said the cable runs from Šventoji in Lithuania to Liepāja in Latvia, two coastal cities located about 65 km (40 mi) apart, and that it was currently unclear what caused the incident. On January 4, 2026, Latvian State Police reported that neither the ship nor the crew members had been detained at this stage. The sailors are cooperating with the police and are actively assisting the investigation.

Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina confirmed that the damage was recorded in the western part of the country, in the waters off Liepaja. She also tried to reassure the public, saying that the incident had not affected the quality of telecommunications services for Latvian consumers. However, the situation is developing against a backdrop of heightened regional tensions. Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Baltic Sea region has repeatedly suffered power outages and damage to gas pipelines. Due to these threats, a heightened state of alert has been declared in the region, and NATO has also been declared in the region, with NATO significantly increasing its patrols, deploying frigates, aircraft and naval drones.

German intelligence services and the Ministry of Defense have also expressed concern about the overall security situation, indicating that Russia is seeking to expand its capabilities to wage a large-scale war against the Alliance as early as 2029, even if it scares Ukraine in its current form. Among the methods being tested, Russia uses both military means and actions of its special services, accompanied by support from structures and organizations associated with the so-called “shadow fleet“, which is used hybridly to increase tension and carry out hybrid attacks.

Against this background, a similar situation is evident in relation to the tanker Bella 1 (IMO 9230880), which is allegedly owned by the Turkish-Panamanian company Lois Marine Shipholding Enterprises S.A. Since December 21, the tanker has been pursued in the Caribbean Sea by the US Coast Guard for alleged violations of sanctions against the regime in Tehran. The Istanbul-based clone of this company is accused of ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the pursuit, the ship changed its name to Marinera, while the authorities of the aggressor state appealed to the United States with a request to stop the pursuit.

In the illegal “Russian Maritime Register of Shipping“... The ship with IMO number 9230880 is currently listed as sailing under the Russian flag, with registration number 010977 and port of Sochi. It is noteworthy that the date of issue of its “classification documents“ is not indicated, and the aforementioned beneficiary is not listed in the Russian registers. Thus, the Russian state classification authority has once again become a tool of the aggressor state and its special services, facilitating the circumvention of sanctions imposed by civilized countries.

According to “CBS“ in 2025, at least 11 cables and one gas pipeline were damaged, and damage to another gas pipeline was avoided thanks to circumstances. From the point of view of the Russian regime and the Russian special services, this is a cheap, inconspicuous, but effective tactic, because technically one can always point to a “storm“ or “technical error“, but the real damage is in the tens of millions of euros and critical vulnerability. In addition, such situations allow us to talk about hybrid operations with the assistance of the Russian special services, using foreign flags for plausible deniability.

In 2025, the question of countering the “shadow fleet“ is being investigated thoroughly in the activities of special commissions in Denmark and the UK and in the search for forms of counteraction to the “shadow fleet“ of Russia and within the framework of the “Coalition of the Willing“. with the support of the USA, conducting investigations into the participation of tankers from the “shadow fleet“ of Russia in the launches of unmanned aerial vehicles, violation of airspace and elimination of damage to the national interests and sovereignty of Western countries from the activities of the “shadow fleet“ of Russia.

Over the past year, Russia has significantly intensified its attacks on both Danube infrastructure and ships on the Danube River. In August 2025, a Russian naval drone entered the Danube estuary for the first time. This is the first confirmed case of Russia using a drone against ships on the Danube River, which poses additional risks to shipping safety and regional stability. In the fall of 2025, there was a further increase in attacks - Russia targeted energy and port infrastructure, about 10 ships were damaged in Danube ports, and on November 17, 2025, Russia hit the Turkish LPG tanker "Orinda", IMO number 9240122, with Turkish shipowner "Orinda Denizcilik" from Ankara. As a result of the fire, which lasted more than a day, and the threat of a strong explosion, Romania was forced to evacuate the inhabitants of two villages.

As a result of Russian actions, the situation on the Lower Danube has deteriorated significantly: in 2025, an increase in the number of attacks on ports, ferry crossings, oil product tanks and other critical infrastructure on the Danube was recorded, which negatively affected shipping and harmed the ecology of the Danube region. As a result of attacks by Russian drones, damage was recorded for the first time on vessels directly on the Danube under the flags of Slovakia (July 16, 2025, Izmail), Turkey (November 17, 2025), Palau, Cameroon, Liberia, Tanzania. During attacks by Russian drones on Ukrainian ports on the Danube, violations of the airspace of Romania and Moldova were recorded (sometimes with explosions, falling debris in the Danube region of these countries). With the assistance of Russian military intelligence, Russia used drifting mines. At the mouth of the Danube, namely at the sea approach to the Bistre Canal, on July 23, 2025, ships were blown up, and the mines drifted into the Black Sea towards Romania and Turkey.

After a long wait, the Danube Commission expressed its international reaction to the situation on the Danube. Also, on 5 November 2025, the Sarajevo Declaration on the Danube was adopted, a joint statement of the foreign ministers of the Danube region during the 14th annual EU Strategic Forum for the Danube Region in Sarajevo, which condemned Russia's activities in the region, including the use of missile and drone attacks against Danube infrastructure, which also violate the space of Romania and Moldova, and recognized these actions as a serious violation of the freedom of navigation aimed at undermining the security and stability of the entire Danube region. On 17 December, one of the oldest international organizations in the world - the Danube Commission - decided to establish a register of damage in the Lower Danube caused by military actions of the Russian Federation. An official statement in support was made at the 104th session.

At the 104th session, an official statement was made and supported, drawing attention to serious environmental and maritime security problems that have already led to tangible environmental damage. In 2025, experts recorded pollution of the Danube Delta caused by fuel oil leaks from old Russian river tankers that sank in the Kerch Strait due to critical wear and tear and unseaworthiness. These ships were part of Russia's covert fleet, deliberately used to circumvent international sanctions. The classification documents for these ships were issued by Russian classification societies despite their obvious invalidity. Both tankers broke up during a storm not only due to their age, but also because they were never designed or intended for active sea navigation. Such fraud and gross violations of international standards by Russian registries have directly led to the deterioration of the ecological state of the Danube Delta, causing damage to biodiversity, fisheries and coastal communities.

These practices are not accidental. Russian classification societies – including RMRS, RCS and the Russian Register Association – along with their offices in Western Europe, as well as associated maritime structures operating in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and in third countries, are linked to sanctioned Russian companies such as Rosatomflot, Lukoil, Gazpromneft and Rosneft. These networks, supported by Russian and Chinese intelligence services, pose a serious threat to maritime and environmental security in the Black Sea region and the Danube Basin countries.

The activities of Russian registries and their associated organizations constitute systematic violations of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as key international conventions such as SOLAS, MARPOL, MLC and STCW. By issuing false classification documents and allowing the operation of dangerous vessels, these registries facilitate Russia’s military logistics, illicit trade and the export of resources from temporarily occupied Ukrainian ports. At the same time, they actively circumvent EU sanctions and continue to operate within certain European jurisdictions, effectively turning cooperation with them into indirect support for Russian aggression.

These risks and violations were officially recognized at the 104th session of the Danube Commission, where the official statement was made, supported by more than 50 participants and representatives of international organizations. The statement explicitly addresses the illegal activities of Russian classification societies, their support by intelligence services, and the resulting consequences for environmental and maritime security, including the disaster with a tanker from the hidden flotilla involving “Volgoneft“ ships in the Kerch Strait, which had a direct negative impact on the environment and fisheries. As a result of the meeting, the Danube Commission decided to initiate and intensify cooperation with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union and other international organizations in order to hold the Russian Federation accountable for these violations and the damage caused.

Currently, among other striking circumstances, one can point out the use of the Russian structure of JSC “Yugreftransflot“, which is associated with the operation of Russian ships in the World Ocean and the transportation of a dual-purpose Arctic transport refrigerator of the “Ivan Panin“ type, which is structurally equipped with a container complex of missile weapons “Kalibur-K“. and may pose a security threat by facilitating the activities of the “tanker fleet“ of Russia, in particular in the northern areas of navigation of the Russian fleet and the increase in the active activity of the “shadow fleet“ of Russia in the Arctic and within the framework of its participation in the Northern Sea Route.

At least Russia has already announced its intentions to significantly increase the use of the “shadow fleet“ within the framework of the Northern Sea Route. Russia is already evaluating the introduction of year-round sailing of vessels, measures are being developed to attract foreign investment, primarily from the PRC, and an analysis and search for operators is being carried out. Activities on the Northern Sea Route have generally been carried out little without the direct participation of Russian warships and icebreakers along the routes, and the absence of Russian special services in the line of support for such activities is difficult to imagine.

Therefore, risks to marine ecosystems and maritime security are increasing in the Arctic in parallel with Russian oil production activities. It is possible to indicate some key destinations of such a fleet in the Arctic, in addition to “northern supplies“; these are tanker routes from Murmansk to the Atlantic Ocean and from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean via the Northern Sea Route, as well as for transporting oil from Russia's Arctic oil and gas fields. In these circumstances, any oil spill incident, even with such a small tanker, would cause serious damage to the fragile nature of the Arctic, not to mention the safety aspect. And safety at sea is not at all a key feature of Russian Arctic shipping, as was proven when the nuclear icebreaker “50 лет Победы“ with IMO number 9152959 collided with the Russian-flagged cargo ship “Yamal Krechet“ with IMO number 9202041 on the Arkhangelsk-Sabeta route.

For example, in 2023, Russia sent three Suezmax and ten Aframax ships through the Arctic, carrying nearly 1.5 million tons of Chinese crude oil while sailing the Northern Sea Route, including “Hammurabi“, now “Novator“, IMO 9297357, and “Olympic Prospect“, now “Oasis“, IMO 9511387, as reported by High North News. “GCaptain“ wrote that in August 2024, the largest oil tanker to enter Russia's Northern Sea Route, the 164,565-ton "Prizma", IMO 9299678, began its ice transit to Tianjin, China. On August 23, 2024, the smaller Aframax tanker "Viktor Bakaev" with IMO 9610810 completed the Arctic route from Primorsk in the Baltic Sea to Dunin, China, after a 33-day voyage. As the "Barents Observer" adds, the tanker "Sai Baba" with IMO 9321691, which in September 2024 was traveling the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to China, was part of a large, hidden fleet registered in Africa that now operates in Russian Arctic waters.

This ship was renamed “Lahar“, then “Bark“, changed flags to Djibouti and Oman, but still transported Russian oil to China, now from Russian Pacific ports. But in September 2024, this almost 20-year-old tanker with a deadweight of 158,889 tons collided with the main layer of multi-year sea ice in the Chukchi Sea, having “permission“ to sail without an icebreaker escort only in light ice conditions.

In 2024, “Greenpeace“ stressed that Russian exporters are increasingly using older ships to export crude oil, and as they age, they become more susceptible to wear and corrosion, which increases environmental risks. At the same time, more and more Russian ships are operating without insurance against specific risks, such as oil spills. According to the Arctic Council, there are more than 50 chemical tankers and 50 oil tankers in Arctic waters, as well as dozens of gas and crude oil tankers. Their operations are particularly risky, as ship-to-ship transfers often involve unloading liquefied natural gas (LNG) from expensive ice-class tankers onto cheaper conventional gas carriers, including operations with the new Russian LNG plant Arctic 2, described by „Reuters“.

Even some of the new LNG tankers for this plant, located on the Gida Peninsula, namely „North Sky“, „North Mountain“, „North Air“ and „North Way“, supplied by „Samsung Heavy Industries“ under the Panamanian flag, „are not listed in the applicant's information“, as „Barents Observer“ noted, and mentioned permits to sail without the assistance of an icebreaker in „light ice“, which raises more questions than answers. At the same time, as the “Financial Times“ reports, EU shipyards are repairing Russian ice-class tankers and offering them dry docks, which allows Moscow to continue transporting gas through the Arctic, despite Western sanctions against its energy sector. Therefore, the risks of large-scale oil incidents in the Arctic are growing, and in the conditions of the “tense silence“ of the Arctic Council and the IMO on this issue, decisive steps are needed from the US, especially in the current conditions of oil price management.

Thus, the Russian behavioral practice regarding the transportation of dangerous goods, in particular weapons and military equipment for military purposes, thanks to the “shadow tanker fleet“, violates UNCLOS, namely Article 94 “Flag State Obligations“. According to the norm, the flag state is obliged to ensure real control over vessels, safe operation and compliance of information about vessels with reality. Thus, Russia's violation consists in the fact that the "shadow fleet" operates with actually undeclared cargo and creates "invisible" ship structures (monster companies).

In addition, 99% of such ships manipulate AIS and hide their route. This is a direct violation of the obligation of due care and effective control. It also violates Art. 110 of UNCLOS “Right of visit“. Such ships can be stopped and inspected if there is suspicion of illegal use of the flag or lack of a real flag. Russia violates this norm, because in this case, ships from the “shadow and ghost fleet“ often change flags (Comoros, Tanzania, Panama, etc.), use “convenient flags“ without registration, excluding AIS, which allows the ship to be recognized as de facto stateless. That is, the status of a stateless ship gives the right to detain such ships by any state. Art. 301 of UNCLOS “Good faith and abuse of rights“ is also violated, since in such a situation Russia uses commercial ships for secret military transport, for placing platforms (in the aforementioned example “Caliber-K“) under the guise of civilian containers. This turns the civilian fleet into a hidden military infrastructure, which is a direct violation.

In addition, Russia also violates the SOLAS Convention, namely Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, which prohibit the concealment of military-type cargo, the concealment of military capabilities as civilian, the deactivation of AIS and the obfuscation of identification data. Such a ship from the “shadow or ghost” fleet, which does not report military cargo, violates ISPS, is subject to detention in port, inspection and even a ban on entry into ports (port state control). Russia also violates MARPOL. If a ship from such a ship with dangerous cargo, in particular weapons, moves in a “secret mode“, without P&I insurance, classification escort, compliance with the rules for the carriage of dangerous goods, then this is a gross violation of Protocols I and II of MARPOL, because the risks of an incident increase many times over, and the “shadow fleet“ and “ghost fleet“ a priori demonstrate an increased rate of incidents.

Russia violates the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988. This is a key aspect of the system of Russian violations. The transportation of weapons on a ship under civilian cover is the illegal use of a civilian ship to prepare for aggression, i.e. disguised military transport. According to Article 3 of this Convention, it is prohibited to use a ship to cause harm to another state, it is prohibited to transport weapons for terrorist or military actions, it is prohibited to disguise military capabilities as civilian. In this case with the “Kalibur-K“ or another similar case, this is a classic case of violation of this 1988 Convention.

In addition, in the situation with the transportation of dangerous goods from Russia, in particular weapons and military equipment for military purposes by the “shadow tanker flotilla“ and the “ghost flotilla“, we can also talk about a violation by Russia of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. on the use of civilian vessels in military operations, which will consider the situation not only as a violation of maritime law, but also of humanitarian law. Civilian vessels cannot be military platforms, cannot disguise a military purpose, cannot be used for deception, perfidy, which is already a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

This creates grounds for recognizing Russia's actions as casus belli, and although international law does not officially define a "list" of grounds, it does define the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. There are criteria according to which such Russian actions are considered grounds for the use of force if at least two factors are proven: the vessel transports military systems for the purpose of aggressive actions; the vessel acts on behalf of the Russian state and there are grounds for the formation of a military chain of command. That is, if there is a connection between the vessel, the Russian Ministry of Defense or with the special services of Russia (FSB, Main Directorate of the General Staff, etc.), naval logistics, then such vessels are no longer civilian, but military targets. Legally, this opens up the right to preventive self-defense in the event of a threat of imminent force.

After all, is this an international crime on the part of Russia? Yes, and several at the same time. The international crime of a State, according to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, is a violation of the sovereignty of other States, obligations under UNCLOS, a violation of the prohibition of the threat of force, the rules of maritime safety and the prohibition of perfidy. This entails the responsibility of States, in particular, for violating the non-proliferation regime, since, for example, the container complex “Kalibur-K“ is covered by the first category of missile technology under the Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996. The transportation of such systems without a declaration is a violation of the Wassenaar Arrangement regime. The violation of Russia's obligations regarding maritime security is an act of illegal maritime transport of weapons. This is what the US and the EU are already using as an argument against Iranian and North Korean ships.

That is, the “shadow tanker fleet“ or “ghost fleet“ transporting dangerous cargo, in particular weapons, and these weapons are intended for use, and the transportation is carried out under the control of the Russian state (in particular, its military and special bodies), there is a threat of imminent attack, in which case another state has the right: to detain ships, inspect them, block them, destroy them if there is a threat (preventive self-defense). This is already a formally permissible action within the framework of international law. This is especially demonstrated by NATO's practice in the northern latitudes when conducting operations against the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s.

In this context, it is important to recall NATO's “maritime“ practice towards the USSR. The most telling example is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a major historical precedent for countering the Kremlin's hostile intentions. This is the gold standard of international law for how to respond to covert military activity disguised as civilian shipping. Let us recall that Moscow transferred "P-12" and "P-14" missiles to Cuba via civilian ships under the USSR flag, the cargo was declared as "agricultural equipment" (in some cases not declared), and medium-range missiles and launchers were disguised on board. In fact, this is a similar scenario to the situation with "Kalibur-K" in containers, since this cargo has a civilian appearance, military purpose, has signs of clandestine movement, poses a threat and is coordinated with the assistance of the Russian military and special services.

Then the US creates a naval blockade (quarantine), that is, a de facto casus belli. Operation “Naval quarantine of Cuba“ includes an interception line, the right to inspect all Soviet ships, stop and force the ships to turn back. The US actions were recognized as a legal basis for self-defense, since there was a threat of imminent attack, the USSR was using civilian ships for military aggression, in a treasonous mode, and ships with dangerous cargo lost protection as merchant ships. This precedent can now be legally applied against the “shadow tanker flotilla“ and the “ghost flotilla“ of Russia.

In 1970-1991, NATO systematically conducted operations in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. The Alliance's operations included tracking "fishing" and "scientific vessels" of the USSR, which, under the guise of "fishing trawlers", "oceanographic" ships, "refrigerators" conducted underwater reconnaissance of cables, mapping of the shelf, reconnaissance of the route of underwater submarine navigation. This is an analogue of the modern actions of the ships of JSC "Yugreftransflot". in the North Atlantic and the Arctic. NATO officially exercised its right to inspect vessels (right of visit) on the basis of Art. 110 of UNCLOS, suspicions of intelligence activity.

Another NATO practice included operations against the USSR's "disguised military fleet" in the Norwegian Sea. At that time, the USSR actively used the ships "Murmanrybprom", "Sevrybflot", "Soyuzvneshtrans" and "Sovfrakht" to deliver components for underwater tracking systems, acoustic buoys, elements of maritime reconnaissance and possible participation in organizing sabotage. NATO correctly considered such ships to be military transports, legitimate targets for interception and not having the full immunity of civilian ships.

After 1983, NATO conducted operations against the Soviet Special Fleet in the North Atlantic, when, after the downing of a Korean Air Boeing 747 passenger plane by a Soviet fighter, the Alliance increased patrols, introduced a harassment and inspection regime, and used interception of ships with suspicious cargo. NATO's practices against the USSR provide a legal basis for using actions against Russia's "shadow tanker flotilla" and "ghost flotilla". Direct parallels with the "Kalibur-K" and an analogy with the "Aleksandrovsky", "Oktyabrsky" and other Soviet ships that transported missiles to Cuba are traced. "Yugreftransflot" is essentially a new “Sovfracht“, and Russia's public, fishing and transport ships are Russian camouflaged military transports.

Russia's Arctic routes repeat the USSR's practice of using civilian ships for military logistics in the Arctic. That is why NATO and EU countries have the right to put into practice the suspension of Russian ships from the “shadow” and “ghost” fleet, to inspect them, block their path, demand a U-turn, introduce a maritime “sanitary zone“, including one free from their activities, to prohibit their entry into ports, and in case of a real threat to intercept and even destroy them.

This is permissible under international law, because what Russia is implementing in practice today completely repeats the Soviet practice of the 1960s and 1980s, which has already been qualified by the international community as a covert militarization of the civilian fleet, a violation of maritime law, a pretext for a blockade, a legitimate basis for the use of force. Therefore, the fact of the covert transportation of dangerous goods from Russia can indeed be legally recognized as a casus belli or casus foederis (a pretext for a collective response by the allies).

Today it is known that the leading countries of the West, and in particular the United States, are already studying the methodology of maritime operations, inspections, delays, suppression of the activities of the “shadow“. and “ghost fleet“, including through economic pressure and restriction of the rapidly expanding logistics of the Kremlin not only for the supply of Russian oil and oil products, but also for the transportation of dangerous goods.

Of particular interest is the position of France and Germany on ensuring environmental safety from the activities of the Russian “shadow fleet“ in the presence of data that could indicate a clear danger from Russian ships or those associated with the Russian special services. Of course, it is clear that such actions should be accompanied by tracking, inspections and the creation of artificial obstacles to the illegal movement of ships from the “shadow fleet“, which should increase the costs and financial risks for Russian structures associated with the “shadow“ fleet, and structures of third countries that are involved in coordinated actions against the safety of sea routes, shipping safety, and the economic and environmental security of the regions where the Russian fleet operates.

It is obvious that the reaction to the use of the “shadow tanker fleet“ and the “ghost fleet“ by Russian special services in their own activities should be comprehensive, both at the level of individual countries and at the level of international institutions. But it is important to note that the integration of sanctions regimes and the regime for the protection of underwater infrastructure is necessary because the same vessels are associated with both evading sanctions and carrying out reconnaissance, sabotage and sabotage with the support of special services.

It is also advisable to consider the possibility of introducing special legislation by creating “safety zones“ around critical navigation areas and the presence of infrastructure, where vessels from the “shadow tanker flotilla“ and “ghost flotilla“ would be prohibited from anchoring, trawling, transshipment or transiting based on available data on threatening activities, for example, the transportation of dangerous goods, and we are not talking only about Russian oil from old vessels that threaten the environment, but also about weapons or other military equipment for military purposes that the aggressor practices transporting. Such violations would be punished under the principle of strict liability (liability regardless of proof of intent). This is a legal instrument that directly contradicts the “vessel as weapon“ tactic.

Expanding sanctions should be considered to include additional Russian ships or tankers associated with Russian entities that have shown anomalous behavior, simultaneously falling into the list of ships from the “high-risk sanctions perimeter“, without proving intentional sabotage, diversion or illegal economic activity. The operations of Western countries at sea, the constant monitoring and analysis of “shadow ships“ and “ghost ships“ - a model that not only can be, but should be scaled up in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as working out its use in the Arctic regions, as a logical response to the widespread hostile activity of Russia, which operates with the support of the military and intelligence services of the aggressor state.

Source: britpanorama.co.uk