It has been more than six years since former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell declared that the Union must learn to speak the "language of power". Yet Europe's response to today's tectonic geopolitical shifts shows little sign of such learning. This is written by Zachary Paikin, a fellow in the "Grand Strategy" program at the "Quincy" Institute for responsible statesmanship, in the pages of "Politico".
The Union's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine was to adopt a normative approach that precluded any possibility of seeking a mutually acceptable outcome or compromise with Moscow. The predictable result was an increase in Europe's dependence on US-guaranteed security, which deepened its vulnerability to the predatory behavior of great powers in a rapidly changing world. And since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House, Europe has only deepened this initial strategic gap.
The Union has torn apart the remnants of its normative power before it has built up the tools of hard power, which has left it even more strategically isolated. Few today are convinced that Ukraine's right to seek NATO membership is a sacred part of the "rules-based international order" — especially when Europe is willing to interpret international law loosely and selectively in its responses to strikes against Venezuela or Iran. It is hard to argue that the future of Greenland should be decided by Greenlanders and Danes when the same standard is not applied to the people of Gaza.
But by failing to understand what lies behind Trump’s drive for peace in Ukraine, Europe risks missing an opportunity to develop the diplomatic flexibility and hard power capabilities needed to navigate a post-unipolar world.
After three decades in which the liberal West wrongly assumed that its preferred norms and principles could unilaterally shape the contours of the world order, Trump is seeking to rewrite the terms of great-power relations. In the cases of Venezuela and Greenland, for example, he wants to rewrite the rules of what is permissible in the “backyard.” America.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that this vision foreshadows a world of spheres of influence. Rather, the United States is forced to maximize its room for maneuver in its relations with other great powers, given that Washington and its allies can no longer set the terms of the international order for themselves. And that requires taking steps to avoid an excessive rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing—even as Russia has incentives to maintain stable relations with a rising China.
In other words, the United States needs to reset its relations with Russia.
This does not require legitimizing spheres of influence and therefore does not necessarily conflict with European sensitivities. But it is a task that remains impossible without Moscow and Washington resolving their differences over Ukraine.
If Russia concludes that a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Ukraine has become impossible, the fighting will continue—no matter what. Perhaps to mutual exhaustion, or perhaps the conflict will escalate in ways that seriously threaten Europe’s security. In either case, the political conditions will no longer allow for a restart of US-Russia relations. That is why Trump, despite repeated obstacles, remains determined to pursue peace in Ukraine.
Europe’s response to Trump’s Ukraine initiative, however, largely fails to see the big picture.
Too often, the Union tries to insert "poison pills" into the negotiations by crossing Russia’s red lines – as in the case of the "Coalition of the Willing" proposal to deploy a deterrent force on Ukrainian territory. Perhaps this is because, after decades of Russia being assured that it has no say in the security orientation of a state on its border, a deal that cements a compromise on this issue is too difficult to accept. Or perhaps, more cynically, it is about buying time so that Europe can build up its military capabilities and postpone the moment when the bill for rebuilding Ukraine becomes inevitable.
But refusing to consider the compromises needed to achieve peace would be a serious missed opportunity for Europe. A compromise agreement would allow Kiev to join the EU in the future and develop meaningful cooperation with the West in the areas of security, intelligence, and the defense industry. Despite its many weaknesses, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy clearly states the desire for European countries to stand on their own two feet as the continent’s leading security providers. And an end to the war would contribute to that goal by making America’s supporting role in ensuring Ukraine’s security clear.
Fortunately, we saw some encouraging signs at the latest meeting of the "Coalition of the Willing", held earlier this month in Paris. The coalition’s latest proposal for a multinational force does not explicitly envisage the deployment of combat units on Ukrainian territory, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s statements have spoken only of unspecified "military hubs". This suggests that a security assurance agreement acceptable to Moscow may be within the realm of possibility.
Having already destroyed its normative legitimacy, Europe has little reason to pursue a policy course that risks entrenching its status as a strategic bystander. Subservient to an increasingly predatory America, we are rapidly approaching the point where the risks of a "bad peace" in Ukraine will be less than the risks of not seizing the opportunity that such a peace offers Europe to become a more flexible and capable actor of hard power.
As long as the war continues, the EU's dependence on the United States will persist, and the European "language of power" will remain unattainable.