The partnership between Russia and China has no boundaries - if you believe the leaders of both countries, of course. But the reality is not so idyllic. This is what Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founder of the Center for New Eurasian Strategies and co-founder of the Russian Anti-War Committee, wrote for "Politico".
An awkward marriage of convenience, their relationship is constrained by opposing goals: President Vladimir Putin's Russia wants to dismantle what is left of the post-Cold War international order and reshape it in the Kremlin's image and likeness. And China’s contrasting gradualist approach to creating a China-centric global system requires preserving stability, predictability, and a semblance of a rules-based order.
Putin is in a hurry because he has a limited window of opportunity to play to his strengths by exploiting divisions within what he calls the "Collective West". But its weaknesses are plain to see: the US intervention in Venezuela, the Kremlin’s reluctance to defend Iran, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024 are all part of a pattern – that of an overstretched, weakened Russia that is increasingly unreliable and less trusted by allies in the global south.
And while US President Donald Trump sometimes presents Russia and China as a collective threat to the US – for example, when it comes to justifying his policy on Greenland – Washington is actually much more interested in shaping global dynamics with Beijing than with Moscow.
The 2025 meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Seoul made it clear that the Trump administration sees value in separating the "Russia question" from the "China question" and in building a pragmatic relationship of economic cooperation and "machtpolitik" with Beijing. And while many experts dismiss this possibility, the Kremlin is uneasy about it—and rightly so.
For Russia, the implications of a rapprochement between the United States and China—even if it is based on convenience rather than conviction—are profound.
Such a shift would reduce Putin’s Russia to the status of a minor player on the international stage and sharply weaken its influence—not least in Ukraine. The Russian leader’s dependence on Chinese supplies of machinery, equipment, and the transit of goods needed to sustain his war has reached unprecedented levels.
Without China, Putin’s war machine would likely grind to a halt in 12 months or less.
That’s why Moscow’s reaction to the Trump-Xi meeting was predictably bellicose, with Kremlin-friendly TV channels trumpeting the fact that Russia’s new missiles, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, could plunge the world into ecological disaster or wipe out millions of people in an instant—a sure sign that Putin is shaken.
It’s true that relations between China and Russia have strengthened significantly since 2022, and China has done little to rein in Putin’s aggression so far. Moreover, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told EU foreign policy chief Kaia Kallas that his country did not want Russia to be defeated in Ukraine, as the US would then focus its attention on Beijing.
However, the maintenance of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing is based on the assumption that both sides would gain more by standing up to the US together. This is now in question.
Washington initially mistakenly believed that it could tear Moscow away from Beijing by offering concessions and engaging China from a position of strength. This strategy has changed, however, with Trump describing his last meeting with Xi as a "12 out of 10" and enthusiastically accepting an invitation to visit China in April.
The US leader's pragmatic approach is certainly closer to Xi's style and opens the door for Beijing to achieve its goals in terms of trade and hegemony in the immediate neighbourhood. Moreover, neither is willing to provoke a military conflict with the other. Trump, for his part, has vowed to limit America's "endless wars" - even as he has bombed Iran and threatened several neighboring countries. And while Xi has his sights set on Taiwan, he has every reason to avoid war with the US because of the risks to China's economy.
This is in stark contrast to Putin, who is stuck in the logic of war to maintain his power.
His absolutist approach to diplomacy is strikingly different from Trump’s. Every time the US has pressed for a ceasefire in Ukraine to allow for talks, the Kremlin has reiterated its maximalist goals and instead escalated its air strikes. At the very least, Trump seems to have realized that he cannot force Putin to the negotiating table with existing sanctions or limited military pressure. No matter how many “constructive” phone calls he has, a deal is unlikely to be reached.
Meanwhile, talk of Trump’s withdrawal from Ukraine has largely died down in Washington. The US leader remains committed to a peace deal and seems to understand that Beijing’s influence over Moscow now offers the best prospect of achieving one.
The question is whether the “no-holds-barred” partnership with Putin still offers greater benefits for Beijing, or China's current interests are focused on a pragmatic detente with Washington and Europe.
While Europe is wary of the US administration, China now has the opportunity to solidify a long-term agreement with the old continent. And this gives Europe a potential advantage in persuading China to distance itself from an unpredictable "ally" and to limit the Kremlin's neo-imperial aggression. Ultimately, Beijing has no interest in Putin's continued destabilization of Europe.