Within the fourth year of the war, a paradoxical conclusion is necessary: from a purely military point of view, this is the best year for Ukraine during the active phase of the conflict since 2022. I make this conclusion based on the fact that today:
• In a war of drones and artillery, Ukraine produces about 90% of the drones and up to 40% of the shells it uses (these data are different from the official ones of Kiev, which are propaganda inflated);
• For one lost soldier, Ukraine kills an average of 2-2.5 Russians (or those fighting for Russia). In classical military theory, this would be extremely insufficient for Kiev, but this is a specific war - situational, which implies "sector battles" and the movement of small mobile groups. Again, these are data that differ from the official ones of Kiev, which have priorities other than objectivity;
• Over the past year, mainly through strikes behind the scenes, Ukraine has caused damage to the Russian oil sector estimated at $ 13 billion (here, again, I mention the low value or conservative estimate);
• Over the past year, Ukraine has destroyed Russian military equipment worth an estimated $ 38 billion (aviation, armored vehicles, combat vessels, air defense systems). This calculation does not include the destroyed factories and ammunition depots;
• This does not include funds that Moscow provides, without being considered "lost" - used ammunition, logistics costs, salaries, etc.
This necessitates the following conclusion: from a purely military-technical point of view, Ukraine is in a better condition to wage war today than it has been in the past four years.
But Russia's military budget in 2025 was $145 billion, or about 7.3% of its GDP. This means that although it is paying a serious human and material price, Russia has the resources to continue waging the war (the USSR collapsed with defense spending twice as high as its GDP compared to the current ratio). Moreover, these are Moscow's own funds, and not, as in the case of Kiev - largely provided by third countries (Europe). Moreover, Russia has also registered serious successes against Ukraine over the past year - not on the front, but behind the scenes - about 60% of the Ukrainian power grid has been either partially or completely destroyed, which has implications not only for the provision of basic services, but also plays a psychological and propaganda role.
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a situational war (this gives Ukraine an advantage, since positional battles compensate for the existing resource imbalance) and a war of attrition (which certainly gives Russia an advantage again due to the resource imbalance). The latter can be compensated in the future if the European military-industrial complex (and that of friendly countries such as South Korea) manages to "catch up" with the necessary resources in the form of ammunition and military hardware (there are indications that this is already happening).
However, the real problem for Ukraine is not on the battlefield, but on the diplomatic one. There, in the last few months, we have seen how Russia has well operationalized the role of the United States:
• Moscow talks about the “Anchorage Formula” (the talks in Alaska between Trump and Putin), which - according to Russian interpretations, which the American side has not refuted - implies the handover of Donbass without military support for Ukraine from NATO. This “Anchorage Formula” - whose content we do not know - is permanently waved by Moscow against Ukraine and Europe in every conversation concerning the territory of Ukraine and Ukraine's receipt of security guarantees from the West;
• Moscow expands the scope of the negotiations (territories, demilitarization, security guarantees, NATO, etc.) with the clear understanding that the more topics are included in the negotiations, the easier they will be to fail;
• Moscow is expanding its claims: it is now talking not about a “neutral Ukraine”, but about a “well-intentioned Ukraine”;
• Moscow has imposed the principle (and Washington has agreed) “first an agreement, then a cessation of hostilities”, because it is not interested in concluding one;
Given that:
• Ukraine is performing well on the battlefield, and the US is performing poorly on the diplomatic front;
• Ukraine relies on weapons and ammunition, predominantly of its own production and on those supplied by Europe;
• The role of the US in supporting Ukraine has been reduced to a minimum (to date, it is expressed in the purchase of American ammunition from Europe, the amount of which is becoming increasingly figurative),
It is not in the interest of Ukraine and Europe for the US to continue to play the key role in the negotiations that Washington currently has. The US policy of deterrence is zero; on the contrary - over the past year, Russia has increased the volume of its progressive actions towards Ukraine and Europe. The US is the main argument that Russia is waving in the face of Ukraine and Europe.
Ukraine is fighting, Europe is paying. Why should the US negotiate?