Taking a position on Russia's attitude turns into a structural division in Bulgaria. On the eve of the parliamentary and European elections on June 9, Moscow returns to a limited extent as a cultural alternative and geopolitical model, but without succeeding for the time being in ruining Bulgaria's pro-European orientation. There is certainly an old Russian-Bulgarian story, but it does not in itself explain the breakthrough of the far-right party "Revival". in the past years. This deserves increased attention in this European Union member state, which is organizing its sixth legislative elections since 2021 at a time of struggle against Russian interference. This is what Maria Mateeva - Kazakova, director of the Institute for Research, Analysis and Strategies in Sofia, wrote in her material published on the website of the Polish "Robert Shuman" Foundation.
Promoting the Russian model in Bulgaria
The return of Russia as a central subject in the Bulgarian political discourse happened gradually between 2013 and 2016. In fact, between 2003 and 2013, while the orientation towards NATO and the European Union became almost consensual, the parties claiming to be pro-Russian, such as " ;Attack" for example, are not very active on the political scene on this topic. Then, given the disappointments following Bulgaria's accession to the Union in 2007 and Russia's growing assertiveness on the international stage, the possibility of a relevant Russian model returned to the Bulgarian political debate. The emergence of certain Eurosceptic opinions and the rise of pro-Russian tensions go hand in hand. A study devoted to the content of the Bulgarian media for the period 2013-2016 highlights the fact that the number of Eurosceptic publications in the Bulgarian language has increased many times. At the same time, in 2014, a new far-right political actor with a pro-Russian vision emerged. Party "Revival" is gaining ground amid growing Euroscepticism and Russia's return to the national debate. It also took advantage of the political crisis that started in 2021. This party is gaining votes as the elections are held between 2021 and 2024. From 3% of the votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections, it rose to a result of 14 ,16% in the parliamentary elections in 2023. "These sixth elections should above all allow "Vazrazhdane", the nationalist party of Kostadin Kostadinov, to progress (...) It now comes in second place in public opinion polls" , explains Corinne Deloy on May 21. Little by little, this party took the place of the traditionally self-proclaimed anti-elitist, anti-European, anti-American, anti-NATO and pro-Russian party, the aforementioned "Attack". The latter was presented in the parliament between 2005 and 2017 and defended pro-Russian ideas, but which were not actively exploited, since then the important thing was to oppose everything that directly or indirectly affects the Turks.
The pro-Russian tendency of far-right parties
The attractiveness of the Russian model, carried by far-right parties, observed in Bulgaria, emerges as a pan-European trend. Some of them claim to be pro-Russian, to varying degrees, especially in the 2010s. Parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the German "Alternative for Germany" (AFD), the French National Front (FN) (now the National Assembly - RN), are passing the baton to each other in Russia's anti-democratic and anti-liberal rhetoric. The Hungarian regime of Viktor Orbán has even been described as the "Trojan horse" of Putin within the Union. In the European Parliament, far-right representatives in 2014, then the former "Europe of Nations and Freedom" group, created by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders in 2015, opposed the sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Crimea. The Hungarian think tank Political Capital, at the Central European University in Budapest, discussed in a 2014 study the project to create a pro-Russian bloc in the European Parliament. Which shows to what extent the spread of pro-Russian political ideas was already taking place on a European scale. It also confirms the fact that it is not simply a division of East and West. The "Revival" party, which this year could probably enter the European Parliament, is part of this movement and would a priori join the "Identity and Democracy" group if it gets seats there.
Beyond this progress seen throughout the Union, every national road plays a role in the reception of the Russian model: the countries occupied by the Red Army at the end of the Second World War include citizens who have memories - idealized or real - for Soviet hegemony and react accordingly to this Russian model. However, as of February 24, 2022, it must be recognized that the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine clearly signals a change in "soft power" of the Kremlin in Bulgaria. And that deserves attention.
Increasingly regular opposition to pro-Russian discourse
The return of the division regarding the perception of the Russian model in Bulgaria is illustrated by the clear political initiatives, but it has, above all, great symbolic significance. The proposals to remove the pro-Russian symbols from the Bulgarian heritage come in particular from the parties of the coalition "We continue the change - Democratic Bulgaria". (PP-DB). This coalition consists of small parties from the old anti-communist front (in particular "Democratic Bulgaria") as well as movements structured around political leaders who still have little experience, such as Asen Vassilev or Kiril Petkov, although the latter was a minister -president between 2021 and 2022. Even if in their speeches we find elements of language that can be defined as anti-elitist, from the point of view of their geopolitical orientation, it is a pro-European and pro-Western coalition. This is how we can interpret the increase in arms exports to Poland in favor of Ukraine in 2022, the decision to terminate the concession of the Russian oil company "Lukoil" in the summer of 2023 in the port of "Rosenets" or the recent hype about pro-Russian paramilitary groups. The dismantling of the monument erected in 1954 in honor of the Soviet Army, located in the heart of Sofia, represents the most symbolically significant act of this redefinition of the relationship between Sofia and Moscow. This event in December 2023 caused considerable tension: party opponents from the former communist parties and the Bulgarian far-right protested in vain and together demonstrated the same pro-Russian affinities, while others welcomed the end of this huge (45 meters high) symbol. Of the political forces involved in the case, in particular, "Revival" and... the Socialist Party (BSP). This dismantling therefore put an end to one of the key symbols of the "special" connection between Bulgaria and Russia, but the discussions are intensifying and the interventions in the memory are increasing. Thus, many Bulgarians recognize the beneficial role of Russia in the end of Ottoman rule in 1878, but refute the relevance of a monument related to Russia's Soviet past and, in general, to communism, and oppose the propagandists of the pro-Russian discourse in Bulgaria . In the same spirit, the project to replace the day of the national holiday, which is currently March 3, also appears. Presented by the coalition "Continuing the change - Democratic Bulgaria", its aim is to replace the date March 3, marking the abolition of Ottoman rule, with a holiday with a more universal meaning and unrelated to Russia - such as May 24 (the feast of the brothers Cyril and Methodius , the creators of the Cyrillic alphabet). This initiative - which was one of the key elements of the 2023 Constitution Amendment Bill - ultimately failed. The goal of this coalition was clear: to cut ties with Russia.
Pro-Russian dependence that promotes fear of Europe
Bulgaria shows a particular attitude towards Russia that differs from other EU member states: favorable opinions of Russia and Vladimir Putin have fallen sharply with the war of aggression in Ukraine, but Bulgarians remain relatively uncritical of Russia compared to the average for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The 2023 GLOBSEC study for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania highlights these Bulgarian specificities. Bulgaria is characterized by a slightly weaker attachment to the European Union and NATO, and its citizens are slightly more oriented towards Russia than the average countries in the region. This can be explained by the fact that Bulgaria is the country where citizens feel the least threatened by Moscow, despite the geographical proximity, but also because Bulgarians are the ones who are most sympathetic to illiberal leaders. We especially note that 48% of Bulgarians admit sympathy for the Hungarian Viktor Orbán and his image of resistance against the "powers of the West".
Bulgarians' behavior towards Russia has undergone an original change since 2022: oppositions are back in daily debates and domestic political decisions, Moscow's image is affected by its attempted illegal invasion of Ukraine, but not yet ruined, as shown for example, the arguments in favor of preserving the monument to the Soviet Army. This return to the debate and the multiplication of arguments in favor of or belittling the bad image of Russia inevitably have an impact on the feelings of Bulgarians towards the European construction. If 71% of Bulgarians want their country to remain a member of the Union, the same percentage report a feeling of "dictation from Brussels". In general, the adoption of the euro is a source of concern - 56% of Bulgarians say they agree with the statement that "the introduction of the euro will undermine our sovereignty and ruin our economy." These are the fears that must be heeded, because it is through these gaps that Russian disinformation slips in, feeds fears and disrupts institutional and political life. Russia has a limited contribution as a cultural alternative and geopolitical model for Bulgaria, failing to disrupt the country's pro-European orientation, as well as the majority support for the European Union and NATO. Bulgaria is part of the logic common to several European countries: the logic of supporting a far-right ideology with pro-Russian ambitions.
Bulgaria has a peculiar history with Russia, but it is contentious and does not lead to blind adherence to the model currently supported by the Kremlin. These are far-right activists who act as agents of Russian interference, almost everywhere in Europe. Therefore, rather, fears related to the European Union and the lack of Bulgarian political stability seem to favor the pro-Russian discourse during the last elections, rather than the attachment of Bulgarians to the superiority of the model promoted by the Kremlin.