Two years ago, NATO adopted a "back to the future" strategy ; for forward defense and deterrence after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To implement it, the allies committed to various measures to strengthen their deterrence and defense at the Madrid summit in 2022. As NATO leaders gather in Washington for the 75th anniversary of the alliance's summit, this document reviews allied efforts to strengthen collective defence. They were found to have made significant progress in defense spending, forward defense, high readiness forces, command and control, collective defense exercises and the integration of Finland and Sweden - achievements that should be recognized in Washington. However, while NATO may be ready for war, the question remains whether it is ready to fight - and thus deter - a protracted war. To achieve this goal, allies still need to spend more, increase industrial capacity, address critical capability gaps and strengthen national resilience, CSIS writes.
Si vis pacem, para bellum - If you want peace, prepare for war. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not yet have a motto - Animus in consulendo liber - then the first Latin proverb would fit the purpose of the alliance quite well. The phrase conveys part of the eternal logic of deterrence: preparing for war may be the best way to prevent it.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO adopted a new "back to the future" strategic concept that returned Russia to its Cold War adversary status and put deterrence and defense back at the heart of the alliance's strategy . NATO unveiled the concept of the 2022 Madrid summit along with a wide range of commitments that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described as a "fundamental shift to our deterrence and defence.
In less than a month, NATO leaders will gather in Washington for the alliance's 75th anniversary summit. Ahead of this historic meeting, this paper reviews the progress NATO Allies have made in meeting the commitments made two years ago in Madrid.
The document consists of three sections. The first briefly summarizes NATO's efforts to strengthen defense and deterrence since 2014 and examines the current Russian threat to NATO. The second assesses the progress made by NATO Allies in implementing their Madrid commitments to strengthen deterrence and defense in the nine problem areas outlined in the Madrid Summit Declaration. The final section uses this assessment to assess whether NATO is ready for war.
The Road to Washington
NATO's path to stronger deterrence and defense began at the 2014 Wales summit, where allies responded to Russia's annexation of Crimea by making long-term commitments to raise defense spending above 2 percent of GDP . Their short-term focus was on adapting NATO forces. This began with the 2014 Readiness Action Plan, followed by the establishment of four multinational Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) Battlegroups in the East in 2016. In 2018, NATO's Readiness Initiative improved the force posture by a high on standby for NATO.
While the 2022 Strategic Concept has grabbed public attention, another NATO concept agreed in 2020 is already quietly revolutionizing deterrence and defense: the Euro-Atlantic Deterrence and Defense Concept (DDA). The DDA focuses on deterrence and protection today. After Russia's invasion in 2022, NATO activated its defense plans, placing 40,000 troops - plus air, naval and other assets - at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Four new EFP missions followed, along with naval reinforcement, air policing, air defense and multinational exercises.
NATO planning was further transformed at last year's Vilnius summit with the unveiling of new defense plans, another product of the DDA. The "DDA Family of Plans," as described by SACEUR, US General Christopher G. Cavoli, includes three regional plans (covering Northern, Central and Southern Europe) along with area-specific plans (land, air, sea, cyber, and space forces) as well as logistics and support plans. As one recent analysis suggests: "None of this would be possible without the DDA."
Are you ready for war?
Russia's actions in Ukraine have confirmed the fears of many that Vladimir Putin will seek to continue the Stalinist subjugation of Russia's near neighbors. War suggests that the worst thinking about "maximum intentions" of Russia, who have historically led NATO planning, is justified for the foreseeable future. Putin's apparent penchant for aggression, risk-taking and strategic miscalculations make him a dangerous adversary - and difficult to deter.
Russia suffered huge losses in Ukraine, but "almost fully recovered militarily" to pre-war levels thanks to national mobilization and a war economy supported by China, Iran and North Korea. Beyond Ukraine, Russia is making nuclear threats against NATO and ramping up hybrid threats across Europe. Several European leaders have warned that Russia could attack NATO allies within three, four, five or eight years. Not only is China helping the Russian military to rebuild, but the prospect of coordinated aggression between Moscow and Beijing has many implications for NATO - the most serious being the implications for the US force posture in Europe.
To paraphrase the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, what kind of war should NATO prepare for? Perhaps the most stressful scenario is a rapid takeover of territory by Russian forces in the Baltic region. Variations of this scenario have been described and analyzed in recent years, almost becoming a cliché, but it should not be dismissed. In the jargon of military planning, this is the "most likely" and "the most dangerous" course of action that Russia may take.
This is the most likely scenario for any Russian conventional attack on NATO, as the local balance of power is drastically in Russia's favor. That's not to say it's likely - a lot of things would have to go badly for Russia to consider this a good option - just that it might be the most likely scenario for a war between NATO and Russia. Despite all the warnings from NATO leaders, it's still unclear if (and why) Russia will invade.
The implications mean that NATO planners must be prepared, as this kind of incursion carries the risk of nuclear escalation and is difficult to reverse. Any NATO operation to recover lost ground will require establishing air superiority and control over the Baltic Sea before massing significant local ground forces. Even with NATO's assurances, this situation is threatening enough under Russian doctrine for Moscow to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons for coercive or military purposes - forcing NATO to threaten nuclear use to force withdrawal and restore deterrence.
This is why Baltic officials describe the best strategy as "repel, not expel". This is also why NATO's new strategic concept has returned deterrence by denial and forward defense to the core of the alliance's strategy. As in the Cold War, deterrence by punishment - which relies primarily on the "sword" of the strategic nuclear forces of the US, UK and France - will continue to do most of the heavy lifting of deterring the most serious threats to NATO allies. But just as in the Cold War, NATO allies will increasingly rely on forward-based "shield" forces. to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense. This paper focuses on the commitments made by NATO allies in Madrid to do just that. The following section analyzes these commitments in detail.
From Madrid to Washington: Assessing NATO Allies' Commitments to Strengthen Deterrence and Defense
Defense Expenditure
"We reaffirm our commitment to the Defense Investment Pledge in its entirety. We will build on this pledge and decide next year on further commitments after 2024" — Madrid Summit Declaration
The 2014 Defense Investment Pledge (DIP) requires allies to invest at least 2 percent of GDP in defense - and at least 20 percent of that in modernization - by 2024. Last year in Vilnius, the allies agreed , that 2 percent will become the "minimum". " While in Wales only three allies met the target, this year 18 are expected to do so. NATO estimates that this year will be the first in which European NATO allies invest 2 percent of their total GDP. European allies have increased their investment by about a third since 2014 to a total of $380 billion.
Recent spending announcements include the "historic boost" of Norway's spending, which will double over the next 12 years. The UK government recently announced a "fully funded plan" to reach 2.5 percent by 2030 - an additional £75 billion ($96 billion). Meanwhile, despite announcing an additional C$8.1 billion ($5.9 billion) in funding by 2030, Canada will still fall short of 1.76 percent of GDP.
Despite strong progress in defense spending since Madrid, three important questions remain for NATO allies. The first is whether the "minimum 2 percent" target agreed in Vilnius is sufficient to maintain a positive trajectory and provide the capabilities needed for a strong forward defense. The second is what they spend money on. European allies must address their known capability gaps and remove their reliance on the United States to conduct high-end collective defense missions. The last question is how the money is spent. European allies spend more but cooperate less, making defense more expensive and ineffective than it needs to be.
Forward Defense Force
"The Allies have committed to deploying additional stable combat forces in place on our eastern flank, to be augmented from existing battlegroups to brigade-sized units where and when needed. . . [including] establishment of structures" — Madrid Summit Declaration
The core component of NATO's revitalized forward defense is the eight EFP missions, including a multinational force of several allies led by a framework nation. The status of each mission is outlined below based on the latest data available. This analysis highlights progress on two new commitments from Madrid: to expand each mission to "brigade-sized units" (up to 5,000 employees) and to create "division-level structures".
NATO's forward defense forces are also deployed in the air and at sea. Last year, NATO's enhanced Air Policing mission carried out more than 300 interceptions of Russian aircraft in Baltic airspace. Allied air forces also increased their contribution to Air Policing and Air Shielding (air and missile defense). At sea, allied standing naval forces came under SACEUR command for the first time in 2022, while a French naval strike group operated under NATO command in the Mediterranean.
Significant progress was made to improve NATO's forward defences. After Madrid, Allies demonstrated the combat readiness of all eight EFP missions with battle group-level certification exercises. Four of the eight missions were exercised at the brigade level to rehearse rapid reinforcement in a crisis. Meanwhile, all eight missions are integrated into the NATO command structure at the division level. EFP Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have plans to integrate with new structures at the national division level. Meanwhile, NATO allies have stepped up existing air and sea missions. However, only two EFP missions plan to permanently increase the size of the brigade. This is because the Madrid agreement leaves the decision to scale up to the host, framework and contributing nations. The question remains whether even brigade-sized missions would be sufficient deterrence by denial, given the local power imbalance in Russia's favor.
NATO Force Model
"We welcome the initial proposals from the Allies for the new NATO force model, which will strengthen and modernize NATO's force structure and provide resources for our new generation of war plans" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
In Madrid, the Allies agreed to transition to a new force model by 2023. NATO's New Force Model (NFM) aims to strengthen deterrence and defense by providing a much larger array of forces that are available for rapid deployment in a crisis. The NFM replaced the 40,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF). It contains three levels of forces held ready for 10 to 180 days (the NRF's ready time is 15 days). The NFM foreshadowed the regional plans agreed a year later in Vilnius, stating that forces "will be pre-assigned to specific plans". The NFM also provides the high-readiness forces needed for the new Allied Response Force to which NATO will transition in mid-2024.
Detailed Allied contributions to the NFM remain secret, but public announcements indicate progress. Germany agreed to provide 30,000 troops and a combination of 85 ships and aircraft that could be mobilized in 30 days. The UK provides combat aircraft, ships, aircraft carriers and a "brigade-sized ground force". The United States has also placed much of its 80,000-strong force in Europe under NATO command, the most tied to NATO structures in decades.
Challenges remain in terms of generating and sustaining forces. Last year, leaders of NATO's Military Committee acknowledged work remained to meet the 300,000, but stressed the importance of knowing what was missing. In addition, experts such as John R. Denny of the US Army War College have raised concerns about preparedness. Recruitment and retention challenges in Europe and the United States are undermining readiness as demand for support and logistics personnel increases. Denny notes that NATO has established readiness review processes for Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, but these have revealed deficiencies.
Authorities for SACEUR to activate and deploy NFM forces before the crisis will be essential to the implementation of the DDA. As SACEUR confirmed, these authorities support "NATO's ability to implement its plans and help influence allies to participate with their own forces". Yet allies have not always been willing to provide NATO commanders with the "devolution" needed for optimization and effectiveness. It also highlights the importance of aligning the NFM force composition with regional plans potentially different from the forces that allies typically provide.
Command structure
"The Allies have committed themselves to . . . enhanced command and control" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
NATO is constantly adapting its post-Madrid command structure, vital to the implementation and execution of regional plans. The scale of the NFM also highlights the need for an updated and modernized structure.
The new HQ includes the HQ of the Multinational Division North (MND N) in Adaži, Latvia, which became fully operational in July 2023. In March 2024, the HQ of the Multinational Division North-East (HQ MND-NE) in Elbląg, Poland followed suit. Both have a key role in coordinating EFP missions. In September 2023, NATO Rapid Deployment Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) became the temporary headquarters of the Allied Response Force (ARF).
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO also requires new arrangements. JFC Norfolk (JFCNF), NATO's newest strategic command overseeing the North West Europe regional plan, became fully operational in July 2021, but has changed significantly since the accession of Finland and Sweden as a political consensus was formed among the Nordic gathering nations under JFCNF. To meet this reconfiguration, the JFCNF is being scaled up, with full integration planned for 2025. The JFCNF demonstrated its readiness by assuming command of the Steadfast Defender for a month while the exercise was in its area of responsibility. A new corps-level land component command has been proposed in Mikkeli, Finland (about 140 km from the Russian border), possibly vital to the JFCNF's C2 infrastructure.
If established, Micheli would increase the number of corps-level commands to 11 that NATO deems necessary to implement regional plans. Streamlining NATO's C2 structures is critical to robust deterrence and defence. Flexible commands such as the German DEU MARFOR, capable of rapid scalability in crises or supporting DDA activities, are essential. Prioritizing C2 adaptation and exercise should address this need.
Integration of Finland and Sweden
"We reaffirm our commitment to NATO's open door policy. Today we decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO and agreed to sign the accession protocols" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
NATO's most notable achievement since the Madrid summit has been the accession of Finland and Sweden as full NATO members. Following their formal invitation and after nearly two years of political drama, Ankara and Budapest eventually dropped their objections after extracting concessions from various allies, including the United States. It sent a strong political signal to Moscow and added a serious deterrent to NATO's ranks, gaining two highly capable members with the ability to severely limit Russia's freedom of maneuver in the Baltic Sea.
The process of fully integrating Finland and Sweden into NATO continues, but significant progress has been made. Integration was aided by the deep military cooperation between the two countries and NATO prior to accession. Both were Enhanced Capability Partners (under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative), which rated Finland and Sweden as more interoperable with NATO than some existing allies. The integration of the "huge" Nordic air power has been developing for decades, as the recent integration of the Finnish and Swedish air forces into NATO shows.
Several challenges remain for the full integration of Finland and Sweden. These include developing adequate command structure arrangements, adjusting regional plans and DDAs, and taking into account the defense requirements of both nations in all areas, including logistics. The analysis suggests the critical role here of the United States and the United Kingdom, given that the United States recently signed agreements on northern defense cooperation and the United Kingdom leads the Joint Expeditionary Force, which has integrated Finnish and Swedish forces in operations for several years.
Collective Defense Exercises
"We will enhance our collective defense exercises to be prepared for high-intensity, multi-area operations and ensure reinforcement of any ally at short notice" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
After Madrid, NATO made good on its promise to refocus its exercise program on collective defense. The recent Steadfast Defender exercise was NATO's largest exercise since the Cold War, involving 90,000 personnel from all allies in all areas. It included naval and amphibious exercises in the Far North and multi-area exercises across Europe with an emphasis on military mobility. Steadfast Defender is an important tool for testing and validating other major lines of effort such as NFM and regional plans.
NATO's exercise program focuses on multi-domain operations. In the air, Germany hosted and led its largest ever Air Defender edition, while the Vigilant Falcon tested the Baltic Air Police this May. At sea, Neptune Strike 2024 featured five carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean, and Dynamic Mongoose focused on anti-submarine and surface combat. The Baltops 2023 exercise was the first with the participation of Finland as an ally.
The newest fields, cyber and space, were also tested. NATO held its special Vulcan Guard space exercise in April. NATO's Center of Excellence for Joint Cyber Defense in Tallinn, Estonia, hosted the world's largest cyber defense exercise, Locked Shields, last year. In June, the Coalition Warrior interoperability exercise will test interoperability across all NATO C2 domains and systems.
Defense Industry
"To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance needs a strong and capable defense industry with sustainable supply chains" — Communiqué from Vilnius.
Russia's war in Ukraine has exposed the critical state of NATO's defense industrial base as allies scramble to supply Ukraine with ammunition and replenish their stockpiles. In Vilnius, the allies called for removing barriers to defense trade and investment between them to strengthen resilience. The Defense Production Action Plan (DPAP) was revealed, "leveraging the Alliance's role as organizer, standards-setter, requirements-setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler". Highlighted DPAP priority areas include aggregating demand between allies to accelerate joint supply, increase production capacity and improve allied interoperability.
Different advances in demand aggregation, interoperability and supply coordination and cooperation are evident. From July 2023, the NATO Support and Supply Agency (NSPA) awards contracts for ammunition, joint supply of Patriot missiles and artillery shells. In addition, Allies have improved cooperation in multinational capabilities, as evidenced by NATO's MRTT-C air fleet achieving initial operational capability. Traditional European manufacturers have increased trade within Europe, but Poland's strategy of importing from all sources has significantly boosted the arms trade for the continent.
Efforts to synchronize between the European Union and NATO could improve NATO's deterrence and defense if such an effort were undertaken. The European Union has allocated more than 500 million euros ($544 million) to increase ammunition production and provided aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Support Mechanism. In addition, the first-ever Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) was published this year with the aim of increasing capacity and intra-European cooperation. Although some believe that EDIS competes with DPAP in terms of standard setting, officials confirm that they do not compete with each other. The European Union and NATO share the goal of increasing readiness, making enhanced coordination between them essential to avoid duplication.
Not surprisingly, significant challenges remain for defense manufacturing. Despite clear signs of demand, barriers to accelerating production and tensions between NATO and the EU persist. Orders form only one input into the production equation, and delivery delays fail to translate into stockpiles in reliable timeframes. Long-term pathologies hampering European production are not easily overcome. To ensure NATO's readiness, the United States must prioritize multilateral munitions production with member states over bilateral efforts. The expected increased role of the European Union is of concern to NATO, but could positively transform the transatlantic defense industrial base, depending on the EU's funding capacity. To effectively leverage NATO's collective investment and build manufacturing capacity, the alliance will benefit from greater integration and consolidation of the defense industry.
Defensive capabilities
"Investing in our defense and key capabilities is essential" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
NATO's cumulative capacity far exceeds that of Russia - even excluding the United States. Two years of war in Ukraine have taken their toll on Russia's armed forces, with its fleet of active main battle tanks down 41 percent since 2022 and active personnel down nearly 20 percent despite partial national mobilization. In addition, NATO, even without the US, may have more advanced equipment than Russia. Approximately 71 percent of NATO's non-US combat aircraft fleet was produced or upgraded after 1990, compared to 53 percent of Russia's inventory.
However, this advantage does not necessarily translate to the battlefield. NATO faces significant capability gaps and readiness challenges that undermine conventional deterrence. The Allies may have more advanced warplanes, but they struggle with magazine depth. During NATO's 2011 air operations in Libya, non-US NATO members began to run out of precision munitions within a month - and this was a relatively minor operation compared to the defense of the Baltic states.
NATO's problems go beyond the air force. According to a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of combat battalions, active main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored reconnaissance vehicles and self-propelled artillery in European armies remained unchanged or decreased between 2014 and 2023. In more broadly European nations have significant gaps in naval forces, air assets, air defense and "crucial munitions" (artillery ammunition and rockets). Any major combat operation in Europe will rely on U.S. forces to compensate for Europe's shortfall in land, sea, and air forces needed to carry out a range of military missions. These issues have not yet been addressed by the significant increase in NATO Allies' defense investment since 2014. NATO allies clearly face a significant transformational challenge in turning their wealth into warfighting capabilities.
Sustainability
"Sustainability is a national responsibility and a collective commitment" — Madrid Summit Declaration.
Resilience - including military capacity, civilian preparedness and contingency planning - was NATO's first line of defense against the Soviet Union. The same is true today. After Madrid, the Allies launched several new initiatives to increase resilience. In October 2022, NATO established a Resilience Committee, which met twice before Vilnius. In March 2023, the NATO-EU Critical Infrastructure Resilience Working Group was established to examine four key sectors: energy, transport, digital infrastructure and space. Its final report in June 2023 recommended 14 actions to boost NATO-EU cooperation on critical infrastructure. This was marked at the Vilnius Summit in July when NATO launched a new maritime center for the security of critical underwater infrastructure within NATO's Allied Maritime Command. The summit communique also highlights societal resilience, health systems, supply chains and energy security. Allies also agreed on resilience goals and a new baseline for allied resilience planning - which remains a national responsibility led by NATO authorities.
Sustainability is a complex issue that requires persistence, investment and collaboration, requiring a more coordinated and collective approach. Building on progress so far, the NATO Resilience Committee should consider new ideas such as a NATO Resilience Fund, a NATO-wide Sustainability Advisory Group and Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) to identify key sustainability risks. The European Union's renewed focus on sustainability and the unique levers it possesses - from financial instruments to regulatory powers - make it well-positioned to act boldly in continued close cooperation with NATO. These efforts also promote Allied responses to the generational challenges in the NATO Strategic Concept, such as green energy and digital transition.
Enhancing military resilience through NATO is not enough; each ally must face the societal challenge of war readiness based on its own strategic culture. New allies Finland and Sweden offer a new wave of expertise based on their advanced approaches to whole-of-society resilience and civic preparedness. Above all, NATO allies must find the "will to fight", which - as Ukraine has shown - remains the basis of defense.
Is NATO ready for war?
As one analysis puts it: "the alliance's journey to stronger defense and deterrence has just begun."
What does this assessment tell us about NATO's readiness for war? The answer to this question depends on the type of war that arises from each crisis. It seems clear that NATO is ready to "fight tonight". The transition to the DDA and the regional plans adopted in Vilnius have resulted in a significant change in the scale of NATO forces that are combat-ready, forward-deployed and under the direct command of SACEUR.
The expansion to eight EFP missions and the strengthening of the air and sea presence enabled NATO to quickly assemble a significant combat force along the eastern front in crises, promoting a cultural change among the Allies. Meanwhile, NATO's C2 developed rapidly and demonstrated readiness through large-scale exercises. The NFM revolutionized the deployment of national high-readiness forces to NATO on a scale 10 times greater than before. Above all, NATO has successfully integrated Finland and Sweden, adding significant air, naval and land combat power and removing any uncertainty about their contribution to an Article 5 scenario.
However, a closer look at the long-term measures agreed in Madrid reveals a slightly different question: NATO may be ready for war, but is it ready for prolonged war? Any permutation of a serious Russia-NATO conflict, which will not end quickly, will turn into a clash not only of armies, but also of societies. It becomes a race of endurance and readiness, industrial capacity and supply chains, depth, logistics, mass, resources and especially the "will to fight". Stalling progress and continuing challenges to increase defense spending, transform defense industrial capabilities, address critical capability gaps, and strengthen national resilience—all necessary to strengthen deterrence and defense—must be recognized, addressed, and overcome. As Gen Cavoli recently made clear, the key issue for NATO is not about Russian realignment per se, but about the alliance's own deterrence and defense. As Clausewitz reminds us in his metaphor of "the two wrestlers", every strategy is dynamic and relative.
In rebuilding their forces, NATO allies face the eternal challenge of balancing the "Iron Triangle" of trade-offs between readiness, modernization and force structure. For NATO this can be fixed. In essence, allies must balance short-term force increases ("fight tonight") and long-term modernization efforts ("fight tomorrow") while preparing for an extension. For example, compare Poland's efforts to soon have the largest army in Europe, with the UK's focus on becoming a "scientific and technical superpower" by 2030. This compromise is neither new nor bipartisan, but the nature of the Russian threat makes it critical. The answer will depend on NATO allies' judgment of when Russia may be able and willing to attack. The diverse range of assessments and the inherent uncertainty of this task make it challenging, but NATO's readiness for war will depend on the type of conflict that arises. It seems clear that NATO is ready to "fight tonight".
The final question raised by this analysis is the paradigm within which NATO allies plan to fulfill their Madrid commitments. The 2022 Strategic Concept has put defense back on NATO's agenda, but for all its merits, Allied forward presence is "still an obstacle". Even if the Madrid commitments were fully implemented, NATO's forward presence would likely still fall short of the standard of deniability necessary to render the Russian fait accompli untenable. The strategy would then be "evict, not repulse", with the opposite remaining preferable. The alliance would put all its eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence, with all the catastrophic risks involved.
As NATO leaders gather in Washington this summer, they should celebrate their significant progress in meeting the commitments made in Madrid to strengthen allied deterrence and defence. They must also push for improvements in key areas that underpin NATO's readiness for protracted war: defense spending, industrial capacity, critical capability gaps and national resilience. They also need to rethink whether the level of ambition they set themselves in Madrid is high enough. During the Cold War, NATO's strategy relied as much on a robust forward defensive "shield" as on its "sword"; for nuclear deterrence. Times have changed, but not that much and still - Si vis pacem, para bellum.