Of the nearly 800-900 thousand Russian citizens who left Russia immediately after the country invaded Ukraine in February 2022, about 650,000 are believed to still be abroad. Some of them have already left their original host country, others have not yet decided how long they will stay abroad, where conditions for them are often difficult.
A new report by the Berlin-based Center for East European and International Studies (CIMI) with authors Felix Kravacek and Gwendolyn Zasze examines the political views of new Russian migrants in the five countries they most often choose: Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
The study is based on direct interviews with 4,300 Russians who left the country immediately after February 2022, as well as earlier - approximately 1,000 respondents in Armenia, Georgia and Turkey, and almost 600 in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The interviews were conducted in the summer of 2023.
A politically heterogeneous group
New emigrants from Russia can also be seen as a potential opposition in exile, the study authors say. In fact, some of these people are indeed involved in opposition or anti-war activities, others openly support the Kremlin, and many prefer to remain silent. And while a significant portion of those who left the Russian Federation immediately after its invasion of Ukraine can certainly be categorized as opponents of the war and the Kremlin, this is much less true of the subsequent migration waves, say the CIMI. It remains to be seen whether the more oppositional Russian emigrants will remain politically active abroad.
The survey reveals the widest range of political views and socio-economic characteristics of the new migrants, as well as large differences in their assessments of Russia's war against Ukraine, emphasizes Felix Kravacek. Given this diversity, "it seems unlikely that migrants will unite around a new idea uniting Russians abroad," the CIMI believes.
Nevertheless, it is not excluded that a common sense of identity may emerge among them. At the same time, different countries seem to attract different groups of Russian migrants - with visible differences in age, level of education or employment. In Georgia and Armenia, for example, there is a large share of young and well-educated migrants, many of whom are from St. Petersburg and Moscow and are employed in the IT sector. A significant number of them have opposition views and have previously participated in protests in Russia.
Armenia: good conditions for political activity against the Kremlin
In Armenia, where, according to official data, about 100,000 Russians live, the majority of respondents said that Russian citizens abroad should also protest against the regime in Moscow. Russians who have fled to Armenia have a stronger sense of responsibility for the political future of the Russian Federation (more than a third indicate this) than migrants in the other countries where the survey was conducted. The report also notes that Yerevan currently “offers relatively more favorable conditions for political action against Russia.”
Anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia
In Georgia, the majority of the 74,000 Russians living there, like those in Armenia, have a negative attitude towards the Russian president and the Russian army. They have no doubts about who is responsible for the war in Ukraine: two-thirds blame the Russian Federation - regardless of whether they arrived in Georgia before or after February 2022.
At the same time, Russians are viewed with suspicion there - especially younger Georgians. Some locals even accuse new migrants from Russia of contributing to the country’s high inflation. It is possible that this atmosphere of hostility or discrimination could mobilize a common group identity among Russian migrants there, the study authors note.
Turkey: Russian migrants with very different views
At the beginning of 2024, around 180,000 Russian citizens had a residence permit in Turkey. The diversity of political views among the new Russian migrants there is striking, but there is a clear pro-Kremlin trend, German sociologists have found. For example, opinions differ significantly when asked who they think is responsible for starting the war in Ukraine. Around 40%, mainly young people between the ages of 18 and 24, as well as those who arrived after February 2022, blame Russia for this.
About 60 percent of respondents - mostly people aged 35 and over - blame the US, Ukraine, NATO and the EU. At the same time, a significant part of Russians in Turkey have a very favorable attitude towards the Russian president and the Russian army and a negative attitude towards Western institutions, the CIMI survey clearly shows. The vast majority of respondents believe that Russians abroad should not protest against the war.
In Kazakhstan: They repeat the Russian state narrative
Also in Kazakhstan, where there are about 100,000 new Russian emigrants, a large part of them have a positive attitude towards President Putin and the Russian army and a predominantly negative attitude towards President Zelensky, NATO and the EU. They see the blame for the war more in the US and Ukraine than in Russia. In general, Russian citizens who fled to Kazakhstan echo the Russian state narrative, and two-thirds of them do not see a need for Russians abroad to protest.
Kyrgyzstan: the country of the youngest Russian migrants
In the first nine months of 2022 alone, 170,000 Russian citizens were registered in Kyrgyzstan. After the five countries studied, Kyrgyzstan has the youngest group of new Russian emigrants, with a large part of them employed in the IT sector. “They seem quite politicized, most of them have experience of participating in protests at home and claim to be following the events surrounding the war against Ukraine - at least at first,“ say the German sociologists. When asked who they blame for the war, about half of those surveyed in Kyrgyzstan point to Russia, about 20% to the United States, and nearly 15% to Ukraine.
The study's authors believe that both old and new Russian emigrants remain a major target of Kremlin propaganda, with many of them remaining "immersed in the Russian media environment." In view of this, it would be wise to "invest more in alternative Russian-language media and maintain opportunities for contact between migrants (from Russia. - Ed.) in different countries," recommends the Center for East European and International Studies in Berlin.
Author: Vladimir Dorokhov