At the very beginning of the month, defying an international arrest warrant, issued in the spring of 2023 by the International Criminal Court and as its troops continue their deadly "special operation" on Ukrainian soil, Russian President Vladimir Putin made an official trip to Mongolia. A quarter of a month earlier, in June, the head of the Kremlin was received with full honors in Pyongyang, another Asian capital that has recently become increasingly occupied by Moscow. From September 10 to 16, Russians and Chinese conducted joint military maneuvers in the Sea of Japan, while in Southeast Asia "Moscow diplomacy" increasingly present alongside the vacillating military junta and finally on the side of Kabul The Taliban Interim Government does not hide much of its "constructive exchange" with the Russian authorities. This is what Arnaud Dubien, director of the French-Russian Observatory in Moscow, says in an interview with the electronic publication Asialyst.
Afghanistan: contacts with the Taliban, but no official recognition
Asialyst: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan celebrated its first 3 years in power last month following the takeover of Kabul from the Taliban in the summer of 2021 and the chaotic withdrawal of the international coalition. How does Moscow view Afghanistan and its new masters today? What are her plans? Will Vladimir Putin's Russia be among the first nations to officially recognize the Taliban government?
Arnaud Dubien: The history of relations between the Kremlin and the Taliban is complicated, to say the least. Let us recall that Russia since 1997 and the previous fall of Kabul supported the Northern Alliance along with the Iranians and the Indians. Putin also provided political and symbolic support to the United States after September 11, 2001. However, the American withdrawal changed the situation, as did the Taliban's relative moderation in foreign policy. The analysis made by the Russian authorities is that the regime in Kabul no longer has any expansionist tendencies in former Soviet Central Asia and that it does not seek to destabilize the borders of the former USSR. This is actually the most important thing seen from Moscow, where there were concerns in late 2021 about hostility between the Taliban and Tajikistan. As for official recognition, I doubt Putin will take such a step anytime soon. Remember that the Taliban is still considered a terrorist organization in Russia. But this does not hinder the political and economic contacts between the two countries. Thus, a Taliban delegation attended the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg in June 2022.
Moscow and Tokyo "missed the boat"
Asialyst: Marked by more or less tense episodes since the end of World War II, relations between Japan, a strategic ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and Russia are not currently going through their most peaceful chapter. The invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine and the subsequent Japanese sanctions oblige. Is the dispute over the Kuril Islands (Northern Territories), over whose sovereignty Tokyo and Moscow are fighting, destined to remain at a dead end? How does Moscow traditionally perceive this territorial dispute with Tokyo and to what extent can it change its position on the subject? Does she see this as a particular lever to use on other issues for example?
Arnaud Dubien: After holding an in-depth dialogue with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Russia noted Japan's return to more traditional positions, that is, more aligned with those of the United States. Officially, the Kuril dispute has been closed since the July 2020 constitutional reform, making any revision of the borders virtually impossible. In reality, Moscow and Tokyo missed the boat in the 1990s. The hypothesis of the deal for "investment territories" no longer seems credible, especially after the outbreak of the Ukrainian war. The Kremlin has noted the tightening and formalization of military alliances in Asia around the US and believes this trend will continue. But he no doubt hopes that the prospect of further deepening his security cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang will prompt Seoul and Tokyo not to go too far in their support for Ukraine.
North Korea: Kremlin "sits behind the sanctions it voted for at the UN"
Asialyst: Since Vladimir Putin's visit to Pyongyang in June, not a week goes by without another demonstration of "closeness", solidarity or cooperation between North Korea and Russia. The North Korean regime misses no opportunity to highlight its growing cooperation with its Russian ally. In the Kremlin, as well as in the eyes of the Russian population, what is the value of this "partnership of circumstances", denounced by the international community?
Arnaud Dubien: I would say that for Russia today it is both a necessity, an opportunity and a win-win deal. The Russian army, now waging a war of attrition in Ukraine, needs ammunition and weapons, including long-range missiles and artillery. There are already deliveries, but we don't know their volume and we don't know if they are continuing. On the other hand, sending North Korean soldiers to Donbass is not a serious hypothesis, but it is a serious hypothesis about sending workers to restore the "new territories" of Russia. Moreover, the resumption of direct dialogue with Pyongyang sends a signal to Seoul, Tokyo, but also to Beijing, which was surprised by this rapprochement. The main question is about the compensations offered by Russia. The supply of food and agricultural products was discussed. The Western press also mentioned the provision of space technology. One thing is certain: the Kremlin sits behind the sanctions it votes for in the UN. But I doubt the Russians will do anything to risk exposing themselves to, say, South Korean arms supplies to Ukraine.
Burma: "A tempting target for Russia in search of new partners"
Asialyst: Back in power for 3 1/2 years in Burma, the junta of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is less and less committed to military action in the face of an armed resistance that is increasingly operational by the day and reaping success after success. The military has little support at the international level: it is essentially limited to Beijing and Moscow. Beyond the supply of equipment to the Burmese military and reciprocal diplomatic support, which is currently stable and highly valued, what is the current Russian-Burmese relationship good for Moscow?
Arnaud Dubien: The importance of Burma in Russian policy in Southeast Asia should not be overestimated. This seems like pure opportunism to me. Here is a weakened regime, ostracized by the West and undoubtedly eager to loosen China's grip. In other words, a tempting target for Russia itself in search of new partners. But she is not ready to invest much. Support for the UN, some arms supplies, maybe facilities for the Russian services there. Agriculture and tourism can also be subject to cooperation, but both countries start from afar. There are still no regular direct air connections between Russia and Burma.
South China Sea: Moscow's message to Washington
Asialyst: In this strategic maritime perimeter, which is tense to say the least, especially between China and the Philippines, backed by the Americans and competing daily for control of the Spratly Shoals, Sino-Russian cooperation is increasingly visible, with joint maneuvers , held in mid-July. Vladimir Putin visited Hanoi in June, a capital that is not exactly in sync with Beijing when it comes to the sovereignty of certain islands in the South China Sea. What is Moscow's priority interest in this complex and unstable region?
Arnaud Dubien: In recent years, the navies of Russia and China have increased the number of joint exercises. They have carried out such in particular in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, but also in Asia, which does not fail to worry the Americans, their allies, but also India - which also has regular maneuvers with Russia. So far, the Kremlin has been careful not to get drawn into territorial disputes in the region, especially since some of them involve friendly or close countries, such as Vietnam. But Russia is undoubtedly going further than it normally would. In this case, I think the message is more aimed at the United States. Essentially: "Look, your policy in Ukraine could lead to a de facto alliance with Beijing that will seriously hurt you in Asia."