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There can be no government this time. Here are the options:

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Oct 29, 2024 23:01 48

There can be no government this time. Here are the options:  - 1
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Comment from Veselin Stoynev:

In the 8-party 51st parliament, it is difficult to form a government because there are several basic factual positions with the status of political lemmas, similar to lemmas in mathematics, which frame what is even conceivable to happen:

1. There cannot be a government this time. Because another completely empty parliament and new elections will mean that almost all the current parliamentary parties will be swept away at the next vote by something new. That is, the failure of the 51st Parliament is a zero-sum game for those involved.

2. Cabinet is only possible with the first mandate. Because the winner of the elections refuses to support a second and third mandate if his fails, and in the previous parliament the second and third mandates were returned empty.

3. Management with the second mandate is impossible, because not only GERB excludes itself from it, but also PP-DB must exclude "Revival". and DPS-New Beginning. The remaining APS, BSP, ITN and MECH do not have an arithmetic majority.

4. A governing majority of a minimum of 121 deputies can only be composed of at least three parties, including GERB.

5. "Revival" cannot participate in the majority. (excluded from GERB) and MECH (excluding GERB and both DPS).

6. If DPS-New Beginning enters the majority, then PP-DB, APS, ITN and MECH are excluded from it (again self-excluded).

With these restrictions, three groups of options are outlined.

Option 1

The most possible coalitions are GERB-PP-DB-APS (125 MPs), GERB-PP-DB-BSP (126 MPs), GERB-PP-DB-ITN (124 MPs), larger quadruple combinations or a large quintet coalition GERB-PP-DB-APS-BSP-ITN, which would even have a qualified majority of 163 votes.

Option 2

There is also a theoretical possibility for a coalition without PP-DB and without Peevski, but with Dogan: GERB-APS-BSP-ITN (126 deputies). But then the question is whether it is easier for GERB to lose the New Beginning than PP-DB.

Option 3

The last option is for a GERB minority cabinet, which can even be single-party, because to pass, 62 votes in the parliament are enough, and GERB has 69. However, for this purpose, a broad passive majority of almost all the other parties to provide 121 or a little more deputies in the hall, so that the meeting can be regular, and with the vote of half plus one or a few more of those present, Borisov can form a one-party cabinet, which he can even head himself. However, this means that for all its actions thereafter, this cabinet relies on floating parliamentary majorities and can be removed at any moment, as long as a majority of 121 votes is collected (constitutionally, the government can be elected with even 62 votes, but for to be taken down, at least 121 are required).

What GERB offers

The main challenge for GERB to form a government is whether it can secure for its partner the second force PP-DB. Throughout the election campaign, the PP-DB insisted on an equidistant prime minister and three anti-corruption measures as a prerequisite for a cabinet, and Boyko Borisov insisted that in the event of a convincing result for his party, he would be prime minister and did not budge from his position already in several parliaments for a politically responsible government on a coalition basis .

For the figure of the prime minister, both formations can easily find an approximation. Already in the campaign, PP-DB parties corrected "equally distant" of "mutually acceptable" prime minister, which seems not only a more workable wording, but also does not necessarily exclude a political color of the prime minister. However, the coalition's categorical requests are that Borissov should not be prime minister. ITN is in the same position.

The GERB leader can easily give up the premiership, which he presents as a generous step towards understanding, while at the same time winning the other party's agreement to give up the non-partisan and expert profile of the head of the government and "raise" him. to an expert-political profile, in a figure like Rosen Zhelyazkov, for example.

From there on, it should be specified to what extent the government will resemble an open coalition with a well-deserved dominance of GERB as the clear winner of the elections and proportional participation with ministerial seats of the smaller partners in it - or will it look more like a program-expert cabinet with more distant participation, especially of PP-DB, in it. Whatever the configuration, however, publicly this government cannot help but resemble "Assembly-2", no matter how much the PP-DB politicians run away from these comparisons. They will have to find a more convincing communication with their voters, even if they are surprised to find that a large part of those who voted for them have already swallowed the prospect of a new "assembly".

The more important question is what GERB, as the lead negotiator, can provide PP-DB and ITN (because they are the two most likely coalition) as anti-corruption policies, so that they can legitimize their support for such a government . What's more, through them, the real emancipation of GERB from Peevski will be proven, and not simply with his non-participation in the government majority.

Smaller steps, but faster at the beginning

It is obvious that after the failure of the constitutional judicial reform and the rotation due to the regulatory bodies (in PP-DB's reading) these anti-corruption policies will now be less ambitious. But it is precisely when smaller steps are already relied upon that they can be started more easily and quickly at least. Therefore, GERB's offer for joint management may include consent to the implementation of the three anti-corruption measures contained in the Recovery and Resilience Plan, as well as the beginning of seeking consent for the election of a new Supreme Judicial Council, which will elect a new chief prosecutor and chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court. The current SJC, with a long-expired mandate, is preparing in mid-January to finalize the election of Borislav Sarafov as chief prosecutor, and the mandate of the chairman of the SAC, Georgi Cholakov, expires in three weeks.

And the very first step, which will show whether the ground is prepared for regular governance, will be the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly, because first on the agenda is the constitution of the parliament. If the election goes smoothly, without the old quarrels that the president was not necessarily supposed to be from the first political force, it will be a clear sign that normal negotiations for a government can be held at all.