Comment by Vesselin Stoynev:
Minutes before the start of the first session of the 51st parliament, Boyko Borisov proposed a governing formula for a quadruple coalition: GERB-PP-DB-BSP-ITN. Thus, he excluded the MRF-New Beginning, continuing his line "there is no good MRF", eliminating Dogan's APS on a par. And emphasized respectfully excluding "Vazrazhdane" - with the "foreign policy" argument "we are from different political families", and not because GERB, even without its membership in the EPP, has ideological incompatibility with Kostadin Kostadinov's party. Borisov also expressed his readiness to accept the PP-DB's cordon sanitaire around Delyan Peevski, supported in various versions by other parliamentary parties, but only as part of a coalition agreement for governance, headed by himself as prime minister. And this was the second condition after the cordon for a government - all three of his potential partners have long said that they do not want him as prime minister.
Is Borisov playing a double game
It is understandable that potential partners suspect that Peevski may be a behind-the-scenes factor behind the possible quadruple government or that he will only be temporarily out of the scheme (complicating the situation is the question of whether Peevski is truly undesirable for all of them, especially for the current BSP). The distrust is further fueled by Boyko Borisov's refusal to negotiate support for parliamentary speaker - the PP-DB insisted on anti-corruption commitments before this election. There are also doubts that Borisov wants to push his supposedly potential governing partners towards another majority, which is not only anti-Peevski, but also anti-GERB, by choosing another parliamentary speaker, which would actually free him from the burden of not being with Peevski.
And it seems that some of the opposing partners actually have such an attitude. PP-DB surprisingly, although formally valid (after Borisov did not seek binding support for consultations for its chairman), nominated its own candidacy for head of parliament in the person of Andrey Tsekov, who, on top of everything, received the same votes in the runoff as GERB candidate Raya Nazaryan. The procedure ended in vain and the "Vezhdi Rashidov" option is again on the agenda - this time with the current oldest MP Silvi Kirilov from ITN. Or it may try again with an unsuccessful candidate from the small formations - like Natalia Kiselova from the BSP. Either way, the PP-DB's counter-proposal of "parliamentary speaker" has been nullified - he is no longer GERB's liability, because Borisov blasted Nazaryan as a blank check, without paying any power-related fees for her election, except for the humiliation of complete isolation with her failure.
Are PP-DB playing a double game
If Borisov's strategy is to push his opponent partners towards an alternative majority in order to free himself from the burden of not being able to govern either without Peevski or in a minority cabinet with Peevski on his neck, then PP-DB's strategy also does not seem to be just "free from Peevski". A significant portion of PP-DB voters (without it being established through sociological surveys what part of their merged electorate exactly) do not support a coalition not only with Peevski, but also with Borisov. Therefore, the PP-DB's condition that Borisov be freed from Peevski also relies on the expected impossibility of this happening.
However, this pushes towards another impossibility - for collaboration with "Vazrazhdane", without which another majority outside of GERB-DPS-New Beginning is mathematically unthinkable. Moreover, its leader Kostadinov no longer says that for his party the only possible thing is to govern with "Vazrazhdane", but with the participation of "Vazrazhdane". And since the voters of PP-DB would not accept such a collaboration (probably even more vehemently than a coalition with GERB), the option for an alternative anti-GERB-Peevski majority would be such that it would not produce a government.
Is a non-governing majority with "Vazrazhdane" possible?
That is, this would be a majority in parliament that would work for some time, adopting anti-corruption laws and decisions, including blocking the election of Borislav Sarafov as prosecutor general, with a caretaker cabinet continuing to operate - the current one and the new one, after the parliamentary roulette has run out.
Such a non-governing majority will be strongly attacked by the GERB party, which will find in it the perfect excuse for its latest failure - to win elections and not govern. And the end result will again be early elections, in which after the outplay there can only be a smaller loser from both sides, and the only winner is a new political alternative that can reformat the entire political picture.
Can everyone win with the quadruple coalition
Therefore, it is far more reasonable for the two parties to overcome their otherwise well-founded deep mistrust and mutual suspicions in a hypocritical game aimed at escaping political responsibility for regular governance. And to seek, each for themselves, guarantees for joint governance precisely in the weakness of the opposing partner.
The fact that DPS-New Beginning is in complete isolation, and GERB has proposed a formula for governance, gives minimal guarantees to PP-DB and partners (who together have more MPs than GERB) that governance without heavy dependencies on Peevski is possible, at least at the start. The prospect of PP-DB turning out to be the culprit for new early elections - and after a non-governing coalition with "Vazrazhdane", in turn gives guarantees to GERB that its former partners have no other useful move than to remain like that again. It remains in the coalition agreement for Borisov to satisfy a significant part of the PP-DB's demands for an anti-corruption program and to cede the prime minister's position. Then the PP-DB's previous request for a mutually acceptable prime minister is logical to be reduced to a GERB candidate acceptable to them, because the first political force can hardly make a greater concession without this looking like a betrayal to its voters.
Thus, the winner of the elections will record an asset as the one who responsibly conceded, but within reasonable limits, in the name of the country, while the second and the others will gain an asset of formations that have regained the opportunity to achieve their program goals without sending the country to elections again, for which they have nothing much to hope for anyway.