The agreement reached to at least temporarily suspend the active military dimensions of the conflict between "Hezbollah" and Israel is a function of at least two circumstances.
The first is the heavy defeats that the Shiite group has received within the last few months, during which a significant part of the fighting resources of "Hezbollah" was destroyed (such as infrastructure and missile arsenal), a large percentage of its leadership was eliminated, and hence the ability to control and manage the organization was compromised. Despite the sustained ability of "Hezbollah" firing rockets and drones at Israel, which happened on a daily basis literally until the agreement came into effect earlier this morning, as well as resisting on the ground in direct clashes with the Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon, the Shiite group was in retreat mode. In all cases "Hezbollah" there was a greater need for a cessation of hostilities than was the case for Israel. It is also important that Iran has given the "green light" of the Lebanese organization in question to accept the temporary truce.
The second circumstance mediating the conclusion of the agreement is the pressure on Israel to cease its offensive against Lebanon. This understanding of the need to end the war is shared by both the outgoing administration of Joe Biden and the incoming administration of Donald Trump. Tel Aviv received confirmation of this directly from Mar-a-Lago, where Donald Trump, who had just won the US presidential election, received Ron Dermer, Israel's minister of strategic affairs close to Benjamin Netanyahu, specially sent by the prime minister of the Middle Eastern country. According to media reports, at the meeting in question, the Republican stated that he would prefer that commitments related to the conflict in Lebanon not appear on the agenda of his administration. Hence the subsequent information that Trump's team is satisfied with the results of the negotiations between the US/France and Lebanon regarding the cessation of hostilities between "Hezbollah" and Israel.
The conclusion of the agreement in question shows that "Hezbollah" was forced to make two difficult compromises.
One is to cease hostilities, despite the continued offensive of the Israel Defense Forces against "Hamas" in the Gaza Strip. The latter is significant because the Shiite group generally associated its participation in the war with that of "Hamas" (in the words of the now-eliminated former head of the Shiite organization, Hassan Nasrallah, "whatever "Hamas" accepts, we will also accept"). Hence "Hezbollah" had set as a condition for the termination of its participation in the conflict the cessation of hostilities by Israel against "Hamas". However, the conclusion of this agreement showed that "Hezbollah" may have gone in with "Hamas" in the war, but is ready to get out of it before the Sunni terrorist organization.
The second compromise of "Hezbollah" was associated with the withdrawal of the organization's fighters north of the river. Litany, which follows the decisions of UN Resolution 1701 of 2006. In parallel, the remaining military infrastructure of "Hezbollah" in South Lebanon will have to be destroyed, and the territory in question - controlled by the Lebanese armed forces and UN peacekeeping forces. If the mentioned resolution is also the framework of the current agreement, then "Hezbollah" will have to be disarmed as well, whether north or south of the river. Litany.
The truly complex and murky dimension of the concluded agreement, the text of which has not yet been publicly announced, however, concerns an element that most likely does not appear in the text of the agreement. It is Israel's right to strike Hezbollah targets if Tel Aviv deems the Shiite organization to be in violation of the accords. Without being in the agreement document, such a right was apparently given by Washington to Tel Aviv in a parallel document. It is not clear under what conditions or at what range Israel will be able to carry out such strikes (for example, will all Hezbollah positions be a legitimate target of Tel Aviv or only those located south of the Litani River ). Otherwise, it is likely that according to the agreement, the US and France will be tasked with monitoring possible violations (that is, Washington and Paris will be the arbiter), and their sanctioning will be delegated to the Lebanese Armed Forces (that is, the regular army of Beirut will be the executor).
It is the latter, however, that reveals the compromises that, along with "Hezbollah", Israel had to make as well. The idea that the Lebanese Armed Forces would be tasked with controlling (and disarming!) Hezbollah has proven to be a non-working solution given the growth of Hezbollah. after the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Then, as a consequence of the mentioned UN Resolution 1701, the Shiite organization also had to withdraw to the north of the river. Litanies and surrender their weapons; "Hezbollah" did neither. The US idea in this case is that this time the Shiite organization is dramatically weakened and this will motivate it to act according to the rules. Israel's right to strike targets of the group, however, shows that Tel Aviv does not share this American optimism.
The withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from southern Lebanon, which must take place within the 60-day period provided for in the agreement, is also not universally accepted in Tel Aviv. The latter means that this time, unlike at the end of the First Lebanon War until 2000, Israel will not control a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Of course, if it had come to the latter, it would have been in violation of Resolution 1701. The agreement does not mean that Israeli citizens from the northern parts of the country will be able to immediately return to their homes, which was announced as the main goal of Tel Aviv during the invasion of the Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon. In fact, the cessation of hostilities between "Hezbollah" and Israel is most sharply criticized precisely among the displaced Israeli citizens from the border areas. Their argument is that by withdrawing its armed forces, Tel Aviv is returning to the initial phase of the conflict, delegating its security to foreign hands. And in general, the main consideration in Israel is that "Hezbollah" he will bury his head in the sand and wait for better times. Given the asymmetry in power, to win, the Shiite organization must simply survive, and this agreement gives it just that: time and air.
If the agreement for at least a temporary cessation of the conflict between "Hezbollah" and Israel was laboriously and difficultly attained, its violation may very easily occur. Every strike by Israel on "Hezbollah" henceforth, it can be interpreted by the latter as contrary to the agreement specifically and as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty in general, insofar as the Shia group is not a party to the parallel agreements signed between Tel Aviv and Washington. Any attempt to transit weapons or their assembly elements, with which Iran may try to start the process of rebuilding Hezbollah's missile stockpile, will also be cited by Israel as a violation of the agreements reached.
The only thing that can guarantee the relative durability of the cold peace between them is the weakness of "Hezbollah" and the Trump administration's political pressure on Israel. This formula will not resolve the conflict between them, but it will achieve the realistically possible - it will channel the tension in foreseeable directions and contain it within acceptable limits. And this is not a small thing, since borders in the region are easily crossed.