Igor YUSHKOV, energy expert
Negotiations between Russia and the US with Ukraine on the issue of cessation of hostilities remain central to world politics. In addition to the issue of the terms of the ceasefire, a separate economic track has emerged.
Washington continues to insist that Ukraine must compensate the US for the costs of previously provided military and financial assistance. First attempt to sign a deal "for rare earth metals" was interrupted by the scandalous conversation between Zelensky and Trump at the White House on February 28.
After the Trump team put pressure on Kiev, the Ukrainian leadership became more accommodating. But the deal proposed by the United States also changed, and not in favor of Ukraine. Now we are talking not only and perhaps not so much about rare earth metals (probably the American leadership received information about the lack of reserves of most of the declared elements on Ukrainian territory), but about control over transport and energy infrastructure.
Washington is paying attention to those objects that can generate profit here and now. The list of such includes nuclear power plants. Three nuclear power plants remain on the territory of Ukraine: Rivne, Khmelnytsky and Yuzhnoukrainsk. It would be beneficial for the United States to gain control over them. But there are nuances... Today, these nuclear power plants are the main production facilities of Ukraine and form the basis of the entire energy sector of the country. However, the price of electricity on the domestic Ukrainian market is low.
Therefore, in order to increase the profitability of owning such plants, the new owners will lobby for higher prices. It is already becoming clear why Kiev should hand over the nuclear power plant to the United States: it is stated that this will ensure their safety - Russia, in their opinion, will not dare to fire at American property. This is stated in a joint statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Walz, released after telephone conversations between Trump and Zelensky on March 19.
However, throughout the entire Special Military Operation, Russia did not attack the nuclear power plant and its associated infrastructure, so as not to provoke a nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, the reference to security is only a weak attempt to explain the planned division of Ukrainian state assets. Another option is to export electricity from nuclear power plants to Europe, where electricity prices are already quite high. But then we will have to stop supplying electricity to Ukrainian consumers, since now there is nothing to replace nuclear power plants with - the fuel energy sector is heavily "thinned" by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, exports are possible only in small quantities and after the repair of a number of fuel power plants.
The main intrigue was the topic of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Since 2022, this station has been under Russian control and is being managed by Rosatom. The Zaporizhzhia NPP is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe: it consists of 6 VVER-1000 reactors. Due to shelling by the Ukrainian military on the territory of the station and the network infrastructure, all reactors were "frozen". The risk was that if the power lines supplying the plant were damaged and the backup diesel generators ran out of fuel, the reactor cooling system would shut down and the accident that happened at Fukushima in Japan could be repeated.
It would be profitable for Ukraine to offer the United States to take over the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, since the Ukrainians do not control it anyway. And so it would be possible to try to spoil relations between Moscow and Washington. Russia would insist that the plant belongs to Rosatom and is located on Russian territory, and all negotiations about its operation should be conducted by the United States with the Kremlin. But it would also be unprofitable for Russia to refuse cooperation with the Americans on the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant.
The options for interaction may vary. For example, the discussion may not be about American structures owning the plant, but about creating a joint venture to sell electricity to Ukrainian consumers. There are a number of factors that speak in favor of possible cooperation.
First, in today's reality it is extremely difficult to launch the Zaporozhye NPP. The threat of shelling its infrastructure remains. And here the principle that the American side is telling Ukraine about can be used: the presence of a US company will prevent shelling. In this case, it can work, because Kiev is still carrying out these shellings.
Secondly, the launch of the Zaporizhzhia NPP at full capacity is risky due to the fact that in June 2023, Ukraine blew up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, which led to the liquidation of the reservoir of the same name. The Zaporizhzhia NPP has its own cooling pool, but it has always been connected to the Kakhovka reservoir, and there has never been a risk of water shortage. Now, in order to supply the cooling reservoir of the station with water, it is necessary to fundamentally reconstruct the water intake system. To achieve this, it is necessary to ensure the safety of the construction and operation of this infrastructure. Or the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant itself must be restored. However, then the question of funding sources will arise. The parties will obviously argue: who needs the restoration of the normal operation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP more? He should provide the main amount of money.
It would be beneficial for Russia to put at least a few reactors into operation. This would allow it to supply consumers in the "new regions", as well as to create reserves for the energy system of the entire south of the country, including Crimea. In addition, if the Kakhovka reservoir is restored, the North Crimean Canal will begin to operate, since its beginning is located next to the destroyed hydroelectric power station. Now there is practically no reservoir, so the canal needed by the Kherson region and Crimea has dried up.
There are also obstacles to possible agreements between Russia and the United States on the Zaporozhye NPP. First, at the stage of political contacts, Washington may set unacceptable conditions - to transfer the nuclear power plant to the ownership of American structures. Second, the American state itself does not own nuclear power plants even on its own territory. The owners of nuclear power plants are commercial companies. Business may be afraid of such a risky project as the Zaporizhzhia NPP, where there are political, technical and economic risks.
The third obstacle may be precisely the technical and economic side. The first two power units of the Zaporizhzhia NPP were supposed to end their service life in 2025, the third - in 2027, the fourth - in 2028, and the fifth - in 2030. All of them have already gone through the procedure for extending the service life. Even taking into account the postponement of the specified dates by several years (since 2022, they have all been shut down), the problem of the obsolescence of the units remains.
The owner of the plant will have to conduct a large-scale study of the technical condition of each power unit and decide whether to carry out expensive repair procedures to extend the service life or decommission them. The sixth power unit will reach the end of its service life in 2026, but has not yet undergone an initial extension of its service life, so it can safely remain in operation for another ten years.
Thus, it is politically important for Russia to demonstrate full control over the station, sending a signal to both Ukraine and the United States that it does not allow the possibility of revising the results of Russia's territorial gains. At the same time, it is appropriate to demonstrate readiness to reach agreements on mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
Ultimately, for Trump, who is business-minded, it is important to conclude a deal with a large-scale facility to show his critics that he has achieved a lot in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. And Russia may share the above risks. Which side of the scale will turn out to be heavier depends on the details of the negotiations.