More than three years of war in Ukraine and an avalanche of analyses published in the international press in an attempt to predict the outcome of the conflict and reveal Vladimir Putin's intentions. The Russian president, never afraid of provocations, said on June 20 that he did not rule out the capture of the Ukrainian city of Sumy by his troops. Kiev called this "contempt" for the peace process. "I consider Russians and Ukrainians to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours," added Vladimir Putin.
Anastasia Edel, author of "Russia: Putin's Playground" (2016), refuses to make predictions. However, she offers valuable historical and cultural insights into the mechanisms of Russian power and the motivations of the man who has held the reins of the Kremlin for a quarter of a century.
In an interview with the French newspaper L'Express, this Russian-American writer and social historian, who grew up in the Soviet Union and has appeared in Foreign Policy, The New York Times, and The Atlantic, takes an uncompromising look at Putin’s Russia and warns Westerners against the temptation to attribute meticulous strategy to the Russian autocrat.
In her eyes, the Russian leader is not a chess grandmaster but rather a "inveterate gambler". "Today, Putin has linked his political survival - which in Russia often means his physical survival - to the success of his gamble in Ukraine", she notes, while emphasizing that Russia, "despite the image of strength it seeks to project, remains an unstable state".
With a certain nostalgia for Russia in the 1990s, "a period full of hope, when the country had a real chance to establish itself in Europe", Anastasia Edel predicts a rather mediocre place for her president in the history books: "If he leaves anything behind, it will be that he buried this European aspiration under the rubble left by Russian missiles in Ukraine."
L'EXPRESS: In your opinion, "despite being destructive, Putin is not a great strategist, but an opportunist. He was dealt bad cards, but he plays like he has a "Royal Jackpot." Explain that to us...
ANASTASIA EDEL: If we look at the long term and consider the fact that he has been in power for 25 years, what I think is emerging is a pattern of constant improvisation to ensure his survival. His propaganda likes to portray him as a brilliant strategist, a chess master who foresees everything. But in reality, it is mostly a series of opportunistic gambles.
Some of these most visible gambles, the ones with the biggest consequences, succeed: the annexation of Crimea, the interference in American and Western elections, the invasion of Ukraine. Others fail, and there are some that we never hear about. But I see them mostly as reactions to circumstances, not as a well-defined strategic plan. I think this is partly explained by economic, geographical and historical factors, but also by a lack of vision. Because in his world, as Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, once said: "Without Putin, there would be no Russia."
Therefore, he cannot imagine Russia without him, nor himself without power. And so, whatever he does, one must always ask to what extent it serves his main goal: to remain in power indefinitely.
L'EXPRESS: In this respect, he has been quite successful, having been in power for a quarter of a century...
A. EDEL: For a Russian autocrat, this is not so unusual. He has complete control over the system. From the very beginning of his rise, he established what is now called the "vertical of power" - a complex expression invented by propaganda to describe an old Russian model: that of personal power centered around one man, with no other institution besides him. It is a form of personalized autocracy. He perfectly understands how to write, through actions, a manual for democratic subversion. I would not call it a modern democracy, because Russia was not really a modern democracy when he came to power, but it was moving towards it.
I was there, I remember it very well. After decades of Soviet rule, this absurdity that was the USSR began to crumble, and suddenly we felt a huge surge of freedom. In any case, for people of my generation, who were then in their twenties, it was something real. The democratic aspirations existed, they were sincere. But all this remained fragile, and the situation could also turn in the other direction.
Unfortunately, with Putin's arrival, it was easier to push back this nascent democracy than if the context had been more stable. And he managed to develop an extremely effective guide to neutralizing the opposing forces, presenting them as some kind of terrorists, individuals who had to be politically eliminated.
L'EXPRESS: Reading what you wrote, it seems that Vladimir Putin was driven in his crusade against the West not so much by ideology as by the desire to strengthen his personal power...
A. EDEL: You are absolutely right. And that is precisely what makes today's Russia so unique: it actually has no ideology. The desire to be "great" is not an ideology. No matter how hard one tries to present it as an ideology, there must be a basis, basic ideas that explain, for example, why we live the way we do. In Soviet society, this was very clear: we saw ourselves as a "beacon of humanity", even if we had nothing to eat. We thought we were "better than others" because we were supposedly a progressive and just society. Of course, this wasn't true, but by repeating it over and over again, we eventually either believed it, or at least understood that this was the system we lived in. And we obeyed.
Putin tried to develop some uniquely Russian ideology. Towards the end of his second term, he began to promote this idea, positioning Russia in opposition to the West, presenting it as a "civilizational state". But these are all big words that in reality mean little to the average Russian. It is not surprising, then, that in his search for such an ideology he turned to World War II, or rather to what Russians call the Great Patriotic War.
He relied on the victory over the Nazis because it is the only historical element that still resonates with many. Russia, or rather the USSR as a whole, including Ukraine and other republics, paid a high price. But Putin misrepresented this victory as a victory solely for the Russian people. When he boasts that Russia defeated Nazi Germany, he forgets that the Ukrainians played the main role. It was their territory that was occupied by German troops, it was they who blew up German trains and led significant resistance behind enemy lines.
In this way, he has turned an event of more than half a century ago into the foundation of this "new Russia", erecting a cult of victory not only over the Nazis but also over the West. Ultimately, I would say that the only ideology he really implements is this systematic opposition to the West, combined with the presentation of Russia as an independent civilization. That is his current position. And in reality, it is nothing more than revanchism. That is the real ideology. Nothing else.
L'EXPRESS: Has he always perceived the West as an enemy? You seem to be implying that the "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine marked a decisive turning point...
A. EDEL: Putin remains marked by his past in the KGB, and we should not lose sight of the fact that the main mission of this body was to combat dissent, whether internal or external. It was about monitoring its own citizens as well as enemies of the state. During the Soviet era, when he - and I, for that matter - grew up, the West was a sworn enemy. All the attention was focused on America. And even as I was growing up, at least up to a certain age, I was convinced that life would be perfect if only the West would stop trying to undermine us. I would ask myself questions like: Why would the Americans want to drop a nuclear bomb on us? That's how the information bubble works, and that's how propaganda works: it shapes your worldview.
So I think that's his basic position. He was trained to see the West as the adversary. Of course, his views probably evolved over time, but deep down, that's the default option, the easiest to activate. When things don't go the way you want, you look for someone to blame. And the most obvious enemy - the one against whom all the Soviet propaganda is built - is the West.
There's also the fact that Russia has tried to integrate into Europe to some extent, but without ever really wanting to accept its rules. Very early on, Putin showed authoritarian tendencies that were not well received by Western democratic leaders. He was not openly rejected, but he was not welcomed with open arms either. He eventually concluded that he had more to gain by becoming an adversary of the West than by trying to become its friend or European partner, which he could never truly be, since he refused to play by Western rules.
L'EXPRESS: You claim that "Putin's interference in Western affairs is not an end in itself, but a means to eliminate threats to his regime". What threats are you talking about?
A. EDEL: Today, Putin has tied his political survival - which in Russia often means his physical survival - to the success of his adventure in Ukraine. His entire regime now depends on it. He has finally found his "great national idea": war. Russia seems to have been created for this. The ideology is triggered because the homeland must be defended. But traditionally, this kind of gamble can also backfire. And there is nothing more dangerous for a Russian autocrat than losing a war.
Most of the historical concessions made by Russian tsars were wrung out after military defeats, such as Nicholas II's defeat by Japan. Conversely, what really established Russia among the European powers was the victory over Sweden in the Great Northern War, which consolidated Peter the Great's power. So Putin's greatest fear is actually losing that war. Because if that happens, what's left for him?
L'EXPRESS: "Putin's popularity ratings may be high, but in Russia flattery can turn into rebellion without warning", you write. Do you really think such a turn is possible?
A. EDEL: As for approval ratings, in every war there is what is called the "flag effect". And unfortunately, it works in the context of the Russian state. Propaganda is effective. In my opinion, this is one of Russia's main strategic advantages: its ability to manipulate minds, to make you believe that white is black and vice versa. And sooner or later, people end up believing it. But Russia, despite the image of strength it seeks to project, remains an unstable state.
It is a personalized autocracy, without a real institutional counterforce capable of absorbing shocks, unlike European countries that have the history and structure to deal with crises. In Russia, everything rests on a single figure: the master of the Kremlin. So things can change very quickly.
The problem is that Putin has bet too much. He knows that if this bet fails, the entire military machine he has restarted... What can he do with it? For now, he is maintaining a false sense of unity, spreading the idea that Russians are defending their homeland, not bombing peaceful cities and villages. But what will happen to all these veterans, all these men returning from the front? And what will be left after the generous payments made to fighters in the Ukrainian war stop? Nothing but the misery of before.
L'EXPRESS: What mark will Vladimir Putin leave on Russian history?
A. EDEL: That is precisely his obsession: to leave a lasting mark on Russian history. It is easy to understand what kind of leader he would like us to remember by the historical figures he highlights. And it is clear that under his rule Stalin is experiencing a real renaissance. For me, this is simply unthinkable, as someone who experienced perestroika and glasnost, the period when Stalin's crimes against the Russian people were beginning to be revealed. And today we are witnessing a kind of rehabilitation.
It seems obvious to me that the mark Putin wants to leave is that of the man who discovered and restored "Great Russia", something like Peter the Great. Moreover, there is a whole symbolism behind this: a constant return to the mythologized vision of a medieval proto-Slavic state, which he calls the cradle of Russia. He seeks to position himself as a kind of "Vladimir the Great". His ambition is to restore Russia in the image of the old empire, bringing the former Soviet republics back into his orbit. We will have to see how history will judge him, and that is another matter entirely.
When I think back to Russia in the 1990s, a period full of hope, when the country had a real chance to establish itself in Europe, I feel a deep sadness. Russia has always dreamed of Europe, often had a sincere desire for it, but has consistently acted contrary to that desire. If Putin has left any trace, it will be that he has buried this European aspiration under the rubble left by Russian missiles in Ukraine. The division he created between Russia and the West will undoubtedly remain one of the main markers of his historical legacy.
But there is also - and this is something very personal - the destruction of the image of Russia as a great cultural entity. Because you cannot separate culture from the actions of a nation. Today, when I reread the books I admired, I see them differently. Whether it's Tolstoy, Dostoevsky... works that we all loved. Even "War and Peace", for example.
Sometimes we closed our eyes to certain aspects, thinking: "Yes, well, these are the peculiarities of Russia, the circumstances of the time." But today the spotlight is relentless. We have to look at this war in Ukraine and say: it may not be directly inspired by Chekhov or Tolstoy, but it is part of something, it has roots. And this image of Russia that we still had during the Sochi Olympics, this grand vision of a mysterious country, the troika, hovering over the world, the bearer of genius and culture... That is over. And that will also be part of its legacy.
L'EXPRESS: Do the events in Iran - Russia's traditional ally - and the weakening, if not the elimination of the regime, pose a threat to Putin?
A. EDEL: It's hard to say. Russia has long been thought to have established its own axis, particularly with North Korea and, of course, Iran, whose involvement in the war in Ukraine, notably through the supply of drones, is well known. In theory, therefore, the weakening or disappearance of the Iranian regime would be a serious blow to Moscow. But in reality, the impact could be more ambiguous. If tensions in the Middle East raise oil prices, this could actually work in Putin's favor. There is nothing that Russians follow more closely than the price of a barrel of oil. They know very well how much their standard of living depends on it. When I lived there, everyone followed the dollar-ruble exchange rate. Today, the price of oil serves as a barometer.
L'EXPRESS: You grew up in the Soviet Union. Now you live in the United States. What do you think of the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump and the admiration that the latter seems to have for the former?
A. EDEL: First, for Trump, Putin embodies the image of a strong and powerful leader, a figure that Trump himself aspires to be. And that probably says a lot more about Trump than he would like to admit. He sees Putin as someone who has eliminated all resistance, who has absolute power, and who rules the Russian system without question. For Trump, power is understood primarily as a form of dominance, not as a balance or accountability.
This largely fuels his fascination with Putin. Second, Putin has the edge when it comes to democratic subversion. He has developed a real manual for sliding a democratic or semi-democratic system into a completely autocratic and personalized regime. Many of the techniques developed by his political technocrats are now being exported to the West. He acts as a kind of more experienced comrade, a mentor, who shows how it's done. And I think there's a kind of admiration for these methods in Trump.
Third, Putin is a master manipulator. He knows how to influence people. After all, he comes from an institution whose primary mission has been precisely to manipulate public opinion and neutralize any form of democratic expression. Putin knows exactly how to approach Trump, which strings to pull, which buttons to push to get the reaction he wants.
L'EXPRESS: Censorship, deployment of the National Guard, hunting down opponents... Some fear an authoritarian turn by Donald Trump. Do you see any elements that resemble the system introduced by Vladimir Putin in Russia?
A. EDEL: Some trends are frankly worrying. For example, as a Californian, I see on the local news that the National Guard is deployed in Los Angeles, that a state senator is handcuffed by federal agents, or that a Democratic candidate for mayor of New York is arrested while trying to escort someone to immigration court. It’s like reading Russian news from the early Putin era. So there are clear parallels in the attempts to consolidate power and instrumentalize the military.
Despite these parallels, I also have to remind myself—perhaps to preserve my sanity—that America is not Russia. Not because “it could never happen here,” but because it’s always dangerous to apply historical precedent to another context. Still, for someone who believes in democracy, not personalized, militarized power, these are particularly troubling times living in the United States.